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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Racial disparities persist in the criminal justice system today, reflected both in the
disproportionate number of Blacks currently incarcerated as well as differential
sentencing in crimes ranging from drug-related offenses to murder. Although racial bias
enters into the criminal justice system at many different levels (e.g., police harassment,
differential charges filed, legal representation, etc.), one area that has received
considerable attention (including the focus of this study) is juror decision-making.
Research in this area has provided fairly consistent evidence of bias in juror decisionmaking. Specifically, when the race of the juror, defendant and victim are examined
together, discriminatory patterns in decision-making emerge. For example, jurors are
significantly more likely to vote in favor of a defendant's guilt when the defendant is a
different race than the juror, while the victim is the same race (Miller & Hewitt, 1978;
Ugwuebu, 1976; Wuensch, Campbell, Kesler, & Moore, 2002).
Research in the area of discriminatory jury decision-making has focused on two
broad areas: the role of racism and the role of eyewitness identification. These areas will
be examined in some detail in the proceeding sections concluding with the proposed
research question for this study.
Modern Racism
Research on biased juror decision-making has revealed that discrimination is not
always displayed in a straightforward pattern. That is, societal norms and expectations
1

have changed over time. Overtly racist attitudes and opinions are no longer acceptable in
many settings. However, racist beliefs are often expressed in more subtle and indirect
forms. This covert racism is referred to as modern racism, and is usually expressed when
norms and guidelines are ambiguous and Whites are able to rationalize their bias using
factors other than race in a given situation (Dovidio, Smith, Donnella, & Gaertner, 1997;
McConahay & Hough, 1976, Pfeifer & Bernstein, 2003). It is important to understand
modern racism when conducting race-related research on juror decision-making in order
to appropriately design a study that will detect more subtle biases in decision-making.
Dovidio, Smith, Donnella and Gaertner (1997) designed a study that examined the
relationship between more traditional racist attitudes and modern racist beliefs in White
jurors' recommendations for capital sentencing of Black and White offenders convicted
of murder. Participants first completed a scale assessing their current racial attitudes, and
then read one of two trial summaries. In one version, the race of the defendant was
White, and in the other, the defendant was Black. The summary described an actual case
in which one White police officer was murdered and another was wounded while
attempting to make an arrest following an armed robbery. Mock jurors were told that the
defendant was found guilty of all the crimes for which he was accused. Next,
participants watched a video recording that portrayed the opinions of five confederate
mock jurors (participants were led to believe that the videotaped individuals had
previously participated in the study) regarding sentencing in this case. Each videotaped
"juror" advocated the death penalty for the defendant and provided reasons for their
decision. Participants were shown one of two versions of the videotapes. The scripted
reasons that each videotaped confederate juror provided in support of capital punishment
2

were identical in both versions of the tape. The two tapes differed in that the second juror
in one version of the tape was a White male, and in the other version, the second juror
was a Black male. Participants then provided their reasons for their decision.
Dovidio et al. (1997) found that participants who demonstrated high levels of
prejudice on the racial attitudes scale, showed a straightforward pattern of bias toward
Black defendants. That is, they gave the Black defendant a stronger recommendation for
the death penalty than the White defendant. In contrast, participants that showed a low
level of prejudice on the racial attitudes scale demonstrated a more complicated pattern.
That is, low prejudice scoring Whites gave the strongest recommendations against the
death penalty when the defendant was Black and all of the jurors endorsing the death
penalty were White. However, when the defendant was Black and there was a Black
juror advocating the death penalty, low prejudice scoring participants were more likely to
recommend the death penalty for the Black defendant than for the White defendant.
Racial composition of the jury advocating the death penalty did not affect
recommendations when the defendant was White. The pattern demonstrated by the low
prejudice scoring participants is consistent with modern racism. That is, without
justification, the low prejudice scoring participants did not demonstrate a pattern of
biased sentencing. However, the presence of a Black juror advocating the death penalty
appears to have provided enough justification for low prejudice scoring participants to
demonstrate a bias in sentencing. Other studies have also demonstrated a similar pattern
of support for modern racism (e.g., Hill & Pfeifer, 1992; Pfeifer & Bernstein, 2003;
Pfeifer & Ogloff, 1991; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000).

3

Role of Eyewitness Identification
In addition to the race of the defendant and victim leading to biased decisionmaking, jurors may also be unduly influenced by evidence or factors introduced at trial
that are not completely understood. Specifically, there is consistent evidence that
suggests that jurors tend to over believe eyewitness identification testimony; despite
numerous studies that have demonstrated its unreliability (e.g., Kassin, Ellsworth, &
Smith, 1994; Malpass & Kravitz, 1987; etc.). Furthermore, many jurors believe that they
can determine whether an eyewitness is accurate based on inappropriate cues or a
misguided "common sense." As a result, several approaches to reducing this over belief
have been proposed.
In 1996 the National Institute of Justice reported that 28 convicted felons were
exonerated by DNA evidence after varying numbers of years in prison. In all of these
cases, there was one or more false eyewitness identifications (Connors, Lundregan,
Miller, & McEwen, 1996). By 2000, the number of DNA exonerated cases reached 62
(including 8 individuals who had been sentenced to death). Fifty-two of these cases
contained identifications from 77 confident but mistaken eyewitnesses (Scheck, Neufel,
& Dwyer, 2000). In an earlier study of approximately 500 felony cases that led to
convictions that were later overturned, researchers found that incorrect eyewitness
identifications contributed to wrongful convictions in 60% of the cases (Huff, Rattner, &
Sagrin, 1986).
One of the first and most pivotal studies that first illustrated jurors' tendency to
over believe eyewitness identification testimony was conducted by Elizabeth Loftus in
1974. Participants or mock jurors in the study read one of three summaries of a trial
4

involving a murder-robbery. In one condition, no eyewitness testified and the evidence
presented to the jurors was solely circumstantial. In the second condition, in addition to
the circumstantial evidence, there was an eyewitness identification presented to the
jurors. Finally, in the third condition, as in the second condition, there was both
circumstantial evidence and an eyewitness identification; however, the jurors also heard
expert testimony that was intended to discredit the eyewitness (The expert testified that
the eyewitness had poor vision (20/400), had not been wearing his glasses the day of the
crime, and therefore, would have been unable to identify the defendant from where he
stood.). Loftus found that 18% of the mock jurors voted guilty in the first condition
(when there was no eyewitness identification) and 72% of the mock jurors voted guilty
when a single eyewitness was added in the second condition. However, after the
eyewitness was discredited in the third condition, the conviction rate only dropped to
68%, illustrating that the eyewitness failed to be discredited even after the jurors learned
that the witness would have been unable to identify the defendant from where he stood.
Although attempts at replicating this study have failed (Elliott, 1993; Hatvany & Strack,
1980; Kennedy & Haygood, 1992; Whitley, 1987), this was one of the first studies that
highlighted the powerful influence that eyewitness testimony has on jurors. Later studies
have demonstrated that jurors tend to overestimate the accuracy rates of eyewitnesses
(Brigham & Bothwell, 1983) and that jurors tend to falsely believe that they can
determine when eyewitnesses are accurate based on inappropriate cues (Thomson, 1988).

5

Approach to Reducing Jurors' Over Belief of Eyewitness Identification
One proposed solution is to improve the means by which eyewitness
identifications are obtained by focusing on systemic variables, such as lineup
construction. However, as in any systemic change, this is a longer-term approach that
may take many years to implement. A second proposed solution is to have judges
provide cautionary instructions to juries about the factors that affect the reliability of
eyewitness identification. However, the effectiveness of these instructions appear to be
limited (Cutler, Dexter, & Penrod, 1990; Katzev & Wishart, 1985) and revised
instructions that have demonstrated the greatest effectiveness in reducing juror over
belief of eyewitnesses are inadmissible in most courts because they have been deemed to
bias the jury in favor of the defense (Greene, 1988). A third proposed solution and the
focus of this study involves using psychological expert testimony. A psychological
expert testifies about the factors that influence the accuracy and reliability of eyewitness
identifications, with the goal of clearing misconceptions and helping jurors make
informed decisions. While there have been concerns raised by both the legal and
psychological communities regarding the potential bias in favor of the defense that may
occur with the use of psychological expert testimony, there is research evidence to
suggest that this fear is unfounded. In fact, the limited research that has examined the
effect that expert testimony has on juror decision-making has found jurors' sensitivity to
factors influencing eyewitness memory is increased (Cutler, Penrod, & Dexter, 1989) and
their reliance on eyewitness testimony alone is reduced (Hosch, Beck, & Mclntyre,
1980). Furthermore, jurors do not see the eyewitness as any more or less credible as a
function of the expert testimony (Cutler, Penrod, & Dexter, 1989; Hosch, Beck, &
6

Mclntyre, 1980) and juror belief of the eyewitness is not reduced to a level that is
consistent with no eyewitness at all (Culter, Penrod, & Dexter, 1989; Fox & Walters,
1986; Hosch, Beck, & Mclntyre, 1980). Instead, there is evidence to suggest that jurors
are able to incorporate the information learned from the psychological expert testimony
and better evaluate the accuracy of the eyewitness identification on research-based
factors rather than on misconceptions.
While there is a substantial body of research on the influence of victim,
defendant, and juror characteristics on juror decision-making, there is little research that
explores the influence of expert witness characteristics on this process. The little
research that has been conducted that explores the impact of expert characteristics
pertains primarily to attorneys. However, if the race of the victim, defendant and juror
play an important role in juror decision-making, it may be reasonable to expect that the
race of other people involved in the trial may also be influential in that process. A
common model of information processing proposes that if jurors (or any information
receiver) are overloaded with information (which is not uncommon in a trial that
becomes saturated with details) or is unmotivated to attend to a message, may process
information through a peripheral route (rather than a central route) (Petty, Cacioppo, &
Goldman 1981). If peripheral processing occurs, superficial characteristics such as the
race of the person delivering the message, rather than the content, may influence the
juror's assessment of the information.
The few studies that have explored the influence that expert race has on juror
decision-making have yielded mixed results. Some studies suggest that White jurors are
more likely to find a defendant guilty when represented by a Black defense attorney
7

rather than a White defense attorney (Cohen & Peterson, 1981) and view same race
attorneys as being more honest than different race attorneys (Mixon, Foley & Orme,
1995). Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that White jurors are more likely to find
a defendant guilty when racial arguments are used as part of a defense (Boliver, 1999).
However, there are other studies that suggest that the race of an expert witness has no
effect on either the perception of the expert or the expert's message (Memon & Shuman,
1998; Miyatake, 1999).
Goal of Present Study
The goal of the present study is to explore the relationship between defendant
race, psychological expert witness race, and racially salient psychological expert
testimony on juror decisions. In light of earlier research that has demonstrated the
complicated role that racism plays in juror decision-making (e.g., Dovidio, Smith,
Donnella & Gaertner, 1997; Pfeifer & Ogloff, 1991; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000), and
jurors' over reliance on eyewitness identification testimony (Brigham & Bothwell, 1983;
Loftus, 1974; Thomson, 1988), this study seeks to explore the role that racism plays in
juror decision-making, attending particularly to whether racism affects whether jurors
take into account the psychological expert witness testimony in their decisions. Specific
hypotheses are presented at the end of Chapter 2.
Definition of Major Terms
The following terms will be used throughout this manuscript:
Blacks - This term will be used throughout to describe Americans of African ancestry.
Researchers have used various terms to describe this group, including African-American,
8

Afro-American, and Black American. This term is used for consistency, regardless of the
researchers' original term to describe this group.
Whites - This term will be used throughout to describe Americans of European ancestry.
Researchers have used various terms to describe this group, including Caucasian
American, Caucasian, and White American. This term is used for consistency, regardless
of the researchers' original term to describe this group.
Psychological expert witness testimony - This term will be used to describe a
psychologist who is an expert in the area of perception and cognition, and testifies during
a trial to educate jurors about possible limitations of eyewitness identification.
Eyewitness testimony - This term will be used to describe an individual who testifies
about a first hand account about what occurred during the commission of a crime and is
able to identify the person or persons who committed the crime. The term eyewitness
identification testimony may also be used, but refers to the same meaning.
Modern racism - This term refers to a modern form of prejudice that characterizes the
racial attitudes of many Whites who endorse egalitarian values, who do not regard
themselves as prejudiced, but who discriminate in subtle, rationalizable ways (Dovidio,
Smith, Donnella, & Gaertner, 1997).
Cross-race effect - This term refers to the tendency for people of one race to be better at
identifying members of their own race than members of another race (Abshire &
Bernstein, 2003). This term is sometimes referred to as an "own race bias."
Weapon focus - Weapon focus refers to the concentration of some witness's attention on
a weapon, such as the barrel of a gun or blade of a knife, during a crime, leaving less
attention available for viewing other items (Loftus, Loftus, & Messo, 1987).
9

CHAPTER II

ACTUAL RACIAL DISPARITIES REFLECTED IN U.S.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
There is substantial evidence of consistent and systematic racial bias in the
criminal justice system in the United States. Racial disparities are clear: Although Blacks
represent about 12% of the national population (based on 2000 U.S. Census), they make
up close to half of those who are incarcerated for crimes (Harrison & Karberg, 2003).
Furthermore, there were an estimated 12% of African American men between the ages of
20 to 24 in jail or prison in 2002, compared to just 1.6% of White men in the same age
group (Harrison & Karberg, 2003). Some of these disparities may be explained, in part,
by differential sentencing for drug related offenses, which target low-level dealers in
inner city areas. For instance, in 2000, the average sentence for a crack offense was 44
months longer than the average sentence for a powder cocaine offense (Coker, 2003).
Although Blacks have higher rates of incarceration for drug offenses, data suggests that
Blacks do not use drugs any more than Whites. In a 2001 National Survey on Drug
Abuse, rates of illicit drug use were found to be 7.4% African American, 7.2% White
(non-Hispanic), and 6.4% Hispanic. However, Blacks made up more than 57% of those
incarcerated for drug offenses in state prisons during the same year of the study (U.S.
Department of Health & Human Services, 2001). In other words, Blacks are
disproportionately incarcerated for drug related offenses (Coker, 2003).
Racial disparities are also evident in death penalty sentencing. For instance,
based on a survey conducted in 2000 and 2001 by the Department of Justice that
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reviewed federal death penalty cases, for the years 1995-2000, 682 defendants were
charged with death eligible crimes (crimes punishable by the death penalty). Of the 682
cases, the defendant was African American in 48% of the cases, Hispanic in 29% of the
cases, and White in only 20% of the cases. Furthermore, in the 20% of cases in which
the defendant was White, 48% were able to make a plea agreement that avoided a death
penalty prosecution; however, only 25% of Blacks were able to do the same (U.S.
Department of Justice, 2000).
Disparities are even more evident when crimes are committed across racial lines.
Since 1977, Blacks who kill Whites have over a 4.5 times greater risk of having the death
penalty sought than Blacks who murder other Blacks (Paternoster, 1983). In a thorough
examination of over 7,000 executions known in American history, Radelet (1989) found
that there has been 1 execution of a White for a crime against a Black for every 533
recorded executions in American history. In fact, White defendants who murder Black
victims are the group least likely to receive a death sentence (Costanzo, 1997). Since
1976, 39.3% of the people killed in the execution chamber have been Black, and 86% of
the executions have been people convicted of killing Whites, even though roughly half of
all murder victims in the United States are Black (Smolowe, 1991). In sum, the archival
research on racial disparities in the criminal justice system illustrates that Blacks are
disproportionately represented in jails and prisons (Harrison & Karberg, 2003) and
constitute the majority of offenders who face the death penalty (Coker, 2003).
Racial bias can enter into the legal system at various levels in the process.
However, one way that has received considerable attention from social scientists is
through the jury decision-making process. Juries are often not racially representative of
11

their respective jurisdictions. Although the Court has established guidelines that attempt
to provide a racially representative jury pool, other factors, such as low rates of voter
registration and small response rates to jury summons, are barriers to having
representative jury pools. Furthermore, judges allow prosecutors to exclude Black jurors
when race-neutral justifications are provided (Alschuler & Deiss, 1994).
Racial Bias Reflected in Jury Decision Making Research
Early researchers that investigated bias injury verdicts found that race (as well as
other demographic variables) account for less than 2% of the variance in verdict
preference (Boyll, 1991; Howard & Redfering, 1983; MacCoun, 1989). However, when
the interaction of the race of the juror, defendant and victim are examined together,
patterns begin to emerge. One trend that has emerged is that jurors may be most likely to
find a defendant guilty who is of a different race from their own, but whose victim is the
same race, compared with any other defendant-victim race combination.
For instance, Foley and Chamblin (1982) had 191 White and Black university
students listen to audio taped descriptions of a trial in which an adult male was charged
with committing sexual battery on an 11-year-old child. The race of the defendant and
the race of the victim were varied. They found that White mock jurors were most likely
to find a Black defendant guilty when the victim was White. However, this significant
relationship did not hold for Black participants. Hymes, Leinart, Rowe and Rogers
(1993) also found support for an interracial bias in a study that had 96 White
undergraduate students read a description of a trial in which the alleged victim and
defendant met in a college bar, and an alleged attack ensued after an interaction at the
12

bar. Both the race of the victim and defendant were manipulated. The mock jurors in
this study were more likely to find the defendant guilty when his race differed from the
race of the victim, than when the defendant and victim's race were the same, regardless
of the race of the defendant. In a more recent study Wuensch, Campbell, Kesler, and
Moore (2002), investigated whether the judgments of White mock jurors would be
affected by the race of the litigants in a civil trial in which a female plaintiff had alleged
sexual harassment by a male defendant. The researchers conducted two studies; one with
193 White undergraduate participants and another with 172 Black undergraduate
students. Participants were provided with written summaries of the litigants' testimony
as well as testimony of the litigants' character witnesses. The race of the litigants was
manipulated. Among the White mock jurors, guilty verdicts were significantly more
frequent (79%) when the plaintiff (alleged victim) was White than when she was Black
(59%). Furthermore, among White male jurors, guilty verdicts were significantly more
likely when the defendant was Black (73%) than when he was White (50%). A similar
pattern was found for Black jurors, in which guilty verdicts were significantly more
frequent when the plaintiff was Black than when she was White. In addition, Black male
jurors were significantly more likely to return a guilty verdict when the defendant was
White than when he was Black. Other studies have provided similar support for an
interracial bias injury decision-making (e.g., Miller & Hewitt, 1978, Ugwuegbu, 1976).
There is also evidence to support racial bias in the sentencing phase of a trial.
DeSantis and Kayson (1997) conducted a study in which 160 undergraduate students and
faculty (80 White and 80 Black) were given a fictitious burglary case to read in which the
defendant was accused of obtaining a key to a neighbor's apartment and stealing $25,000
13

worth of cash and merchandise from the neighbor's apartment. After reading the case
summaries, participants were asked to recommend sentencing, among other tasks, for the
defendant. The researchers manipulated the race, attractiveness and gender of the
defendant. The results indicated a significant main effect for the race of the defendant, in
which Black defendants received harsher sentences than White defendants. Similar
results were found by Ugwuegbu (1979) in which 256 White undergraduate students read
a transcript of a simulated rape case. Both the race of the defendant and victim were
manipulated. The results indicated that Black interracial (i.e., Black defendant, White
victim) rape was more harshly punished by White jurors than White interracial or Black
interracial rape.
Despite the research that demonstrates a pattern of racial bias injury decisionmaking, there is a smaller group of studies that do not provide support for this pattern.
For instance, Nemeth and Sosis (1973) tried to distinguish between the effects of
defendant race and defendant attractiveness. (Attractiveness was defined as being
likeable, middle-class, and no criminal history.) They used two different samples. One
sample was described as coming from middle to upper-middle-class backgrounds and
being politically liberal. The other sample was described as coming from working-class
backgrounds and politically conservative. The participants were then given a description
of the defendant as well as a summary of the facts of a vehicular homicide case. Both the
race and attractiveness of the defendant were manipulated. There were no significant
differences in either sample with regard to race. Furthermore, the sentence given to the
defendant was found to be significantly affected by the attractiveness of the defendant
among the working-class sample. That is, the unattractive defendant was sentenced more
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harshly than the attractive defendant. This trend did not hold true for the middle to
upper-middle-class sample.
While this study might initially call into doubt other studies that have provided
support for the presence of racial bias injury decision-making, it is important to note the
methodological problems in this study. First, there were only 40 participants in each
sample, with a total of 80 participants in the entire study. Thus, the sample size may not
have been large enough to detect statistically significant differences with regard to the
race of the defendant. Second, the race of the mock jurors was never specified in this
study. Therefore, the reader is only left to assume that the participants were all White.
However, if they were not, this may explain a lack of statistical significance with regard
to the defendant's race. Finally, the race of the victim was never specified in this study.
As mentioned earlier, the race of the defendant or juror alone provides little predictive
value. It is when the total juror-defendant-victim racial combination is examined that a
statistically significant interaction emerges.
In another study by Sargent and Bradfield (2004) it appears that there is not only
an absence of racial bias, but also an increased sensitivity to guilt determinations when
the defendant is Black. In this study 240 White participants (community members) read
a report of a case in which a Black or White man was charged with armed robbery, and
the alibi that he offered was either strong or weak. In addition, the participants'
processing motivation was varied, such that some were highly motivated to process the
information carefully and make thoughtful verdict decisions. In the low motivation
condition, participants were given little motivation to make careful decisions and knew
they would receive financial compensation for their participation regardless of the
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amount of thought put into their judgments. Under the high motivation condition,
participants judged the defendant's guilt as more likely when his alibi was weak than
when it was strong. This main effect was not moderated by race. However, under low
motivation, the effect of the alibi strength was moderated by defendant race. That is, the
Black defendant's likelihood of guilt was judged higher when his alibi was weak than
when it was strong. In contrast, the White defendant's likelihood of guilt judgments was
insensitive to alibi strength in the low motivation condition.
Modern Racism
Studies such as these (i.e., Sargent and Bradfield, 2004) are not only inconsistent
with much of the research that has explored the role of racial bias injury decisionmaking, but also run contrary to the statistics that reflect actual racial disparities in the
American criminal justice system. However, these inconsistent results may have an
explanation that reflects the complexity of current racial relations. That is, it may reflect
a theory that is referred to as modern racism.
Modern racism (Dovidio, Smith, Donnella, & Gaertner, 1997; McConahay &
Hough, 1976, Pfeifer & Bernstein, 2003) is described as developing in response to racial
laws and norms that encourage racial tolerance and express disapproval for overt racist
attitudes, opinions and behaviors. However, many White Americans' negative feelings
and attitudes about Blacks that were learned earlier in life persist into adulthood. Given
the changes in societal norms, and individuals' desire to reject traditional racist beliefs,
Whites may become somewhat unaware of the racist beliefs that they continue to hold.
Furthermore, these attitudes are often expressed indirectly and in subtle forms. When
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norms are ambiguous or conflicting, discriminatory behaviors are likely to be displayed.
Ambiguity may allow Whites to rationalize their bias against Blacks using factors other
than race. However, when norms and guidelines are clear, bias is less likely to occur
because it may be more difficult to justify prejudice when there are few factors other than
race that could explain the discriminatory behavior. Whites are also motivated to appear
non-prejudiced when racial issues are salient or a central focus. In fact, Whites may even
behave more favorably toward Blacks, relative to Whites, when there is no justification
for a negative reaction or evaluation. In short, as cultural expectations and norms have
changed, so has the expression of once acceptable racist attitudes and beliefs for many
White Americans (Dovidio, Smith, Donnella, & Gaertner, 1997; Hill & Pfeifer, 1992;
Pfeifer & Bernstein, 2003).
While modern racism may reflect a more contemporary form of racism, it is likely
that traditional racism persists in some today, which is reflected in studies that
demonstrate a straightforward relationship between race and biased jury-decision making.
However, modern racists demonstrate a more complicated pattern of bias, which may or
may not be evidenced in research, depending on the design of the study. Dovidio, Smith,
Donnella and Gaertner (1997) were able to design a study that captured the complexity of
this relationship for modern racists. Specifically, they examined the relationship between
overt or more traditional racist attitudes and modern racism in White jurors'
recommendations for capital sentencing of Black and White offenders convicted of
murder. After participants completed a scale assessing their current racial attitudes, they
were given one of two trial summaries. In one version the race of the defendant was
White, in the other the defendant was Black. The summary described an actual case in
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Georgia in which one White police officer was murdered and another was wounded while
attempting to make an arrest following an armed robbery. The summary made it clear to
the mock jurors that the defendant was found guilty of all the crimes for which he was
accused. Following the summary, participants watched a video recording that portrayed
the opinions of five confederate mock jurors (participants were led to believe that the
videotaped individuals had previously participated in the study) regarding sentencing in
this case. One by one, each videotaped "juror" advocated for the death penalty in this
case and provided their reasons for this decision. Participants were shown one of two
versions of the videotapes. The scripted reasons that each videotaped confederate juror
provided in support of capital punishment were identical in both versions of the tape.
The two tapes differed in that the second juror in one version of the tape was a White
male undergraduate student. In the other version, the second juror was a Black male
undergraduate student. Participants then provided sentence recommendations and
provided their reasons for their decision.
Dovidio et al. (1997) found that participants who showed a high level of prejudice
on the racial attitudes scale demonstrated a straightforward pattern of bias toward Black
defendants. That is, they gave the Black defendant a stronger recommendation for the
death penalty than the White defendant. In contrast, participants that showed a low level
of prejudice on the racial attitudes scale demonstrated a more complicated pattern. Low
prejudice scoring Whites gave the strongest recommendations against the death penalty
when the defendant was Black and all of the jurors endorsing the death penalty were
White. However, when the defendant was Black and there was a Black juror advocating
for the death penalty, low prejudice scoring participants were more likely to recommend
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the death penalty for the Black defendant than for the White defendant. Racial
composition of the jury advocating the death penalty did not affect recommendations
when the defendant was White. The pattern demonstrated by the low prejudice scoring
participants is consistent with modern racism. That is, without justification, the low
prejudice scoring participants did not demonstrate a pattern of biased sentencing.
However, it appears that the presence of a Black juror advocating the death penalty
provided enough justification for low prejudice scoring participants to demonstrate a bias
in sentencing.
Other studies have demonstrated a similar pattern of support for modern racism.
Sommers and Ellsworth (2000) conducted a two-part study that also demonstrated the
elusiveness of modern racism. In their first study, both Black and White undergraduates
read 12 trial summaries, which included one paragraph describing the prosecution's case
and one paragraph describing the defense's case. Five of the trials involved cross-racial
crimes in which half of the participants read about a White defendant and the other half
read about a Black defendant. All five of these trials were thought to make race salient
by evoking common racial scripts (e.g., a man allegedly burned down a church attended
by congregants who were not of his race). The remaining seven trial summaries did not
involve cross-racial crimes or mention race at all. White participants did not differ in
their guilt ratings, sentence recommendations, perceived strength of the defendants' cases
or dispositional attributions of the defendants' behavior for the White and Black
defendants. However, in the second study Sommers and Ellsworth manipulated racial
salience. Participants were given one trial summary, in which the defendant was either
Black or White and race was either a salient issue or not. All four versions of the
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summary involved a cross racial crime. When race was salient, as in the first study,
White participants did not differ in their guilt ratings, sentence recommendations, or
personality attributions of the White and Black defendants. However, when race was not
salient, White participants gave the Black defendant significantly higher guilt ratings and
recommended longer sentences. Furthermore, White participants rated the Black
defendant's personality as significantly more aggressive and violent than the White
defendant's personality. In this study, when racial issues were salient, White participants
did not exhibit prejudiced decision-making, perhaps because they were motivated to
appear non-biased. However, when race was not salient, racial bias was demonstrated. A
lack of racial salience may have provided enough ambiguity for White participants to
find other rationalizations for their biased decision-making.
Additional support for modern racism was provided by a study conducted by
Pfeifer and Ogloff (1991). In this study, 257 White undergraduates read a nine-page rape
trial transcript. Both the race of the defendant and the race of the victim were varied
(either Black or White). In addition, some participants received jury instructions that
were based on jury instructions that would have been given by a judge in a similar case.
The jury instructions included the importance of the presumption of innocence, the
meaning of reasonable doubt, and the need to be free from prejudice. Other participants
did not receive jury instructions. After reading the transcript, participants were asked to
rate the guilt of the defendant. The results indicated a significant main effect for jury
instructions. In other words, when jury instructions were given, there were no
statistically significant differences in guilt ratings between the Black and White
defendants. However, when participants were not given jury instructions, they rated the
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Black defendant as significantly guiltier than the White defendant, when accused of
raping a White woman. Consistent with modern racism, the jury instructions may have
removed much of the ambiguity from the decision making process. The instructions
provided legally relevant guidelines on which to base guilt determinations, providing less
opportunity to base decisions on prejudicial attitudes. Other studies have also provided
additional support for modern racism (e.g., Hill & Pfeifer, 1992; Pfeifer & Bernstein,
2003).
Eyewitness Identification
In addition to the race of the defendant and victim potentially biasing jurors'
decisions, bias may also enter the jury decision-making process in other ways, such as in
the importance or weight that jurors may place on evidence not completely understood by
jurors in a trial. One way in which this can occur is when jurors rely heavily on
eyewitness identification, which has been shown to be unreliable.
Pattern of Unreliability
Research on the psychological factors that affect an individual's ability to
accurately identify another person, especially after the commission of a crime, has been
an area of interest since the early 1900s. In fact, in 1912 Hugo Milnsterberg published
the first book on these phenomena called On the witness stand: Essays on psychology and
crime, in which he described how our senses can be deceived as well as how suggestions
can affect our perceptions. He staged a number of crimes in front of audiences of
lawyers and psychologists to demonstrate that memories of crimes, especially under the
stressful conditions of courtroom testimony, are often unreliable (Brigham, 1983). Since
21

then there has been a plethora of research on the psychology of eyewitness identification
(e.g., Kassin & Barndollar, 1992; Loftus, 1974, 1976; Wells & Murray, 1983; etc.).
Although the extent and degree to which specific factors affect eyewitness accuracy
continue to be debated, there are a number of factors that continue to surface in the
eyewitness literature, these include: (1) cross-racial identification (This refers to
witnesses ability to recognize people of their own race better than people of another race
(Malpass & Kravitz, 1987).), (2) arousal (or stress) (This refers to the idea that high
levels of arousal lower identification accuracy (Kassin, Ellsworth, & Smith, 1994).), (3)
weapon focus (This refers to the idea that if there is a visible weapon used during the
commission of a crime, a witness will focus their attention, at least part of the time, on
the weapon (Kassin, Ellsworth, & Smith, 1994).), (4) the forgetting curve (A witness's
ability to retain information about an event typically decreases over time (Bahrick,
1984).), (5) unconscious transference (A witness may identify a person in a lineup
because the person is familiar from an encounter other than the crime.), (6) prior
identification (A prior false identification may impair later identification in a lineup
(Gorenstein & Ellsworth, 1980).), (7) show-ups (This is a one-one-one confrontation of a
witness and a suspect where the witness is asked if the suspect is the perpetrator of the
crime. It has been argued that showups are overly suggestive of the suspect's guilt
(Malpass & Devine, 1981).), (8) time estimation (It has been argued that eyewitnesses
tend to overestimate the duration of events (Cutler, Penrod, & Martens, 1987).) and (9)
the relationship between confidence and accuracy (There is not a relationship between
witness confidence and witness accuracy. That is, an eyewitness can be highly confidant
and inaccurate (Smith, Kassin, & Ellsworth, 1989).) Although this is not intended to be
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an exhaustive list of all the factors that may affect eyewitness identification, it covers the
most commonly addressed factors in the eyewitness literature. In addition, it is important
to note that some critics (e.g., Egeth, 1995 & Elliott, 1993) deny the validity of most, if
not all, of the factors mentioned above which may impact an eyewitness's ability to make
an accurate identification. However, there is an even larger body of literature which
supports many of the factors listed above (e.g., Loftus, 1993, etc.). Furthermore, this list
illustrates the many different factors that can potentially influence an eyewitness's
accuracy, and calls into question the heavy emphasis placed on eyewitness identifications
in both criminal investigations and court trials, especially in the absence of other
evidence.
Cross-Race Identification
Since the cross-race effect (also sometimes referred to as own race bias or otherrace effect) has been found in many studies to account for 15% of the variance in
discrimination accuracy, this is an issue of particular importance (Meissner & Brigham,
2001). Several literature reviews have illustrated the robustness of this phenomenon
(Brigham & Malpass, 1985; Chance & Goldstein, 1996; Meissner and Brigham, 2001) as
well as its reliability (Kassin et al., 1989; Yarmey & Jones, 1983). For instance, in a
recent meta-analytic review Meissner and Brigham (2001) examined 39 research articles
involving 91 independent samples representing almost 5,000 participants. The reviewers
found a pattern in which other-race faces received a lower proportion of hits and a higher
proportion of false alarms when compared with own-race faces. Specifically, participants
were 1.4 times more likely to correctly identify a previously viewed own-race face when
compared with performance on other-race faces. In addition, participants were 1.56
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times more likely to falsely identify a novel other-race face when compared with
performance on own race faces. Meissner and Brigham (2001) also found that
participants were 2.23 times more likely to accurately discriminate an own-race face as
new versus old when compared with their performance on other-race faces. Previous
meta-analyses (Anthony, Copper, & Mullen, 1992; Bothwell et al., 1989; Shapiro &
Penrod, 1986) have indicated a cross race effect accounting for 6% to 11% of the
variability across studies.
Commonly posited explanations for the cross-race effect include racial attitudes
and interracial contact. However, there has been little empirical support for the
hypothesis that prejudicial racial attitudes impair one's memory for other-race faces. In
their meta-analytic review, Meissner and Brigham (2001) examined the pattern of
correlations between racial attitudes and performance on other-race faces across studies.
They found that the mean weighted effect size across studies indicated no significant
relationship between racial attitudes and the cross-race effect. On the other hand,
interracial contact has been demonstrated as having a small, but statistically significant
relationship with the cross-race effect. In the same meta-analytic review Meissner and
Brigham (2001) examined the pattern of correlations between self-rated interracial
contact and discrimination of other-race faces. The mean weighted effect size across
studies demonstrated a significant relationship. They found that interracial contact
accounted for approximately 2% of the variability across participants. Similar results
were found in an earlier field study in which 73 clerks that worked in convenience stores
were tested on their ability to identify Black and White customers who had been in the
store two hours earlier. Photograph lineups that had been prepared by personnel in the
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local police department were used for identification. These researchers found a weak but
statistically significant relationship (a correlation of .28) between self-reported amount of
interracial experiences and cross-race recognition accuracy (Brigham, Maass, Snyder &
Spaulding, 1982)
Meissner and Brigham (2001) have noted that the relationship between racial
attitudes and interracial contact may not be mutually exclusive. That is, although there
may not be a direct relationship between one's racial attitudes and memory for other-race
faces, racial attitudes may play a mediating role by influencing one's social contact and
experience with other-race individuals. Meissner and Brigham (2001) found the mean
weighted effect size between interracial attitudes and contact across studies demonstrated
a significant relationship. They found overall, that individuals with more positive
attitudes toward other-race individuals tended to rate themselves as having greater
interracial contact when compared with individuals with more negative attitudes.
Interestingly enough, the cross-race effect appears to vary across racial and ethnic
groups. Meissner and Brigham (2001) found that White participants demonstrated a
significantly larger cross-race effect when compared with Black participants on the
measure of discrimination accuracy (The standard distance between the means of the
"new" and "old" distributions.). This difference was seen in the magnitude of false alarm
responses; however, Black and White participants did not differ in the magnitude of the
cross-race effect on either proportion of hits (correctly identifying a face as "old") or
estimates of response criterion (The level of familiarity necessary for an individual to
categorize a given stimulus as "old" vs. "new."). White participants also demonstrated a
significantly larger cross-race effect when compared with participants in the "other"
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racial and ethnic category. This significant difference was observed reliably in hit, false
alarm, and response criterion estimates. However, the analysis of discrimination
accuracy was not significant.
There is also evidence to suggest that even with an awareness or prior
understanding of the cross-race effect, it may not make a meaningful difference in juror
decision-making. For instance, Abshire and Bernstein (2003) found in their study that
Black participants were more likely than White participants to be aware of the cross-race
effect. In addition, Black participants perceived eyewitnesses of different races as
varying in credibility. However, the Black participants who were aware of the cross-race
effect were no more likely to take it into account when evaluating eyewitness testimony
and reaching a verdict than participants who were unaware of the effect.
A cross-race effect has not only been found in eyewitness identification, but also
in the construction of lineups. Ideal lineups should contain both the suspect as well as
five or more individuals that are known to have no involvement in the crime under
investigation (foils), but whose appearance is similar to the suspect or a previous
description of the offender. The procedure is less suggestive when the individuals in the
lineup are similar in appearance by making it less obvious which lineup member the
police suspect is the actual offender. Furthermore, since the suspect is likely to fit a prior
description, it is important that the foils do as well in order to enable a fairer test of the
witness's ability to identify the actual suspect rather than make an identification based on
an earlier description. Lindsay and Wells (1980) demonstrated that fair lineups benefit
both the suspect and the police investigation. They conducted a study in which
participants were first exposed to a mock crime and then were asked to identify the
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offender of the crime in one of four lineup conditions. One lineup condition was a fair
(containing individuals similar in appearance to the target) lineup in which the offender
(target) was present. A second lineup was a fair target-absent condition. A third lineup
was unfair (containing individuals dissimilar in appearance to the target), target present
condition. And finally, the fourth lineup was an unfair, target absent (but one individual
similar in appearance to the target was present) condition. Lindsay and Wells (1980)
found that the unfair target-present lineup produced the highest number of accurate
identifications, while the unfair target-absent lineup produced a high number of false
identifications. The fair target-present lineup produced a small decrease in the number of
accurate identifications; however, it also produced a large decrease in the number of false
identifications. Clearly, there is a trade-off, with the fair target-present lineups producing
less overall identifications but a greater percentage of accurate ones.
Additional evidence of the cross-race effect in lineup construction was found in a
study by Brigham and Ready (1985) in which White and Black participants were asked to
construct photographic lineups by selecting five photos of foils that were "reasonably
similar in general appearance" to the target photo (p. 418). Brigham and Ready (1985)
found that both the Black and White participants were equally selective on the White
lineups; however, when constructing the Black lineups the White participants were much
less selective. On the other hand, Black participants became more selective on the Black
lineups. While both Black and White participants demonstrated an own-race bias in their
construction of the lineup, Black participants were better lineup constructors because they
showed a greater level of overall selectivity. This may be due, in part, to Blacks having
greater cross-racial experience as a result of being a minority within a White majority.
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Over Belief of Eyewitness Testimony
Unfortunately, there is evidence to suggest that the over belief of eyewitness
identifications has led to many wrongful convictions. In 1996 the National Institute of
Justice reported that 28 convicted felons were exonerated by DNA evidence after varying
numbers of years in prison. In all of these cases there was one or more false
identifications (Connors, Lundregan, Miller, & McEwen, 1996). By 2000, the number of
DNA exonerated cases reached 62 (including 8 individuals who had been sentenced to
death). Fifty-two of these cases contained identifications from 77 confident but mistaken
eyewitnesses (Scheck, Neufel, & Dwyer, 2000). In an earlier study of approximately 500
felony cases that led to convictions that were later invalidated, researchers found that
incorrect identifications by eyewitnesses contributed to wrongful convictions in 60% of
the cases (Huff, Rattner, & Sagrin, 1986).
One of the first studies to demonstrate jurors' tendency to over believe eyewitness
testimony was conducted by Elizabeth Loftus in 1974. Loftus had mock jurors read one
of three summaries of a trial involving a murder-robbery. In one condition, no
eyewitness testified and the evidence presented to the jurors was solely circumstantial. In
the second condition, in addition to the circumstantial evidence, there was an eyewitness
identification presented to the jurors. Finally, in the third condition, as in the second
condition, there was both circumstantial evidence and an eyewitness identification;
however, the jurors also heard expert testimony that was intended to discredit the
eyewitness (The expert testified that the eyewitness had poor vision (20/400), had not
been wearing his glasses the day of the crime, and therefore, would have been unable to
identify the defendant from where he stood.). Loftus found that 18% of the mock jurors
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voted guilty in the first condition (when there was no eyewitness identification) and 72%
of the mock jurors voted guilty when a single eyewitness was added in the second
condition. However, after the eyewitness was discredited in the third condition, the
conviction rate only dropped to 68%, illustrating that the eyewitness failed to be
discredited even after the jurors learned that the witness would have been unable to
identify the defendant from where he stood. Although attempts at replicating this study
have failed (Elliott, 1990; Hatvany & Strack, 1980; Kennedy & Haygood, 1992; Whitley,
1987), it was one of the first studies that highlighted the powerful influence that
eyewitness testimony has on jurors.
In another study, Brigham and Bothwell (1983) had 132 jury eligible residents
complete questionnaires asking them to assess the accuracy rate of eyewitnesses to three
staged crimes. While the actual accuracy rates ranged from 12.5% to 32.3%, respondents
to the questionnaire estimated that between 51.5% to 70.6% of the witnesses would have
been able to correctly identify the offender. Similar results were found in a study
conducted by Thomson (1988). In this study 54 participants viewed a videotape of four
"witnesses" as they indicated whether they recognized individuals in a set of slides as
having appeared in another series of slides presented 5 minutes earlier. The witnesses on
the videotape were engaged in a person-recognition task, with half of the people in the
slides appearing in an earlier series and half of the people not appearing in an earlier
series. Thomson found that participants' mean weight ratings bore no relationship to the
accuracy to the witnesses' responses. Despite the participants' inability to determine the
accuracy of the witnesses, many participants asserted that they "knew" when a witness's
response was correct or not.
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Some critics have argued that studies that illustrate mock jurors' over belief of
eyewitnesses do not generalize to an actual courtroom in which there are attorneys that
examine and cross-examine eyewitnesses. Furthermore, critics have asserted that skilled
attorneys could expose for jurors which witnesses are accurate from those that are
inaccurate by using realistic examination techniques. In response to this criticism,
Lindsay, Wells, and O'Connor (1989) videotaped experienced and inexperienced
attorneys examining accurate and inaccurate witnesses to a staged crime, using their
preferred questioning style. After watching the videotaped interaction, mock jurors were
still unable to distinguish accurate from inaccurate witnesses. When the eyewitness was
accurate, 68% of the mock jurors voted guilty. When the eyewitness was inaccurate,
70% of the jurors voted guilty.
There is also evidence to suggest that jurors do not have an adequate
understanding of the problems associated with eyewitness identifications. Seltzer, Lopes
and Venuti (1990) found support for this assertion after conducting post trial interviews
with 190 jurors who sat on jury panels in criminal trials in the District of Columbia
Superior Court. Jurors demonstrated little understanding of the factors that may affect
eyewitness identification, such as cross-racial identification and arousal levels. Seltzer et
al. (1990) then examined the responses of 60 jurors who sat on cases in which eyewitness
identification issues became a central issue in the case. Presumably there was crossexamination in these cases that was intended to focus on the conditions that may have
impacted the identification's reliability. In addition, it may have become an issue
discussed and considered during the jury's deliberation. When the responses of these 60
jurors were compared to the responses of the 130 jurors who sat on cases in which
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eyewitness identification was not contested, they found that for four of the five surveyed
questions, there were no significant differences. On the question in which there was a
significant difference, jurors who sat on a case in which there was significant debate over
eyewitness identification issues were significantly (x2(3) = 12.3, p=.002) less likely to
give the correct response than the other jurors.
A later study by Shaw, Garcia and McClure (1999) illustrated a similar lack of
understanding on behalf of jurors. Researchers had 72 jury-eligible adults who were
enrolled at a large university in the southwestern United States each generate a list of
factors they believed to affect the accuracy of an eyewitness's testimony. Only 1% of the
responses included systemic variables related to police questioning and identification
procedures. However, there is a large proportion of research that explores systemic
variables that affect eyewitness identification and illustrate the importance of these
factors on the accuracy of eyewitness identification, such as suggestive questioning and
the postevent misinformation effect (e.g., Loftus, 1974; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985;
Zaragoza, McCloskey, & Jamis, 1987), biased lineup construction (e.g., Brigham and
Ready, 1985), and biased lineup instructions (e.g., Malpass & Devine, 1981). When
respondents were asked about the sources of their information about eyewitness
testimony, the two highest rated items were their own "common sense" and every day life
experiences. Similarly, Rahaim and Brodsky (1982) found that community residents that
were asked to behave as mock jurors were unaware of the empirical evidence concerning
eyewitness accuracy, with their views primarily shaped by inaccurate "common sense."
In addition to jurors having a lack of understanding about the unreliability of
eyewitness testimony, there is evidence to suggest that many practicing attorneys may
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also lack awareness about it. Rahaim and Brodsky (1982) found that 73 practicing
attorneys that participated in their study demonstrated little awareness and understanding
of the factors affecting eyewitness identification, with the least amount of understanding
regarding cross-racial identification. This suggests that attorneys should not be relied
upon to instruct juries regarding the reliability of eyewitness testimony.
Furthermore, jurors may be using inappropriate and inaccurate cues to determine
the accuracy of eyewitnesses. For instance, a common juror misconception is that the
more confident a witness is, the more accurate they are likely to be (Smith, Kassin, &
Ellsworth, 1989; Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1979; Wells & Murray, 1983). Wells,
Lindsay, and Ferguson (1979) have shown that mock jurors are more likely to believe
highly confident witnesses than they are to believe less confident witnesses. However,
Leippe, Wells, and Ostrom (1978) have found no significant relationship between witness
confidence and accuracy. Furthermore, jurors may be unaware of why a particular
eyewitness may testify in a confident manner. For instance, Wells, Ferguson and Lindsay
(1981) found that after witnesses were briefed on their testimony, their confidence
increased, resulting in mock jurors delivering an increased number of guilty verdicts. In
fact, there is evidence to suggest that eyewitness confidence may have such a strong
impact on jury decision-making that it may overshadow most other variables jurors may
consider when determining an eyewitness's accuracy. For instance, Cutler, Penrod, and
Stuve (1988) manipulated confidence and nine other variables believed to affect
eyewitness identification procedures (e.g., retention interval, lineup instructions,
disguise) and found that only confidence exerted a reliable influence on mock juror
judgments.
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Similar results were found in a more recent study by Brewer and Burke (2002).
These researchers had 130 jury duty eligible participants listen to an audio-tape of a court
case reenactment containing opening statements of the defense and prosecution, the
prosecution's examination and the defense's cross-examination of one eyewitness,
closing statements from prosecution and defense, and closing instructions from the judge
which outlined the elements to be considered by participants when forming a judgment
and provided an explanation of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Both testimonial
consistency and witness confidence were manipulated. Brewer and Burke (2002) found
that witness confidence had a strong influence on the mock juror's decisions, regardless
of whether the testimony was consistent or inconsistent. Testimonial consistency, on the
other hand, was found to have a statistically nonsignificant relationship to mock juror
judgments. Brewer and Burke (2002) suggest that inconsistencies may have less of an
impact when they come from a confident, rather than an unconfident witness, and that
consistent testimony is not convincing when the witness lacks confidence. Despite the
little importance mock jurors placed on testimonial consistency, research findings
indicate that it is a powerful predictor of witness recall accuracy (Brewer, Potter, Fisher,
Bond, & Luszcz, 1999).
Another misconception that jurors may have is that an eyewitness's memory for
peripheral details is important in determining an eyewitness's identification accuracy.
Bell and Loftus (1988) found support for this assertion in a two-part study in which they
investigated the influence of the degree of detail of eyewitness testimony on judgments of
credibility and guilt. In their first experiment, mock jurors read a civil court case
involving an automobile-pedestrian accident. In the case summary, both the plaintiff and
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defendant had an eyewitness testify on their behalf, each testifying to contradictory
accounts of what happened. The degree of detail of both the plaintiff and defendant's
eyewitness were manipulated, with a highly detailed testimony consisting of additional
peripheral details about what the victim was wearing. Bell and Loftus found that mock
juror judgments of the credibility of the eyewitnesses on each side and the percentage of
negligence of the parties were influenced by the relative degree of detail of the
eyewitness testimony on each side. That is, judgments of credibility increased as the
degree of detail increased in the eyewitness testimony. Furthermore, a greater percentage
of negligence was assigned to the party with the low-detailed eyewitness testimony. In
their second experiment, mock jurors read a criminal court case involving a robbery and
murder. As in the first experiment, the prosecution and defense eyewitnesses testified to
conflicting accounts, manipulating the degree of detail by including or excluding a
statement about what store items the defendant picked up before robbing a small grocery
store at gun point. Bell and Loftus (1988) found that the degree of detail of the
prosecution eyewitness testimony influenced judgments of guilt and judgments of the
credibility of the witnesses. In other words, mock jurors judged the defendant as more
likely to be guilty when the prosecution eyewitness provided more detail. However,
there was no main effect for the degree of detail of the eyewitness testimony on the
defense's side. Similarly, mock jurors deemed the prosecution's witness to have greater
credibility as the degree of detail increased. Again, this pattern did not hold for the
defense eyewitness (no significant main effect). When Bell and Loftus asked mock
jurors to provide reasons why they believed the high-detailed eyewitness had greater
credibility, roughly half of the mock jurors who provided explanations stated or implied
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that the eyewitness who gave a highly detailed testimony was more aware, attentive,
perceptive, had a better viewing/hearing position, and had a better memory for details
than the eyewitness who gave a low detailed testimony. Despite the inferences that the
mock jurors in this study made about a highly detailed account, empirical evidence
suggests that memory for trivial peripheral details can be negatively related to memory
for a culprit's face. That is, witnesses who are better at identification have been shown to
be poorer at memory for peripheral details (Wells & Leippe, 1981).
Approaches to Reducing Jurors' Over Belief of Eyewitnesses
Improvement of Means of Identification
Despite the many factors that influence eyewitness accuracy and jurors' apparent
lack of awareness or understanding of these factors, there are some proposed solutions to
reducing inaccurate eyewitness identification. One way may involve focusing on
systemic variables, such as improving the means by which identifications are obtained,
resulting in identifications that are more likely to be accurate. For instance, as part of an
initiative of the American Psychology-Law Society (Division 41 of the American
Psychological Association), a group of eyewitness researchers wrote a scientific review
article that contained specific procedural rules developed to minimize errors made in the
collection of eyewitness identifications (Wells, & Bradfield, 1998). In 1999, former
Attorney General Janet Reno requested that the National Institute of Justice assemble a
multidisciplinary working group, which consisted of police, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and research psychologists, which published a set of guidelines for law
enforcement entitled Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement (Kassin, Tubb,
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Hosch, & Memon, 2001). Suggested factors include minimizing the time delay between
apprehension of the suspect and the identification procedure, avoiding instructions or
comments that are biasing while the identification is being made, constructing fair and
appropriate lineups that use foils with a similar appearance to the suspect, minimizing the
chances of witnesses seeing a photograph of the suspect before they view a lineup,
avoiding nonverbal cues that communicate to witnesses investigators' expectations,
among other system related variables concerning how identifications are obtained
(Brigham, 1983; Shaw, Garcia, & McClure, 1999).
Jury Instructions
Another proposed solution may be to have judges provide cautionary instructions
to juries about the factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness identification, when
eyewitness testimony is involved in a case. However, research on the effect of jury
instructions has shown little altering of jury decisions (Cutler, Dexter, & Penrod, 1990;
Greene, 1988; Katzev & Wishart, 1985). For instance, Cutler, Dexter, and Penrod (1990)
designed a study to test the effects of court-appointed expert testimony and judge's
instructions on juror decision-making. The judge's instructions used were Telfaire
instructions that were proposed in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in United
States v. Telfaire. They are a set of instructions which trial judges may use in focusing
juror attention on issues surrounding eyewitness testimony in an effort to safeguard
against unreliable eyewitness identifications (Katzev & Wishart, 1985). Mock jurors
viewed a videotaped trial in which the primary evidence consisted of eyewitness
testimony. Cutler et al. (1990) found that the judge's instructions did not produce
skepticism or sensitivity toward case evidence.
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Similar results were found in a study by Katzev and Wishart (1985). Mock jurors
were asked to determine the guilt or innocence of a defendant accused of burglary after
hearing one of three types of judicial instructions: (1) Instruction only: the judge gave
jurors a standard set of instructions that dealt with such topics as juror responsibility,
function and purpose; (2) Instruction and summation: the judge gave a standard set of
instructions as well as a summary of the evidence presented by the defense and
prosecution; (3) Instruction, summation, and commentary: the judge gave a standard set
of instructions, a summary of the evidence, and a commentary that questioned the
eyewitness testimony and reviewed some of the psychological issues (e.g., role of stress,
etc.) involved in eyewitness identification. Although the data suggested that each
progressive condition reduced the likelihood of reaching a hung or guilty final verdict,
the differences were not statistically significant. Likewise, Greene (1988) found after
employing the Telfaire instructions in a mock trial, mock juror's sensitivity to case
evidence did not increase. Furthermore, there was only a slight, but nonsignificant
tendency for mock jurors to rate the eyewitness as less believable in contrast to the
ratings in the control condition.
Judge's instructions have been criticized for being overly complex, confusing and
difficult to comprehend (Charrow & Charrow, 1979; Greene, 1988; Katzev & Wishart,
1985). In fact, Charrow and Charrow (1979) found that jury members did not understand
45% of the important elements in patterned jury instructions. In response to an apparent
lack of clarity in judge's instructions, Greene (1988) proposed a revision of the Telfaire
instructions by clarifying the language, more accurately conveying the lessons of research
{Telfaire instructions omit many important factors and provides misleading information),
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and explaining the processes by which various factors affect eyewitness testimony.
Greene (1988) found that mock jurors that heard the revised Telfaire instructions were
more knowledgeable about factors to consider when evaluating eyewitness testimony.
These jurors also rated the defendant as more believable than mock jurors that were given
no instructions. However, jurors that heard the revised Telfaire instructions were also
less sensitive to the weak and strong conditions of the trial than the mock jurors who
heard the standard Telfaire instructions or no instructions at all. The two groups that did
not receive the revised Telfaire instructions were more likely to find the defendant guilty
if they viewed the strong identification version of the trial than if they viewed the weak
identification version of the trial. This sensitivity was not seen for mock jurors given the
revised Telfaire instructions. These jurors did not vote for conviction in either the strong
or weak version of the trial. As a result, the superior court judges who reviewed Greene's
revised Telfaire instructions found them biased in favor of the defense. Thus, such a
testimony would not be permitted in a courtroom.
The usefulness of jury instructions appears to be limited, at best. In most
jurisdictions, the decision to employ jury instructions at all is left to the trial court's
discretion. Some courts may only deem it necessary to use jury instructions when the
evidence in a case raises serious doubts as to the accuracy of the identification. If the
trial court decides to use jury instructions, it is also up to the court's discretion as to what
type of instructions to use, general or special (e.g. Telfaire instructions). Some
jurisdictions hold a general proposition that special instructions are unnecessary and
consider it adequate to use only general instructions. If a court decides to use special
instructions, such as the Telfaire, the jury instructions tend to instruct jurors on general
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principles surrounding eyewitness identification, but do not more specifically instruct the
jury about how those principles apply to the case at hand, as this may create bias.
Furthermore, the trial court judge has to be careful not to overstep the jury's role as fact
finder (Lorentzen, 1994; Maleng, 2004). However, as they are currently employed, with
jury instructions imbedded in a longer narrative about other factors unrelated to the
particular case, the relevance of such a testimony is limited (Greene, 1988).
Psychological Expert Testimony
A third proposed solution to reducing jurors' over belief of eyewitness testimony
involves using psychological expert testimony. Psychological expert testimony about
eyewitness reliability is testimony given by an individual who is knowledgeable about the
factors that influence the accuracy and reliability of eyewitness identifications.
Testimony may be given on behalf of the prosecution or defense and is intended to revise
what jurors already believe as a matter of common sense (i.e., by informing them of
research findings not intuitively known or correcting misconceptions not supported by
research.) (Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2001; Woocher, 1986).
The admissibility of expert testimony of any kind (psychological or otherwise) is
guided by both legal standards and the discretion of trial court judges. Since traditional
evidentiary policy requires testimony to be based on a witness's first-hand knowledge or
observation of the circumstances involved in the case, a witness's opinion is generally
excluded from testimony. However, an exception is made for expert witnesses that are
presumed to have the ability to assess the circumstances and draw inferences above and
beyond what a lay jury would be able to draw. Since the expert's opinion testimony is an
exception to the rule, it is the burden of either side (i.e., defense or prosecution) to
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persuade a court of its value and necessity before it is deemed admissible in a case. One
of the leading court decisions that guide courts' determination about the admissibility of
expert testimony is the 1973 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals in United States v.
Amoral (1973). The Amoral decision is important because it was the first to both outline
the general principles regarding expert testimony and to apply those rules to the
psychologist's testimony on eyewitness identification. This decision outlines four criteria
that are necessary in order for any scientific expert testimony to be admissible. First, the
expert must be qualified. Although this criterion is not clearly defined in the Amoral
decision, the Federal Rules of Evidence (enacted in 1975, the Federal Rules prescribe the
criteria for the admission of evidence in the entire federal system), specify that a witness
may qualify as an expert "by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education"
(Woocher, 1986, p. 51). Generally this means holding an advanced degree in a relevant
area of psychology (e.g., perception, memory, etc.), have conducted and published
research in that area and the testimony "must concern a proper subject matter" (Woocher,
1986, p.50). In order to satisfy this criterion, the testimony must provide information that
is beyond the common knowledge of the average juror. In other words, the expert needs
to have some specialized knowledge that is beyond the average layperson. In addition,
this criterion also requires that the expert not invade the role of the jury. That is, it is the
jury that ultimately decides whether the eyewitness is accurate. The third criterion
specifies that, "the testimony must be in accordance with a generally accepted
explanatory theory" (Woocher, 1986, p.50). This criterion refers to a requirement
established 50 years earlier in Frye v. United States (1923) that requires scientific
testimony to be based upon a theory or research finding that has gained general
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acceptance in its field. The fourth and final criterion is that the benefits of the testimony
must exceed any possible prejudicial effects. This means that no expert testimony should
bias or mislead jurors, outweighing evidence from other components of the trial
(Woocher, 1986).
While the Amoral (1973) decision has been significant in shaping the current
guidelines for the admissibility of expert testimony, the emphasis and application of these
guidelines was altered in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993). In the
Daubert ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court urged trial judges to serve as more active
gatekeepers by determining whether an expert's testimony is scientific and assists the
"trier of fact" (Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2001, p. 406). The Court then shifted its
focus from a general acceptance to the broader question of whether the testimony would
be based on information that is not only relevant but also reliable and valid, as well as
obtained through scientific methods (Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2001). A review
of 10 years of cases following the Daubert (1993) decision found that the standards for
admissibility at trial of expert testimony have become more demanding. Specifically, the
reviewer found that judges are more likely to make a determination on the admissibility
of expert testimony prior to trial, to examine the reasoning and methodology that supports
the expert opinion with more scrutiny, and to limit or exclude testimony all together from
the trial (Cecil, 2005).
Despite these rulings that provide legal guidelines regarding the admissibility of
expert testimony, it is also important to recognize the wide variation in the application of
these criteria. Both the Amoral (1973) and Daubert (1993) rulings only apply to federal
courts. While many states followed suit, some states have done so only partly, while
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others have continued to use the Frye (1923) ruling (Kassin et al., 2001). This means that
the rules and standards for the admission of expert testimony will vary, to some degree,
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, from judge to judge, and even from case to case.
Furthermore, the responsibility for applying and interpreting the statutory criteria remains
with the courts. Thus, trial judges are given broad discretion in determining whether to
admit or exclude expert testimony in any given case (Woocher, 1986).
In addition to the legal community showing skepticism regarding expert
testimony, there is dissent within the psychological community as to whether
psychological expert testimony about the reliability of eyewitness identification is
appropriate. Proponents argue that because jurors may over rely upon the testimony of
an eyewitness, a psychologist who is an expert in the field of eyewitness identification
may be able to inform the jury of the limitations of the eyewitness identification. If
jurors could be educated about the inherent unreliability of eyewitness identification, they
may be able to give it the appropriate weight during deliberation (Hosch, Beck, &
Mclntyre, 1980).
Opponents of the use of psychological experts testifying on the unreliability of
eyewitness identification generally assert three main arguments. First, they argue that
research in the field of eyewitness identification does not pass the Frye test. That is,
results have not gained general acceptance in the field because there are a few studies that
have provided inconsistent results. However, Kassin, Ellsworth and Smith's (1989)
survey of the leading eyewitness experts in the country, including skeptics, such as
Elliott, found a consensus among 80% of those surveyed that the following topics were
sufficiently established to testify on in court: the wording of questions, lineup
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instructions, misleading post event information, the accuracy-confidence correlation,
attitudes and expectations, exposure time, unconscious transference, showups, and the
forgetting curve. Furthermore, over 70% of the respondents agreed that data regarding
lineup fairness, cross-race identification bias among White witnesses, and the tendency to
overestimate the duration of events was sufficiently reliable to testify in court (Egeth,
1995; Elliot, 1993; Kassin, Ellsworth, Smith, 1989; Konecni & Ebbesen, 1986).
A second argument posed by critics is that research on eyewitness accuracy lacks
generalizability (Konecni & Ebbesen, 1986). Since many investigations of eyewitness
accuracy use college students viewing staged crimes, critics assert that these results are
not generalizable to different witnesses observing real-life events in possibly lifethreatening situations. However, there have been some studies (e.g., Hosch et al., 1980)
that have found no differences between community residents and college student
samples. Furthermore, this critique is by no means unique to eyewitness identification
research, and holds true for scientific research in many different areas and fields that rely
upon college student samples.
Finally, a third argument against the use of psychological expert testimony is a
concern for the possible consequences on juror decision-making. One concern is that
psychological expert testimony may cause an over correction in verdicts, on the part of
jurors who are overly concerned with being fair (Kennedy & Haygood, 1992). This
could result in guilty defendants being acquitted and, according to some critics (e.g.,
Konecni and Ebbeson, 1986); the number of wrongfully convicted individuals is
relatively small compared to the number of offenders who remain free due to
underreported and underprosecuted crimes. This criticism is more of an ethical one that
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reflects the tone of many politicians that are interested in playing on the public's fears,
rather than focusing on correcting problems within our current justice system. Critics
have also expressed concern that increasing juror skepticism may not necessarily increase
jurors' ability to discriminate between accurate and inaccurate eyewitnesses. Thus,
increasing jurors' overall level of skepticism may not address the larger problem of jurors
being unable to make this distinction. This criticism will be addressed in the section
below.
Research on Expert Psychological Testimony
Despite the controversy surrounding the use of psychological expert testimony,
there has been relatively little research that has evaluated its impact on juror decisionmaking (Geiselman, Putman, Korte, Shahirary, Jachimowicz, & Irzhevsky, 2002).
However, the few studies that have been conducted seem to support the use of expert
psychological testimony. For instance, Hosch, Beck, and Mclntyre (1980) conducted a
two-part study that explored this relationship. In the first phase of the study, community
residents were assigned to one of four six-person juries. To increase the realism of the
study, jurors actually watched the mock trial in a courtroom, with an actual judge,
attorneys and psychologist (as the expert witness), playing their professionally trained
roles. The case presented involved a burglary in which the eyewitness identification
testimony was the only direct evidence linking the defendant to the scene of the crime.
Two of the juries heard all of the testimony, including the psychological expert testimony
on the unreliability of eyewitness accuracy. The other two juries heard all of the
testimony except the psychological expert testimony. During the second phase of the
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study, college student jurors were assigned to one of four six-person juries. Juries saw
the same trial as in the first phase, except it was a videotape of the original trial. As in
the first phase of the study, two juries heard the entire trial, including the psychological
expert testimony and the remaining two juries viewed the trial without the psychological
expert testimony. The data revealed that both samples (college students and community
residents) of mock jurors who heard the psychological expert testimony regarding the
unreliability of eyewitnesses perceived eyewitnesses, in general, to be significantly less
reliable than mock jurors who did not hear the psychological expert testimony. It is
important to note that the jurors did not see the eyewitness as any more or less credible as
a function of the expert testimony; however, they did lower the importance of the
eyewitness testimony relative to other testimony in the trial. Furthermore, psychological
expert testimony significantly increased the amount of time jurors spent discussing
eyewitness identification (27.9% vs. 9.58%) as well as significantly increased their
discussion of other evidence presented at the trial.
Fox and Walters (1986) found similar results in their study. Mock jurors watched
a videotaped criminal trial involving a robbery-murder at a convenience store. Jurors
were assigned to one of six conditions that varied according to the confidence of the
eyewitness (high vs. low eyewitness confidence) and the type of psychological expert
testimony (specific expert testimony, general expert testimony, or no expert testimony).
In the general psychological expert testimony condition, the psychologist discussed basic
memory processes (acquisition, retention, and retrieval) and types of memory (sensory,
short-term and long-term) as they relate to errors or distortions in eyewitness memory. In
the specific psychological expert testimony condition, the psychologist discussed 12
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specific factors affecting eyewitness perception and memory that were highly relevant to
the case. The researchers found that jurors who viewed the general psychological expert
testimony and specific psychological expert testimony were significantly less likely to
believe the eyewitness correctly identified the gunman than jurors in the control
conditions. In fact, the effects of the two types of psychological expert testimony were
similar on most of the dependent measures, except the specific psychological expert
testimony produced more innocent verdicts than the general psychological expert
testimony condition. It is also important to note that jurors continued to be influenced by
the eyewitness accounts, in all three conditions. Jurors continued to use eyewitness
confidence to evaluate eyewitness accuracy, even after viewing psychological expert
testimony that warned against relying on eyewitness confidence. That is, jurors had the
greatest reduction in their belief in the accuracy of the eyewitness in the low-confidence
condition than in the high confidence condition. Thus, eyewitness confidence mediated
the effect of the psychological expert testimony. Although the results indicate increased
skepticism among mock jurors with psychological expert testimony, it is unclear whether
jurors' sensitivity increased (i.e., Increased sensitivity would be indicated by jurors
giving more or less weight to the eyewitness depending on the witnessing conditions.)
A later study by Cutler, Penrod, and Dexter (1989) did, in fact, find support for
psychological expert testimony increasing jurors' sensitivity to factors influencing
eyewitness memory. These researchers conducted a 2 (witnessing and identification
conditions: poor vs. good) x 2 (Witness confidence: 80% vs. 100%) x 2 (Expert
testimony: descriptive vs. quantified) x 2 (Expert opinion: present vs. not present)
factorial design. In addition, there were four groups serving as controls. In the
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witnessing and identification factor, conditions were poor when the robber was disguised,
used a handgun in a threatening manner, identification took place 14 days after the
robbery, and the lineup was suggestive. In the good witnessing and identification
condition, the robber was not disguised, had a concealed handgun, identification took
place 2 days after the robbery and the lineup instructions were not suggestive. For
witness confidence, the witness testified that she was either 80% or 100% confident that
she correctly identified the robber. Psychological expert testimony varied in that it was
descriptive only or descriptive and quantitative. In the descriptive only testimony, the
expert described the witnessing and identification conditions that were relevant in the
case in influencing identification accuracy. In the descriptive-plus- quantified testimony,
the expert described the same information as in the descriptive only condition; however,
statistics regarding correct and false identifications found in the research literature were
included as well. Finally, the last factor, expert opinion, if present, consisted of a rating
that expressed the expert's opinion about the accuracy of the eyewitness identification in
this case. This rating was dependent upon the witnessing and identification conditions.
After watching a videotaped trial, jurors determined a verdict, rated the credibility of the
eyewitness, and were given a memory test about the testimony in the trial.
The results indicated that psychological expert testimony improved juror
sensitivity to the witnessing and identification conditions compared to the control
condition. That is, jurors were more likely to believe the eyewitness made a correct
identification in the good rather than the poor witnessing and identification conditions. In
addition, the descriptive only psychological expert testimony was the most effective form
of testimony that improved juror sensitivity to witnessing and identification conditions.
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Furthermore, as in the Hosch, Beck, and Mclntyre (1980) study, the presence of
psychological expert testimony and the type of psychological expert testimony had
almost no effect on credibility ratings of the eyewitness.
Although these studies illustrate that the presence of psychological expert
testimony reduces jurors' belief of the eyewitness, expert testimony does not reduce juror
belief consistent with no eyewitness control conditions (Cutler, Penrod, & Dexter, 1989;
Fox & Walters, 1986; Hosch, Beck, & Mclntyre, 1980). In others words, even with the
presence of psychological expert testimony, jurors continued to be influenced, to some
degree, by the eyewitness accounts. This illustrates that the concern that jurors will
demonstrate a boomerang effect (see third critique in Expert Testimony section), trying to
overcompensate for possible injustices, allowing offenders who are guilty of committing
crimes go free, is unfounded. Furthermore, there is also evidence that psychological
expert testimony improves juror sensitivity (Cutler, Penrod, & Dexter, 1989) to
eyewitness evidence, allowing them to integrate factors concerning witnessing and
identification conditions when assessing eyewitness accuracy, rather than
indiscriminately accepting (or discarding) eyewitness accounts based on "common sense"
factors.
Psychological Expert's Race and Juror Decision Making
In assessing the value and/or weight given to the psychological expert testimony
in a trial, jurors may rely on superficial characteristics, such as attractiveness or race of
the expert rather than on the content of the expert's testimony. A common model of
information processing proposes that there are two general routes to attitude change:
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peripheral and central (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981). When information processing occurs
through a central route, the quality of the message is evaluated; stronger arguments lead
to greater persuasion. On the other hand, a message may be processed through peripheral
routes. This may occur when the information receiver is unmotivated to attend to the
message or overloaded with information. When information is processed through a
peripheral route, factors irrelevant to the quality of the message determine attitude
change. This may mean that superficial characteristics of the person delivering the
message (in this case an expert) may influence the juror's assessment of the information
rather than the content of the message. Relying on peripheral cues such as attractiveness
or race enable a juror to make shortcuts in their information processing. However, these
shortcuts can lead to biased information processing by making generalizations about
people based on their group membership or on how much the source appeals to the juror.
Attractiveness of a defendant is a fairly well researched peripheral cue.
Attractiveness has been defined in several studies as having a likable personality, being
middle-class, being married with children, and having no criminal record. Physical
attractiveness is often determined by positive ratings on physical characteristics. In turn,
unattractiveness is generally defined as the opposite of these characteristics. Barnett and
Feild (1978) as well as Nemeth and Sosis (1973) both found that attractive defendants
receive more lenient sentences than unattractive ones. In fact, Nemeth and Sosis (1973)
examined both the role of attractiveness and race; however, they only found sentencing to
be affected by the attractiveness of the defendant, not the race of the defendant. Similar
results were obtained by Rector, Bagby and Nicholson (1993) in which they found that
jurors' verdicts were more directly based on the perception of both the defendant's and
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victim's positive appeal (attractiveness) than on the defendant or victim's race, (e.g., The
defendant was found guilty less often when he was perceived positively. In addition, the
defendant was found guilty less frequently if the victim was perceived negatively.)
However, Rector et al. (1993) found that the defendant factor of positive appeal
(attractiveness) differed significantly according to defendant race (i.e., Participants rated
the defendant's positive appeal lower when he was Black.). Although they found no
significant main effects for race and found that defendant race did not load significantly
in their model. These researchers attempted to explain away these results by suggesting
that the attractiveness of the defendant is more salient than defendant or victim race;
however, these results remain unclear.
While there has been extensive research that explores the role that victim, juror
and defendant characteristics play in juror decision-making; there has been very little
research that explores the role that expert witness characteristics play in the courtroom.
The little research on characteristics of experts has only pertained to attorneys. Boyll
(1991) suggests that the most important characteristic of both attorneys (experts) and
witnesses are to be perceived as credible. He argues that jurors are more likely to be
influenced by people they consider to be honest and credible. He defines credibility as
consisting of competence and expertise, trustworthiness, and being dynamic. He also
suggests that persuasive techniques used in sales are important as well. In addition, an
attorney's linguistic style is important in establishing credibility. Finally, Boyll (1991)
emphasizes the importance of appearance and affability in persuading a jury.
The influence of an expert's race on a juror is understood even less. Cohen and
Peterson (1981) investigated the effect of the defense attorney's race and gender on
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jurors' attributions of guilt toward the defendant. Although they found no evidence of
gender bias, they did find a consistent bias against Black defense attorneys. That is,
jurors reported significantly more defendant guilt when the defendant was represented by
a Black defense attorney than when he was represented by a White defense attorney.
However, this study has limited external validity since high school students (11th graders)
participated as the mock jurors in this study. In addition, the researchers did not specify
the race of the participants. Mixon, Foley, and Orne (1995) investigated racial attitudes
in a later study regarding the O.J. Simpson trial. They found that racial similarity
between their survey respondents and the attorneys involved in the trial may have
affected the respondents' perceptions. For instance, they found that White survey
respondents rated the White prosecutor, Marcia Clark, as higher in honesty than did the
Black respondents. In addition, Black respondents rated the Black defense attorney,
Johnnie Cochran, higher in honesty than did White respondents. However, it is also
important to note that this study used a small sample size (Ss=100), which may limit the
external validity of the results.
A dissertation that explored the effects of both the defense attorney's race and the
use of racially relevant arguments by the defense attorney in juror decision making
(Boliver, 1999) indicated that mock jurors found the defendant (who was Black in all
conditions) guilty significantly less often when the defense attorney was of a similar race
(on one count of child abuse). This effect held for both Black and White participants.
Furthermore, White participants were more likely to find the defendant guilty when the
defense attorney used racial arguments as part of the defense. This may be important in
understanding that not only the race of the expert may be important, but also the content,
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such as a racially relevant argument, may be equally important. Boliver (1999) also
found that both White and Black participants who scored highest on levels of
authoritarianism were most influenced by the defense attorney that was racially similar to
them.
There are a few limitations of this study that should be noted. First, the race of
the defense and prosecuting attorneys were always dissimilar. That is, although the race
of the defense attorney was the intended independent variable, the race of the prosecuting
attorney changed as the race of the defense attorney was manipulated in order to have
interracial pairings. Thus, the race of the prosecuting attorney may have been a
confounding variable, limiting the conclusions that can be drawn about the race of the
defense attorney. Furthermore, having racially dissimilar attorney pairings may have
increased the salience of race. Another important limitation is that the defendant's race
was held constant (Black), which limits the generalizability of the results. A final
methodological limitation of concern was that the race of the defendant was not specified
to participants when the defense attorney did not use a racially relevant argument. This is
certainly unlike an actual trial in which the jurors are always aware of the race of the
defendant because of their location in the same courtroom. In addition, participants in
this study were left to assume the race of the defendant, which introduces error because it
is uncertain what cues participants used to determine the race of the defendant and what
race they ultimately assumed the defendant to be.
Despite the modest evidence that suggests that both race and racial arguments
used by experts in court may influence juror decision-making, there is other evidence that
suggests that these factors may not influence the decision-making process. Memon and
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Shuman (1998) conducted a study to explore the influence of expert race and gender on
juror decision-making in a civil dispute. Both the race and gender were manipulated of a
medical expert that testified on behalf of a doctor being sued for medical malpractice
(e.g., Expert conditions: White male, Black male, White female, Black female). Contrary
to the anticipated results of the researchers, there were no significant differences in the
perceptions of the male and female experts. Furthermore, the Black female expert was
seen as the most persuasive out of all of the race-gender combinations. In addition,
White jurors rated the Black female expert as more qualified than Black jurors.
However, it is important to note the small sample size of Black participants in this study
(n=37 out of 312 participants); therefore, interpretation of the results as they relate to
Black jurors should be done so cautiously. It is also notable that although jurors rated the
Black female expert as the most persuasive, expert persuasiveness did not appear to be
related to their verdict. This may suggest that jurors were consciously attempting to
avoid rating experts in a biased manner; however, they may have allowed biases to
influence their verdict (which may be contrary to what they reported).
Similar results were found in a dissertation by Miyatake (1999) that explored how
the race and gender of a psychologist testifying in court as an expert witness influences
mock juror perceptions of the expert witness's credibility and effectiveness. Mock jurors
were given a brief (one page) written description of a criminal trial in which a man is
accused of killing his brother. Participants were then given the written expert testimony
of a clinical psychologist who testified on behalf of the defense, accompanied by a black
and white photograph of the expert. Both the race (Black, White, or Asian) and the sex
(male or female) of the clinical psychologist (expert witness) were manipulated in this
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study. Mock jurors then completed accompanying questionnaires. The results indicated
that there were no significant differences in perceptions of credibility and effectiveness
among all three races of expert witnesses. Furthermore, there were no significant
differences in perceptions between sexes.
While this study did not find any significant differences in ratings of the expert
witnesses based on race or sex, there are some important methodological limitations of
this study. First, generalizability is limited due to the sample. The sample size was both
small (n=83) and consisted of only White participants. Next, the only racial relevance in
this case was the race of the expert witness. The defendant in this case was White in all
of the conditions (an immigrant from Greece), which means both the mock juror and
defendant were of the same race, removing any biases that may have occurred due to the
defendant's race. Furthermore, there were no racially relevant arguments used in the
expert witness's testimony, which also removes an element of racial salience in the
defendant's defense. Boliver (1999) argues that race-relevant content within a trial may
frighten or inflame a racially dissimilar jury. If nothing else, it increases the racial
salience within a trial. However, the race of the defendant was not relevant to this trial,
either indirectly by juror observation or by relevance to his defense. Finally, the only
photo given to mock jurors was that of the expert witness, which might have made the
manipulation of the expert witness race obvious and led mock jurors to correct for racial
biases.
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Goal of Present Study
In short, racial discrimination continues to have a stronghold on the criminal
justice system. Research has repeatedly demonstrated that victim, defendant, and juror
race are important factors in the juror decision-making process. However, despite the
evidence that demonstrates the influential role that race plays in juror decision-making,
little is known about the effects of the race of a psychological expert witness on juror
decision-making. The goal of the present study is to explore this relationship.
Specifically, this study examined the relationship between defendant race, psychological
expert witness race, and expert witness testimony on a racially relevant topic on juror
decisions. Three variables were manipulated: the race of the defendant, the race of the
expert witness, and the expert witness's testimony content.
Hypothesis One
Participants with high scores on the Modern Racism Scale (MRS) (McConahay, 1986)
are most likely to render a guilty verdict when both the defendant and psychological
expert witness are Black.
Hypothesis Two
Participants with high scores on the MRS are most likely to render a guilty verdict when
the defendant is Black and the expert provides racially relevant testimony.
Hypothesis Three
Participants will give the highest ratings - most positive (e.g., credibility, persuasiveness,
importance, etc.) of the expert witness when he is White and provides non-racially
relevant testimony, rather than racially relevant testimony. The lowest ratings of the
expert witness will be when he is Black and provides a racially relevant testimony.
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Hypothesis Four
The defendant will receive the highest ratings - most positive (e.g., type of person to
commit crime, sympathy, pity, anger) when he is White, and a non-racially relevant
defense is presented. The lowest ratings of the defendant will be when he is Black, and a
racially relevant defense is presented.
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CHAPTER III

METHOD

Participants
This study included 303 participants. The sample consisted of 85.81%
White/Caucasian, 4.29% Black/African-American, 3.3% Hispanic/Latino, 2.31% Biracial
(parents from two different racial groups), 1.65% "other," 1.32% Asian/AsianAmerican/Pacific Islander, .66% American Indian/Native American, and .66% did not
indicate any race or ethnicity. The sample included 107 males (35.31%) and 196 females
(64.69%). All participants were sophomore and junior undergraduate students enrolled at
a large mid-western university. All participants met the eligibility requirements for
serving on a jury in the State of Indiana. These requirements exclude those: (a) who are
under 18 years of age; (b) who are not a citizen of the United States; (c) who are not able
to communicate in English; (d) who are under guardianship because of mental incapacity;
(e) who are suffering from a physical or mental disability that prevents the participant
from performing his or her duties as a juror in a satisfactory manner; (f) who have had
their right to vote revoked and not yet reinstated as a result of a felony conviction; and (g)
who are a law enforcement officer. These criteria for exclusion are the same as those
used in the Indiana State Trial Courts. This information was obtained from a form
referred to as a "Juror Pre-Trial Questionnaire," completed by each participant.
Participants were recruited through e-mails that briefly described the study and
the requirements for participation. Participants were not directly compensated for their
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participation; however, their names were entered into a drawing for a chance to win cash
prizes.
Instruments
Juror Pre-Trial Questionnaire
This consisted of 12 items that were used for two purposes. First, this
questionnaire was used to determine if the participants were qualified to serve on a
jury (exclusion criteria given in Participants section). Second, this questionnaire
collected basic demographic information from participants, including: (a) age, (b)
gender, (c) race/ethnicity, and (d) level of education.
Juror Post-Trial Questionnaire
This was a 41-item questionnaire that was developed from questionnaires used in
two prior studies. Items #1-20 were adapted from a study (Balogh, Kite, Pickel, Canel, &
Schroeder, 2003) in which participants were asked to determine a verdict of guilty or not
guilty for a defendant that was accused of sexual harassment. In the original study,
participants were also asked to make a series of ratings on a 7-point scale about both the
defendant and alleged victim. For the present study, the questions were revised (e.g.,
names and charges were changed) for the relevancy of this study.
In the first section of the revised items, participants were asked to choose a
verdict of guilty or not guilty on the two charges of Robbery and Battery (Items #1-2).
Next, on a 7-point scale, participants are asked to rate the likelihood that the defendant
was guilty (Item #3) and their confidence in their verdicts (Items #4-5). Then,
participants were asked to select what they believed to be an appropriate sentence for
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each charge independently (Items #6-7), if they selected a guilty verdict in the first two
items. Next, participants were asked what influenced their verdict the most (Item #8) and
if there was any piece of evidence or testimony that they did not find believable (Item
#9). Then, participants were asked to rate the defendant's character, rating the likelihood
that he is the type of person who would engage in the types of crimes in which he was
accused (Item #10). In addition, participants reported the amount of sympathy, pity, and
anger they felt for the defendant (Items #11-13). Participants also rated the likelihood
that the defendant has engaged or will engage in the behavior in which he stands accused
(Item #14). The remaining questions in the first half of this questionnaire asked
participants to rate the amount of sympathy and pity they felt for all of the
victims/eyewitnesses involved in the case (Items # 15-20).
The second half of the questionnaire, items #21-37 were taken directly from
another study (Miyatake, 1998) that examined participant ratings of the credibility,
professional performance and expertise of a psychological expert witness. The internal
consistency reliability for the previous study of 76 undergraduate students resulted in a
coefficient alpha estimate of .88. For Experiment 2, a coefficient alpha estimate of .88
was also found. In the present study, participants were asked to rate the psychological
expert witness on a 9-point scale ranging from 0 (disagree) to 8 (agree) with seven of the
items reverse scored. A higher score indicates a higher rating of expert witness
performance and expertise.
Finally, the last four items on the questionnaire (Items #38-41) were manipulation
checks for expert testimony content and race. Participants were asked to identify the
topic on which the expert witness testified (e.g., weapon focus, the cross-race effect, or
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no topic at all) (Item #38). Next, participants were asked to identify the race of the
defendant (Item #39), the race of the two witnesses who identified the defendant (Items #
40), and the race of the psychological expert witness (Item #41).
Modern Racism Scale (MRS) (McConahay. 1986^)
This instrument is designed to measure modern racist beliefs. Specifically,
modern racism is defined by: (1) a belief that discrimination no longer exists and that
African-Americans now have the freedom to compete in the marketplace and to enjoy
those things they can afford, (2) the belief that African-Americans are pushing too hard,
too fast, and into places where they are not wanted, (3) that these methods and demands
are unfair, and (4) that recent gains are undeserved and that prestige granting institutions
are giving African-Americans more attention and status than they deserve. Modern
racists assert that racism is bad and do not believe the aforementioned statements
constitute racism because they believe them to be based upon empirical facts. Finally,
modern racists do not define their own beliefs and attitudes as racist (McConahay, 1986).
This instrument consists of seven items scored on a five-point Likert-type scale
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). High scores indicate stronger
modern racist beliefs. In prior college samples, coefficient reliabilities for the MRS
range from .86 to .91 (McConahay, 1983). Validity studies have found significant
correlations between voting behavior and scores on the MRS, where those scoring high
were more likely to vote for White candidates than those scoring low on the scale
(McConahay & Hough, 1976). Similarly, there were significant correlations found
between the MRS and the strength of opposition toward busing (McConahay, 1983). In
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addition, McConahay has found strong correlations between scores on the MRS and antiBlack feelings as measured by the Feeling Thermometer (McConahay, 1986).
The MRS was embedded with 12 filler items. The 12 filler items were taken from
the Altemeyer Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (1996). This scale consists of
attitudinal statements, half of which favor and half of which oppose an authoritarian
attitude. The filler items were included to protect the integrity of the MRS items.
Furthermore, most other studies that have used the MRS have administered it in a similar
manner. This instrument was entitled, "Social Attitudes Survey," for the purposes of
administering to participants.
Procedure
Participants were recruited through e-mails that briefly described the study and
the requirements for participation. A total of 8,624 recruitment e-mails were sent to
sophomore and junior undergraduate college students that were 18 years of age or older,
U.S. citizens, and currently enrolled at one mid-western university. The 8,624 student emails were randomly divided into eight e-mail lists (this was done by the University's
Office of Information Technology in order to preserve participant anonymity), to
correspond to the eight different conditions. Included in the e-mails was a link that
routed participants to the on-line study. A total of 376 participants followed the link and
began the survey; however, 73 survey responses were dropped due to incomplete surveys,
leaving a total of 303 completed surveys. First, participants read and electronically
signed an informed consent form (and were encouraged to print a copy for their records).
Next, participants were routed to one of eight conditions of the survey. Then, each
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participant completed the on-line survey which guided them through each section, which
included: (a) instructions to the participants, (b) a juror pre-trial questionnaire, (c) a brief
case description, (d) a description of the psychological expert witness, (e) a psychological
expert witness testimony transcript, (f) jury instructions, (g) a juror post-trial
questionnaire, and (h) the Modern Racism Scale (1986).
Once participants followed the link embedded in the recruitment e-mail and
electronically signed the informed consent form, they viewed the following web pages in
the order in which they are listed below:
Instructions to Participants
The first web page viewed by participants was an overview of what they were
being asked to do in the present study. Participants were instructed to imagine that they
were living in Indianapolis, Indiana and members of a jury reviewing a criminal case.
Participants were informed that they would complete a short pre-trial questionnaire, and
read a briefcase description as well as a court transcript of an expert psychological
witness's testimony. They were also informed they would be provided jury instructions
and the legal definitions of the charges brought against the defendant before rendering a
verdict. Participants were informed that the facts of the present case were based on an
actual criminal case. Furthermore, participants were led to believe that their verdicts
would be compared to the verdicts of the jurors who heard the original trial. The
deception in this study was minimal, because the facts of the criminal case used in this
study are loosely based on an actual trial. However, participant responses were not
compared to the original outcome of the trial. The deception was deemed necessary
because research has shown that participants' knowledge that their decision has no
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consequence can significantly affect the outcome of the study (Diamond & Zeisel, 1974;
Wilson & Donnerstein, 1977).
Juror Pre-Trial Questionnaire
Participants provided relevant demographic information.
Brief Case Description
This was a summary of the fictional criminal case, entitled "United States District
Court, Indianapolis Division Credit One vs. Defendant." The arguments of both the
prosecution and defense were presented, including each side's version of what occurred
on the day of the crime, the events that immediately followed the crime and the evidence
that supported their respective arguments. Depending on the psychological expert
witness testimony condition (racially relevant or not racially relevant) to which the
participant was assigned, the second paragraph of the defense's argument either provided
a brief overview of the cross-race effect (in the racially relevant condition) or a brief
overview of weapon focus (in the not racially relevant condition).
Description of the Psychological Expert Witness
This was a brief, one paragraph description of the psychological expert's
education and work experience. There were two different versions of the description. In
one version, the expert witness was an African American male, named Tyrone Parker. In
the other version, the expert witness was a Caucasian male, named Thomas O'Neill.
Only the race and name of the expert witness were varied. The remainder of the
description remained the same in both versions.
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Psychological Expert Witness Testimony Transcript
A fictional four-page transcript of the expert witness testimony was created for
this study. There were eight different versions of the transcript corresponding to the eight
different combinations of race (Defendant: Black or White and Expert Witness: Black or
White) and expert witness testimony (racially relevant or not racially relevant)
conditions. In one version, the expert witness provided a racially relevant testimony on
behalf of the defense testifying on the cross-race effect. In the other version, the expert
provided a non-racially relevant testimony on behalf of the defense on the phenomenon
of weapon focus.
Jury Instructions
This web page explained the functions of the court and the jury, which are part of
Indiana Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions for the Seventh Circuit Judicial Council. Next,
both charges and corresponding felony classifications were listed. Finally, the legal
definitions of the two charges (Robbery and Battery) in the State of Indiana were
provided.
Juror Post-Trial Questionnaire
Participants provided verdicts for the defendant and rated their perceptions of the
defendant, victims, and psychological expert witness.
Modern Racism Scale (MRS) fMcConahav, 19861
Participants ranked their level of agreement or disagreement with modern racist
beliefs.
Participants completed their surveys at their own pace. After participants
completed the study, they were directed to a web page that thanked them for their
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participation and asked them to submit their responses by selecting a button if they
agreed to allow their responses to be used for the purposes of this study. Once
participants submitted their survey responses, they were automatically directed to a
separate web page that allowed them to enter their names and contact information into a
drawing in order to win a cash prize.
Research Design
This study used a 2 (Defendant Race: Black or White) x 2 (Expert Witness Race:
Black or White) x 2 (Expert Witness Testimony: racially relevant or not racially relevant)
between-subjects, factorial design. This study examined the effects of the race of the
defendant, the race of the expert witness, and the use of racially relevant testimony on
juror decisions. In addition, the influences of two covariates (Modern Racism Scale
Score and gender) were also investigated. The following hypotheses were explored in
this study.
A forward logistic regression analysis was used to examine the first and second
hypotheses in this study. A logistic regression analysis can be considered an extension of
multiple regression analysis in situations in which the dependent variable is dichotomous,
as in the present study (George & Mallery, 1999). The logistic regression analysis
produces a regression equation that accurately predicts the probability of whether an
individual will fall into one category (guilty verdict) or the other category (not guilty
verdict) (Mertler & Vannatta, 2005).
Hypothesis 1: Participants with high scores on the Modern Racism Scale (MRS)
(McConahay, 1986) are most likely to render a guilty verdict when both the defendant
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and psychological expert witness are Black. This hypothesis was examined using a
logistic regression analysis, which explored whether MRS scores, defendant race, and
psychological expert witness race are significant predictors of mock juror verdict.
Hypothesis 2: Participants with high scores on the MRS are most likely to render
a guilty verdict when the defendant is Black and the expert provides racially relevant
testimony. This hypothesis was also examined using a logistic regression analysis in
order to explore whether MRS scores, defendant race, and psychological expert
testimony type (racially relevant or not racially relevant) are significant predictors of
mock juror verdict.
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to analyze the
remaining two hypotheses. The MANOVA is used when analyzing more than one
dependant variable, and when the dependant variables are correlated (Grimm & Yarnold,
1995). In both the third and fourth hypotheses of this study, one would expect participant
ratings of the expert witness and defendant, respectively, to be correlated. Additionally, a
MANOVA guards against the chance of committing a Type I error that can occur when
doing multiple univariate analyses, and it takes into account the correlations between
each of the dependant measures (Grimm & Yarnold, 1995).
Hypothesis 3: Participants will give the highest ratings - most positive (e.g.,
credibility, persuasiveness, importance, etc.) of the expert witness when he is White and
provides non-racially relevant testimony, rather than racially relevant testimony. The
lowest ratings of the expert witness will be when he is Black and provides a racially
relevant testimony. To examine this hypothesis, a 2 x 2 MANOVA was used to assess
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whether expert witness race (Black or White) and testimony type (racially relevant or not
racially relevant) significantly affected participant ratings of the expert witness.
Hypothesis 4: The defendant will receive the highest ratings - most positive (e.g.,
type of person to commit crime, sympathy, pity, anger) when he is White, and a nonracially relevant defense is presented. The lowest ratings of the defendant will be when
he is Black, and a racially relevant defense is presented. This hypothesis was also
analyzed with a 2 x 2 MANOVA to assess whether defendant race and testimony type
significantly affected participant ratings of the defendant.
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CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

Preliminary Analyses
Correlations were computed between the measured variables in this study (see
Table 1). The following coding scheme was adopted for this study: For race of the
defendant and psychological expert witness, Black was coded " 1 " and White was coded
"0." For testimony type, non-racially relevant testimony was coded "0" and racially
relevant testimony was coded " 1 . " For verdict, a not guilty verdict was coded "0" and
guilty " 1 . " For participant gender, males were coded " 1 " and females "0." Higher scores
on the Modern Racism Scale indicated higher levels of modern racist beliefs.
Table 1 - Pearson Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables, Dependent Variables
and Covariates
Defendant
Race
Defendant
Race
Expert
Race
Testimony
Type
MRS
Total
Gender
Robbery
Verdict
Battery
Verdict

Expert
Race

Testimony MRS
Type
Total

Gender

Robbery
Verdict

Battery
Verdict

-

-.014

-

-.059

-.036

-

-.099

.081

.069

-

.030

-.029

.052

-.160**

-

.016

.049

.031

-.092

-.154**

.

-.038

.064

.002

-.063

-.122*

.739**

* P <.05, **p<m.
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In addition, descriptive statistics were calculated for the participant demographic
variables and dependant variables in the present study. These statistics are summarized
in two tables below (see Tables 2 and 3).
Table 2 - Summary Table: Participant Demographic Variables and Dependant Variables
Percent % Frequency
Participant Race
Asian/Asian American
African American
Hispanic/Latino
Caucasian/White American
American Indian/Native American
Biracial
Other
Participant Gender
Male
Female
Participant Education
Less than High School
High School or GED
Some College
Associate's Degree
Bachelor's Degree
Graduate Degree
Other
Verdict - Robbery
=> Guilty
=> Not Guilty
Verdict - Battery
=> Guilty
=e> Not Guilty

1.3
4.3
3.3
86.8
.7
2.6
1.0

4
13
10
263
2
8
3

35.3
64.7

107
196

.3
9.6
64.7
19.8
3.3
.3
2.0

1
29
196
60
10
1
6

19.5
80.5

59
244

17.5
82.5

53
250

Table 3 - Summary Table: Participant Age and MRS Total Scores

Participant Age
MRS total score

Mean
21.86
14.41

Minimum
18.00
7.00

Mode
20.00
14.00
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Maximum
58.00
31.00

All four hypotheses were examined. For the first hypothesis, a logistic regression
analysis was used to determine if Modern Racism Scale scores (MRS scores), defendant
race, and expert witness race are significant predictors of mock juror verdict. For the
second hypothesis, a logistic regression analysis was also used to determine if MRS
scores, defendant race, and testimony type are significant predictors of mock juror
verdict. For the third hypothesis, participant ratings of the expert witness (e.g.,
credibility, persuasiveness, etc.) were analyzed using a 2 (Expert Race: Black, White) x 2
(Testimony type: Racially Relevant, Not Racially Relevant) multivariate analysis of
variance (MANOVA). Finally, for the fourth hypothesis, participant ratings of the
defendant (e.g., type of person to commit a crime, sympathy toward defendant, anger
toward defendant, etc.) were analyzed using a 2 (Defendant Race: Black, White) x 2
(Testimony type: Racially Relevant, Not Racially Relevant) MANOVA. A total of 376
participants at least partially completed the surveys; however, 73 survey responses were
dropped from the analyses due to incomplete surveys, leaving a total of 303 participants.
Primary Analyses
Hypotheses 1 and 2
For hypothesis one and two, forward logistic regression analyses were performed
to identify which, if any, independent variables are significant predictors of mock juror
verdict, the dependent variable. An alpha level of .05 was selected a priori for tests of
significance. Logistic regression analysis is a technique used for the prediction of the
probability of an occurrence of an event by fitting data to a logistic curve when the
dependant variable is dichotomous. A logistic regression curve may be preferable to a
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standard regression line when the dependant variable is dichotomous, as in the present
study (Mertler & Vannatta, 2005). When the dependant variable is dichotomous, the
assumptions of linearity, homogeneity of variance, and normality are violated. That is,
the population means of the dependent variables at each level of the independent variable
are not on a straight line; the variance of the errors are not constant; and the errors are not
normally distributed (Howell, 2002). The logistic regression analysis produces a
regression equation that accurately predicts the probability of whether an individual will
fall into one category (guilty verdict) or the other category (not guilty verdict) (Mertler &
Vannatta, 2005).
Hypothesis 1: Verdict
The first hypothesis investigated whether modern racist beliefs, defendant race,
and psychological expert witness race are predictors of mock juror verdicts (guilty or not
guilty), using a forward logistic regression. For this analysis, an interaction variable was
created (Race Combined) by adding the defendant race and psychological expert witness
race variables. These variables were added, rather than multiplied (as would be expected
in the creation of an interaction variable) because the variables had previously been
transformed from categorical variables to continuous variables through dummy coding.
Regression results indicate that none of the hypothesized predictors (modern racist
beliefs, defendant race, and psychological expert race) are statistically reliable in
distinguishing between guilty and not guilty verdicts on the charge of robbery (-2 Log
Likelihood = 295.622; x?(2) = 3.132, p = .209) or on the charge of battery (-2 Log
Likelihood = 279.667; ^(2) = 1.274, p = .529). Wald statistics indicate that all
hypothesized independent variables were poor predictors of verdict (see Tables 4 and 5).
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Table 4 - Logistic Regression Coefficients - Hypothesis 1: Robbery Verdict

MRS Total Score
Race Combined
(Black Defendant
+ Black Expert)
Constant
*p<.05,**p<.0l.

B
.043

Wald
2.535

df
1

P
.111

Odds Ratio
1.044

.168

.646

1

.422

1.183

-2.218

21.040

1

.000

.109

Table 5 - Logistic Regression Coefficients - Hypothesis 1: Battery Verdict

MRS Total Score
Race Combined
(Black Defendant
+ Black Expert)
Constant
*p<.05,
**p<.01.

B
.031

Wald
1.194

df

.069
-2.070

1

P
.275

Odds Ratio
1.031

.101

1

.751

1.071

17.442

1

.000

.126

Hypothesis 2: Verdict
The second hypothesis examined whether modern racist beliefs, defendant race,
and psychological expert witness testimony type (racially relevant or not racially
relevant) are predictors of mock juror verdicts (guilty or not guilty), using a forward
logistic regression. Regression results indicate that none of the hypothesized predictors
(modern racist beliefs, defendant race, and psychological expert witness testimony type)
are statistically reliable in distinguishing between guilty and not guilty verdicts on the
charge of robbery (-2 Log Likelihood = 295.809; x2(2) = 2.946, p = .400) or on the charge
of battery (-2 Log Likelihood = 279.160; %2(2) = 1.780, p = .619). Wald statistics
indicate that all hypothesized independent variables are poor predictors of verdict (see
Tables 6 and 7).
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Table 6 - Logistic Regression Coefficients - Hypothesis 2: Robbery Verdict

Defendant Race
Testimony Type
MRS Total Score
Constant
*p<.Q5,**p<.0l.

B
.045
.196
.044
-2.199

Wald
.024
.441
2.603
20.176

df
1
1
1
1

P
.878
.506
.107
.000

Odds Ratio
1.046
1.217
1.045
.111

Table 7 - Logistic Regression Coefficients - Hypothesis 2: Battery Verdict

Defendant Race
Testimony Type
MRS Total Score
Constant
*p <.05,** p<M.

B
-.236
.026
.033
-1.946

Wald
.590
.007
1.368
15.060

df
1
1
1
1

P
.443
.931
.242
.000

Odds Ratio
.790
1.027
1.034
.143

Hypotheses 3 and 4
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to analyze the
remaining two hypotheses. An alpha level of .05 was selected a priori for tests of
significance. The MANOVA is used when analyzing more than one dependant variable,
and when the dependant variables are correlated (Grimm & Yarnold, 1995). In both the
third and fourth hypotheses of this study, one would expect participant ratings of the
expert witness and defendant, respectively, to be correlated. That is, it is expected that
mock jurors would rate the expert witness and defendant consistently, across domains
(positively or negatively). Additionally, using a MANOVA, instead of separate univariate
tests for each dependant variable, guards against the chance of committing a Type I error
and it takes into account the correlations between each of the dependant measures

(Grimm & Yarnold, 1995).
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Taking the intercorrelations into account can provide a much richer multivariate
analysis of data for two reasons. First, intercorrelations between outcome measures
suggest that the measures may be partially redundant, a degree of conceptual overlapping.
However, a MANOVA avoids this redundancy by taking the correlations between the
dependant measures into consideration (Grimm & Yarnold, 1995). Second, a MANOVA
can detect when groups differ on a system of variables (Huberty & Morris, 1989). That
is, when dependant variables are taken individually, they may not show significant group
differences. However, taken as a whole, as a system defining one or more theoretical
constructs, differences caused by the independent variables may be revealed (Grimm &
Yarnold, 1995).
Hypothesis 3: Ratings of the Expert Witness
The third hypothesis examined whether the psychological expert witness's race
and testimony type (racially relevant or not racially relevant) influenced mock juror
perceptions of the psychological expert witness. To test this hypothesis, a 2 x 2
MANOVA was used to assess whether expert witness race (Black or White) and
testimony type (racially relevant or not racially relevant) significantly affected participant
ratings of the expert witness. Participants rated their perceptions of the expert witness's
educational qualifications, clinical experience, professional reputation, degree of ease and
comfort on the stand, ability to explain technical terms clearly, his overall knowledge,
and credibility. There were no significant main effects or interactions (see Table 8).
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Table 8 - Summary of MAN OVA Results of Expert Witness Race and Testimony Type on
Perceptions (Ratings) of Expert Witness
_

_

_

_

_

„ _ _

"Expert WitnessRace

^953

L44

1

7l60

X)47~

Testimony Type

.950

1.52

1

.130

.050

Interaction

.959

1.22

1

.272

.041

_

_

_

_

_

_

Hypothesis 4: Ratings of Defendant
The fourth hypothesis investigated whether defendant race and psychological
expert witness testimony type (racially relevant or not racially relevant), influenced mock
juror perceptions of the defendant. To test this hypothesis, a 2 x 2 MANOVA was used
to assess whether defendant race and testimony type significantly affected participant
ratings of the defendant. Participants rated the defendant on their perceptions of whether
the defendant is the type of person to engage in the crimes in which he is accused, how
likely it is that the defendant engaged in the crimes as well as their level of sympathy,
pity, and anger toward the defendant. There were no significant main effects or
interactions (see Table 9).

75

Table 9 - Summary ofMANOVA Results of Defendant Race and Testimony Type on
Perceptions of the Defendant
—

_

_

__

_

_

_

_ _ _

_ _ _ _ _ _

_

_

.

_ _

Testimony Type

.986

.815

1

.540

.014

Interaction

.982

1.11

1

.356

.018

—————

_

_

_

_ _

.

Post-Hoc Analyses
Due to a lack of statistically significant findings supporting the original
hypotheses in this study and empirical support for the influence of demographic variables
on juror decision-making (e.g., Boyll, 1991; Elkins & Phillips, 1999; Gowan &
Zimmerman, 1996; Howard & Redering, 1983), post-hoc analyses were conducted to
explore whether demographic variables other than those originally hypothesized play a
significant role in predicting mock juror verdicts. In particular, participant race, age,
gender and year in school were examined using a logistic regression analysis, along with
the originally hypothesized independent variables (defendant race, psychological expert
witness race, psychological expert witness testimony type, and modern racism scale
scores).
On the charge of robbery, data screening led to the elimination of five outliers.
Regression results indicate that the overall model of three predictors (modern racism
scores, participant race, and participant gender) were statistically reliable in
distinguishing between guilty and not guilty verdicts (-2 Log Likelihood = 276.494; x2(2)
= 22.261, p = .004). The model correctly classified 81.2% of the cases. Regression
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coefficients are presented in Table 10. Wald statistics indicate that all three of these
variables significantly predict verdict.
A further investigation of the results reveals, on the charge of robbery, that as the
MRS total score increases, so does the probability of a guilty verdict. That is, when the
MRS score is increased by one point, the odds of a guilty verdict are multiplied by 1.081,
p=.010. In addition, female participants are less likely to render a not guilty verdict
(more likely to render a guilty verdict) than male participants. Specifically, female
participants are 67% less likely to render a not guilty verdict than men. Finally, nonWhite participants are 69% less likely to render a not guilty verdict than White
participants.
On the charge of battery, data screening led to the elimination of five outliers.
Regression results indicate that the overall model of three predictors (modern racism
scores, participant race, and participant gender) were statistically reliable in
distinguishing between guilty and not guilty verdicts (-2 Log Likelihood = 265.636; ^(2)
= 15.304, p = .053). The model correctly classified 82.5% of the cases. Regression
coefficients are presented in Table 11. Wald statistics indicate that all three of these
variables significantly predict verdict. Similar to the findings on the charge of robbery,
when the MRS score is increased by one point, the odds of a guilty verdict are multiplied
by 1.063, p=.048. In addition, female participants are less likely to render a not guilty
verdict (more likely to render a guilty verdict) than male participants. Specifically,
female participants are 58% less likely to render a not guilty verdict than men. Finally,
non-White participants are 62% less likely to render a not guilty verdict than White
participants.
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Table 10 - Logistic Regression Coefficients - Full Model: Robbery Verdict

Testimony Type
Defendant Race
Expert Race
MRS Total Score
Participant Race
(White vs.
NonWhite)
Participant
Gender
Participant Age
Participant Year
in School
Constant
*/?<.05, **/?<.01.

B
.463
.059
.321
.078
-1.173

Wald
2.116
.038
1.096
6.573
8.570

df
1
1
1
1
1

P
.146
.846
.295
.010
.003

Odds Ratio
1.589
1.061
1.378
1.081**
.309**

-1.098

8.830

1

.003

.333**

.001

.001

1

.971

1.001

-.026
-1.646

.022
2.936

1
1

.881
.087

.974
.193

Table 11 - Logistic Regression Coefficients - Full Model: Battery Verdict

Testimony Type
Defendant Race
Expert Race
MRS Total Score
Participant Race
(White vs.
NonWhite)
Participant Gender
Participant Age
Participant Year
in School
Constant
*/?<.05, **/><.01.

B
.257
-.266
.402
.062
-.963

Wald
.633
.707
1.627
3.920
5.579

df

-.858
.013
-.188
-1.289

1
1
1
1
1

P
.426
.401
.202
.048
.018

Odds Ratio
1.293
.767
1.495
1.063*
.382*

5.435
.200

1
1

.020
.655

.424*
1.013

.952
1.708

1
1

.329
.191

.829
.275

Correlations were computed between the independent variables in this study
(defendant race, psychological expert race, psychological expert witness testimony type),
a covariate (Modern Racism Scale scores) and the participant ratings of the expert
witness (see Table 12). This post-hoc analysis was conducted to further explore the
relationships between the independent variables, a covariate, and mock juror perceptions
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of the psychological expert witness. In this exploratory analysis, there were several
significant findings.
Testimony Type
One of the characteristics on which participants rated the expert witness was their
perception of his level of impressiveness or lack thereof on the witness stand. Testimony
type and the expert witness's level of impressiveness were significantly correlated r- .116, p < .05 (see Table 12). That is, participants were more likely to rate the expert
witness's testimony as unimpressive when he provided a racially relevant testimony than
when he provided a non-racially relevant testimony.
Modern Racism Scale Score
Participants' MRS scores were significantly correlated with their ratings of the
expert witness on four items. MRS scores correlated with mock jurors' perceptions of
the expert's: (1) educational qualifications r = .123, p < .05, (2) professional reputation r
= .135, p < .05, (3) professional manner/conduct on the witness stand r = .165, p < .01,
and (4) expertise r = .127, p < .05 (see Table 12). That is, when participants had higher
MRS scores, they were more likely to rate the expert witness as being poorly
educationally qualified, having a poor professional reputation, having an unprofessional
manner on the witness stand, and lacking knowledge in his field of expertise.
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-.058
-.026
-.008
-.096

-.036
-.081
.066
.056
.023
-.032
-.048
.087

-.059

.099

.039

-.051

.079

-.082

.057

-.052
-.087

-.031

-.069

-

TT

-.014

-

ER

-.094

.165**

-.104

.135*

-.063

.123*

-

MR

-.268**

.346**

-.203**

.500**

-.330**

-

EQ

.553**

-.376**

.453**

-.403**

-

CE

-.318**

.526**

-.299**

-

PR

.576**

-.433**

-

WS

-.416**

-

UM

-

EC

CK
PE

u

CT

.082
-.049
-.024
.127*
.360**
-.328**
-.443**
.592**
-.454**
.490**
CK
.025
.024
.087
.025
.000
.214**
.255**
.242**
-.117*
-.016
-.205**
PE
-.086 -.116*
.057
.322**
-.344**
-.319**
.434**
.510**
-.084
.039
.348**
-.350**
U
499**
.014
.002
.050
.525**
-.453**
-.387**
.008
.259**
.387**
.438**
.418**
.303**
CT
*p<. 05**/:x.01
DR - Defendant race, ER - Expert race, TT - Testimony type, MR - Modern Racism Scale total score, EQ - Poorly
qualified educationally, CE - Great deal of clinical experience, PR - Poor professional reputation, WS - Comfortable on
witness stand, UM - Awkward and unprofessional manner, EC - Explained technical terms clearly, CK - Inspired little
confidence in his knowledge, PE - Conducted a thoroughly professional evaluation of the defendant, U - Unimpressive
as judged by the transcript, CT - Credible and trustworthy

DR
ER
TT
MR
EQ
CE
PR
WS
UM
EC

DR

Table 12 - Pearson Correlation Matrix of Independent and Dependant Variables (Ratings of Expert)

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION
The present study examined factors that may influence verdict outcome when a
psychological expert witness testifies on behalf of the defense. Specifically, this study
examined the role of defendant race, psychological expert witness race, testimony type of
a psychological expert witness (racially relevant or not racially relevant), and modern
racism on mock juror verdicts. Additionally, this study examined factors that may
influence juror perceptions of a psychological expert witness and defendant. This study
is important, as evidenced by the enduring systemic racial bias in the treatment of Blacks
in the criminal justice system in this country, with Blacks being disproportionately
incarcerated in jails and prisons (Coker, 2003; Harrison & Karberg, 2003; U.S.
Department of Health & Human Services, 2001) and receiving harsher penalties (e.g.,
longer sentences and more likely to receive death penalty) than White Americans (Coker,
2003; Costanzo, 1997; Paternoster, 1983).
The first hypothesis predicted that participants with high scores on the Modern
Racism Scale (MRS) (McConahay, 1986) would be most likely to render a guilty verdict
when both the defendant and psychological expert witness were Black. This hypothesis
was not supported. The second hypothesis predicted that participants with high scores on
the MRS would be most likely to render a guilty verdict when the defendant was Black
and the expert witness provided racially relevant testimony. This hypothesis was not
supported. The third hypothesis anticipated that participants would give the most
positive ratings of the expert witness when he was White and provided non-racially
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relevant testimony, rather than racially relevant testimony. The most negative ratings of
the expert witness were anticipated when he was Black and provided a racially relevant
testimony. While this hypothesis was not directly supported, there was support for both
testimony type (racially relevant or not racially relevant) and MRS scores significantly
influencing mock juror perceptions (ratings) of the psychological expert witness. Finally,
the fourth hypothesis predicted that mock jurors would give the most positive ratings of
the defendant when he was White, and a non-racially relevant defense was presented.
The most negative ratings of the defendant were anticipated when he was Black, and a
racially relevant defense was provided on his behalf. This hypothesis was also not
supported.
Hypothesis 1: Verdict
Defendant race, expert witness race and Modern Racism Scale (MRS) scores did
not serve as significant predictors of verdict as hypothesized. It was expected that
participants with high MRS scores would be most likely to render a guilty verdict when
both the defendant and expert witness were Black. Regression results indicated that none
of the hypothesized predictors (modern racism scale scores, defendant race, and
psychological expert race) are statistically reliable in distinguishing between guilty and
not guilty verdicts on the charges of robbery and battery.
Hypothesis 2: Verdict
Defendant race, expert witness testimony type and MRS scores did not serve as
significant predictors of verdict as hypothesized. It was originally anticipated that
participants with high MRS scores would be most likely to render a guilty verdict when
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the defendant is Black and the expert witness testifies on a racially relevant topic.
Regression results indicated that none of the hypothesized predictors (modern racist
beliefs, defendant race, and psychological expert witness testimony type) are statistically
reliable in distinguishing between guilty and not guilty verdicts on the charges of robbery
and battery.
Hypothesis 3: Ratings of the Expert Witness
The manipulation of expert witness race and the expert witness's testimony type
did not significantly effect mock jurors' perceptions of the expert witness. It was
originally predicted that participants would give the most positive ratings of the expert
witness when he was White and provided non-racially relevant testimony. The lowest
ratings of the expert witness were expected when he was Black and provided racially
relevant testimony. While these results are inconsistent with earlier research that
demonstrated jurors' racial bias toward defense attorneys increased their attributions of
guilt toward the defendant (e.g., Boliver, 1999; Cohen & Peterson, 1981; Mixon, Foley,
& Orne, 1995), it is similar to research that explored the effects of expert witness race on
the perceptions of the expert. For instance, Memon and Shuman (1998) found no
evidence of racial bias in the perceptions of the expert witness in their study, and in fact,
they found that mock jurors rated the Black female expert as the most persuasive out of
all the race-gender combinations (e.g., White male, Black male, White female, Black
female). In addition, Miyatake (1999) found no significant differences in ratings of
credibility and effectiveness of the expert witness when he was White, Black or Asian.
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While the original hypotheses were not supported regarding the mock jurors'
perceptions of the expert witness, significant correlations were found between
independent variables (testimony type and Modern Racism Scale scores) and mock juror
perceptions of the expert witness. First, testimony type and mock juror perceptions of the
expert witness's level of impressiveness were significantly correlated. That is, mock
jurors were more likely to rate the expert witness's testimony as unimpressive when he
provided racially relevant testimony than when he provided a non-racially relevant
testimony. Second, MRS scores significantly correlated with mock jurors' perceptions of
the expert's educational qualifications, professional reputation, professional
manner/conduct on the witness stand, and expertise. That is, when mock jurors had
higher MRS scores, they were more likely to rate the expert witness as being poorly
educationally qualified, having a poor professional reputation, having an unprofessional
manner on the witness stand, and lacking knowledge in his field of expertise.

Hypothesis 4: Ratings of the Defendant
Defendant race and testimony type did not significantly effect mock jurors'
perceptions of the defendant. It was hypothesized that participants would give the most
positive ratings of the defendant when he was White, and the expert witness's testimony
was not racially relevant. Conversely, the lowest ratings of the defendant were expected
when he was Black and the expert witness provided racially relevant testimony.
However, there was no support for this hypothesis.
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Other Findings
Gender. Participant gender was not originally hypothesized to play an important
mediating role in predicting verdict, as studies with similar designs to the present
investigation did not find gender to be a significant predictor of verdict (e.g., Cohen &
Peterson, 1981; Memon & Shuman, 1998, etc.). However, in the present study, female
participants were less likely to render a not guilty verdict (more likely to render a guilty
verdict) than male participants on both charges of robbery and battery. This result is
similar to prior research with jurors in both civil (e.g., Elkins & Philips, 1999; Gowan &
Zimmerman, 1996; Griffith, Libkuman, Dodd, Shafir, & Dickinson, 2002) and criminal
(e.g., Ugwuegbu, 1979) cases which has demonstrated a consistent gender difference in
which female jurors tend to consider victims more leniently and defendants more harshly
in cases involving crimes against women. Similarly, in the present study, the most
severely injured victim during the commission of the robbery was female. (The female
victim was shot in the head and chest, lost an eye, and needed to undergo extensive
rehabilitation to regain normal usage of her limbs.)
In another study that explored gender differences within the context of the
insanity defense, researchers found that female mock jurors considered the defendants
more dangerous than male mock jurors (Breheney, Groscup, & Galietta, 2007).
However, empirical findings have been inconsistent regarding whether women are more
conviction prone universally, with some research reporting support for this idea (e.g.,
Nagao & Davis, 1980), but others not finding such support (e.g., Villemur & Hyde,
1983).
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There is also some research that suggests there may be an interaction between
race and gender in juror decision-making. Dean, Wayne, Mack and Thomas (2000)
found support for this idea in a study in which they evaluated the roles of both plaintiff
and defendant race and gender on judgments of criminal guilt in either an assault or theft
case. They found that female participants in the study were more likely than male
participants to find defendants guilty of a crime when the victim was White. Similarly, in
the briefcase descriptions used in the present study, the victims that were violently
assaulted were of a different race than the defendant. That is, when the defendant was
Black, the victims that were violently assaulted were White. Thus, the race of the victims
may have influenced White female participant verdict decisions.
Participant Race. A surprising finding in the present study was that non-White
participants were less likely to render a not guilty verdict than White participants on both
charges of robbery and battery. This finding is contrary to the anticipated results.
However, it is important to note that the non-White sample was relatively small in
comparison to the White sample (40 non-White participants versus 263 White
participants) in this study. Therefore, the small non-White sample may render a
comparison between the two groups inappropriate. Furthermore, the non-White
comparison group consists of diverse participants, with widely varying racial and ethnic
backgrounds. Therefore, it may be erroneous to attempt to place these diverse
individuals in one category and make a meaningful interpretation about this
heterogeneous group.
The lack of guilty verdicts rendered by the White participants in the present study
is consistent with some other studies that have found no consistent evidence of racial
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prejudice in White jurors' decision making. For instance, Mazzella and Feingold (1994)
concluded that Black defendants are no more likely than White defendants to be found
guilty in their meta-analysis of 29 studies on racial bias in juror decision-making.
However, these results seem irreconcilable with the racial disparities in incarceration
rates and sentencing between White and Black defendants that persist within the criminal
justice system (Coker, 2003; Harrison & Karberg, 2003; U.S. Department of Health &
Human Services, 2001). Sommers & Ellsworth (2000) suggest that racial prejudice and
discrimination still exist; however, the manifestation of this racial bias has changed. That
is, according to modern racism theory, Whites are motivated to appear nonprejudiced.
Furthermore, as the participants in this study recognized that their verdicts did not have
any actual consequences for any defendant or victim, White participants may have been
more concerned with their social desirability rather than rendering a verdict that was
consistent with their beliefs.
For instance, Memon and Shuman (1998) conducted a study that explored the
influence of expert race and gender on juror decision-making in a civil dispute. Both the
race and gender were manipulated of a medical expert that testified on behalf of a doctor
being sued for medical malpractice (e.g., Expert conditions: White male, Black male,
White female, Black female). Participants rated the Black female expert as the most
persuasive out of all of the race-gender combinations, yet the Black female expert's
testimony did not appear to influence their verdict. This may suggest that participants
may have been attempting to avoid rating the expert in the biased manner. That is,
despite the high level of persuasiveness that White participants reported about the Black
expert, it did not persuade participants in their verdict decision. Similarly, in the present
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study, there may be a disconnect between the attempts of White participants to appear
nonprejudiced through their verdicts in this artificial situation, and the verdicts they may
render when there are real consequences for both the defendant and victim.
Lack of Significance of Hypotheses
Testimony Type
Two of the four original hypotheses proposed that manipulating both the
testimony type of the expert witness (racially relevant or not racially relevant) in addition
to the race of the expert witness (hypothesis three) and defendant (hypothesis four) would
significantly influence jurors' perceptions of both these individuals. Neither of these
hypotheses were supported. Prior (e.g., Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000) studies have
demonstrated that White jurors may be motivated to appear nonprejudiced when racial
issues are salient, which may account for the lack of significance in the racially relevant
conditions. However, this does not account for the results in the non-racially relevant
conditions. This may better be explained by studies (e.g., Hill & Pfeifer, 1992; Pfeifer &
Ogloff, 1991; Sargent & Bradfield, 2004) that suggest racial bias is most likely to
influence White jurors' decision-making in the absence of evidentiary information or
ambiguous circumstances. That is, according to modern racism theory, jurors are more
likely to act on racist beliefs if they can be justified along non-racial grounds (Pfeifer &
Ogloff, 1991). Ambiguity or a lack of evidentiary information can allow jurors to make
prejudicial judgments based on seemingly nonracial grounds (i.e., their perceptions of the
facts of the case).
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Two studies (Hill & Pfeifer, 1992; Pfeifer & Ogloff, 1991) found that by simply
including jury instructions, verdict differences between White and Black defendants were
eliminated. Furthermore, Sargent and Bradfield (2004) found when the evidence strongly
supported the defense's case; there was no significant racial bias in verdicts between
White and Black defendants. Instead, racial bias was most evident when the defendant's
alibi (defense evidence) was weak. In the present study, jury instructions, prosecution
and defense arguments, as well as expert witness testimony were provided. One or a
combination of these factors may have provided enough information to jurors to remove
racial bias from their decision-making.
Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986)
The remaining two original hypotheses predicted that jurors with high scores on
the Modern Racism Scale (MRS) were most likely to render guilty verdicts when both the
defendant and expert witness are Black (hypothesis one), and when the expert's
testimony is racially relevant (hypothesis two). Neither of these hypotheses were
supported.
Limitations/Directions for Future Research
There are several limitations to the current study, which may inform future
research. While there is empirical support for the reliability and validity of the Modern
Racism Scale (MRS) (e.g., McConahay, 1983; 1986; McConahay, Hardee, & Batts,
1981), an explicit measurement of racial attitudes, there are a growing number of studies
that suggest that the validity of the MRS may be diminishing. Neuger (2002) suggests
that because the items on the MRS are not racially neutral, the items may be more
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reactive than McConahay believes, leading respondents to censure their responses in a
non-racist direction that is more consistent with today's politically correct ideals.
Furthermore, there may have been enough change in racial attitudes between the time of
the original validation studies of this measurement and the present, which may actually
render some of the items invalid today. In Migetz's (2004) dissertation research, in
which she had participants make decisions about whether to hire applicants for a human
resource position while varying the race of the applicants, she found the MRS to be a
weak contributor to the prediction of racist behavioral responses (i.e., in hiring decisions).
Another study (Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001) found that participants who
revealed strong pro-White attitudes on implicit measures, reported disagreement with
explicit statements of prejudice and negative beliefs about Black Americans on the MRS.
Similarly, Boniecki and Jacks (2002) found that the MRS did not correlate with measures
of implicit prejudice.
While the MRS is not believed to be an invalid instrument, it may be time for new
validation studies on the scale, perhaps updating some of the items, making them more
consistent with current modern racist beliefs. In addition, future use of the MRS may
benefit from pairing it with a more open-ended measure rather than only relying on the
forced choice responses on the MRS. For instance, in the present study, when participants
had the opportunity to provide feedback and comments on the survey, many participants
expressed very hostile feelings about the use of a racially relevant defense. However,
despite many participants' hostile reactions to this condition, these feelings did not
always translate into behavioral responses (i.e., verdict decisions). Therefore, a future

90

study may benefit from a mixed design that incorporates both quantitative and qualitative
data collection methods, possibly yielding richer results.
Another limitation to the current study is the use of convenience sampling, which
limits the generalizability of the results. That is, all of the participants were sophomore
and junior college students enrolled at one mid-western state university. According to the
university website, over 91% of the students currently enrolled are from within the state.
Therefore, the participant pool was limited by its geographical representation. This may
be important because racial attitudes may vary by geographic region. In addition, the
participant pool was limited by age, as the average participant age was 21.87 years old.
College students may express fewer racist attitudes than older individuals that remember
a time in which the expression of overt racist attitudes was acceptable. Furthermore, the
limited life experiences and familiarity with the legal system of these participants may
also limit the generalizability of these findings. For instance, several participants made
comments on their surveys indicating that they did not believe that someone could be sent
to prison with eyewitness identification being the only evidence linking the defendant to
the crime scene. Unfortunately, this does occur within the legal system, as the scenario
used in this particular study was based on an actual case. Thus, some of the participants'
disbelief about the likelihood of the scenario used in this study may have influenced their
decision-making. In addition, the sample used in this study was predominantly White,
with only minimal representation from other racial and ethnic groups. Therefore, these
results are not generalizable to other racial and ethnic minority groups. In an effort to
increase generalizability, future research needs to include a sample with greater diversity.
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As in all research on juror decision-making, there are limitations to this study due
to its experimental nature. That is, mock jurors recognize that their verdict decisions do
not carry consequences for an actual defendant, which may have influenced the amount
of time that participants took to review the trial documents and render a verdict. Also,
mock jurors made individual decisions in this study about their verdicts. However, in an
actual trial, mock jurors would deliberate with other jurors that may influence or sway
their final verdict decision. In short, it is always important to note the limitations of
experimental research on juror decision-making before attempting to generalize the
results to actual legal situations.
Conclusion
The results of this study indicated that participant modern racism scale scores,
participant race, and participant gender all served as significant predictors of mock juror
verdicts. However, the influence of these variables on verdict preference is not
necessarily straightforward or predictable. This suggests that further research needs to
explore exactly how and why this is occurring. This is important because current
estimates are that less than two percent of cases go to trial, meaning that cases that do
reach trial are often evidentially close, emotionally charged, high risk or high stake
(Boyll, 1991). It is in these cases that non-evidentiary factors, such as emotions and
demographic variables, may be crucial to the outcome of the trial. Furthermore, given
the racial disparities in incarceration rates and sentencing between White and Black
defendants (Coker, 2003; Harrison & Karberg, 2003; U.S. Department of Health &
Human Services, 2001), it is evident that racial bias is, in fact, influencing the juror
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decision-making process. Ultimately, future research needs to extend beyond exploring
whether racial bias is present in juror decision-making, and begin to investigate ways to
redress it in legal settings.
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Informed Consent Form

You have been invited to participate in a research project entitled "Juror DecisionMaking in a Criminal Case." This research is intended to examine how potential jurors
interpret case information and reach a verdict. This project is Lily C. Munavu's
dissertation research.
You must be a Western Michigan University student to participate in this study. If you
decide to participate in this study, your involvement will take no more (and may take
less) than 40 minutes of your time. You will be asked to read several case related items
and complete three questionnaires. Following brief instructions, the first questionnaire
for you to complete is a short demographic survey that is similar to one you might
complete if you were a member of an actual juror pool. Next, you will read a summary
of a court case, background information on the expert witness in this case, a transcript of
the expert witness's testimony, and a set of jury instructions for you to carefully review.
After reading these case materials, you will be asked to complete the last two
questionnaires. The first questionnaire asks you to decide on a verdict in this case as well
as respond to a series of questions about the case. The second questionnaire asks about
your social attitudes, in general. Once you have read and completed all three
questionnaires, you will be given the opportunity to enter into a cash prize drawing.
As in all research, there may be unforeseen risks to the participant. One potential risk of
participation in this project is that you may be upset by the content of the criminal case.
If so, you may seek help in dealing with your feelings at Western Michigan University's
Counseling and Testing Center, 2513 Faunce Student Services Building, Kalamazoo, MI
49008,(269)378-1850.
The benefits of participating in this study include learning firsthand how psychological
research is conducted as well as learning some information about our legal system and
the juror decision-making process. Furthermore, your participation in this study may
contribute to the general body of literature on our understanding of the juror decisionmaking process.
All information collected from you is anonymous. Software will be used to de-identify
the e-mail addresses associated with responses. Furthermore, no IP addresses will be
collected; therefore, there is no identifying information collected. However, there are
potential limits to privacy and anonymity associated with participating in Internet
research. For instance, when using a public computer to submit your responses, there is
the possibility that others around you can view your responses on the computer monitor
or that the history of your web use on a computer may be recorded. In addition, if you
are using a computer at a workplace that monitors your e-mails and Internet activities,
your responses may not be entirely confidential. Thus, you may want to be mindful of
the location in which you are participating in this study. Furthermore, it is recommended
that you close your browser after completing the survey when using a public computer.
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All data collected will be retained for approximately seven years in a locked file in the
principal investigator's office.
You may refuse to participate or quit at any time during the study without prejudice or
penalty. If you have any questions or concerns about this study, you may contact either
Dr. Lonnie Duncan at (269) 387-5152 or Lily Munavu at (269) 599-6283. You may also
contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board at (269) 387-8293 or
the Vice President for Research at (269) 387-8298 if questions or problems arise during
the course of the study.
Human Subjects Institutional Review Board (HSIRB) approval on June 18, 2007.
Do not participate in this study after June 18, 2008.
Clicking below indicates that you have read the description of the study and agree to
participate.
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Instructions to Participants

Imagine that you are currently living in Indianapolis, Indiana and have been selected for
jury duty. You are being asked to review a criminal case that is based on the events of an
actual criminal trial; however, all names and identifying information have been changed.
Your verdict will be compared to the verdicts of the jurors who heard the original trial.
Your task is to complete a short pre-trial questionnaire, similar to the voir dire you may
encounter during jury selection. Next, you are asked to read a briefcase description and
court transcript of an expert psychological witness. Then you will be provided jury
instructions, which include a legal definition of the charges brought against the
defendant. Following your careful review of the case materials, you will be asked to
complete a questionnaire in which you will render a verdict.
You will be reviewing a criminal trial in which the defendant is charged with one count
of Robbery and one count of Battery. Please review all of the evidence carefully before
making a decision about the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
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Juror Pre-Trial Questionnaire

Gender (please check one):
Male
Female
Race/Ethnicity (please check one):
Asian/Asian American/Pacific Islander
Black/African American
Hispanic/Latino
White/Caucasian/European, not Hispanic
American Indian/Native American
Biracial (parents from two different racial groups)
Other (please write in):
Highest Level of Education (please check one):
Less than high school
High school diploma or GED
Some college (did not complete)
Associate's Degree
Bachelor's Degree
Graduate Degree
Other (please write in):
Are you a citizen of the United States?
Yes
No
Are you able to communicate in English?
Yes
No
Are you suffering from a physical or mental disability that prevents you from performing
your duties as a juror in a satisfactory manner?
Yes
No
Are you under guardianship because of mental incapacity?
Yes
No

113

Have you been convicted of a felony?
Yes
No
If "Yes," have your Civil Rights been restored by a Certificate of Rehabilitation
or Pardon?
Yes
No
Are you a law enforcement officer?
Yes
No
Have you ever served previously as a member of a trial jury?
Yes
No
If "Yes," please describe (briefly) the type of case (e.g., civil or criminal) and the
outcome of the trial.

Do you believe a defendant is innocent until proven guilty?
Yes
No
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Brief Case Description: Black Defendant-Black Expert

Prosecution's Case:
On August 5, 2000, at approximately 2:00 p.m. three men robbed Credit One, a credit and
lending institution in Indianapolis, Indiana. During the robbery, one of the creditor's
employees, Wilma Thompson, a 42-year-old Caucasian female, was shot in the chest and
head. Although she survived the attack, she lost her left eye and had to undergo
extensive rehabilitation to regain normal usage of her limbs and speaking ability. Ms.
Thompson's boss, Charles Anderson, a 59-year-old Caucasian male, was assaulted, and a
Credit One customer, Roberta Walker, a 63-year-old African-American female, was
robbed. A set of fingerprints was left at the scene, which belonged to a 25-year-old
African-American male named Eric Chapman. After Chapman's arrest, he revealed the
names of his two African-American male accomplices, 27-year-old James Smith and
Smith's cousin, whom he had only met a few months before the robbery, and knew him
only as "Lamont." However, he was able to provide police with an address where he
believed "Lamont" to live. Police were unable to locate "Lamont" at the provided
address; however, they arrested a 16-year-old African-American male named Lamont
Jackson, fitting a similar description, at a nearby address. The shooting victim, Ms.
Thompson, and her boss, Mr. Anderson, identified Mr. Jackson as the shooter during the
robbery. Furthermore, James Smith, one of the accomplices in the robbery, identified
Mr. Jackson as the shooter and agreed to testify against him.
Defense's Case:
Lamont Jackson maintains his innocence and insists that he was not involved in the
robbery. On August 5, 2000, from 1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m., several friends and relatives
corroborate his story that he was playing ball with them and will testify on his behalf.
Eric Chapman, the first accomplice arrested in connection with the crime who told police
that "Lamont" was the third accomplice, was adamant with the police that they arrested
the wrong guy when he saw 16-year-old Lamont Jackson. Furthermore, against the
advice of his attorney, Mr. Chapman will be testifying on behalf of Jackson's defense that
he was in no way involved with the robbery. James Smith, the second accomplice in the
robbery, who agreed to testify against Mr. Jackson, will be receiving a sentence reduction
in exchange for his testimony. Furthermore, Mr. Smith failed a polygraph test on
whether his version of the crime was true and continues to deny that he even has a cousin
named "Lamont." Roberta Walker, the customer in the bank at the time of the robbery,
was certain that Mr. Jackson was not the third accomplice in the bank robbery. Ms.
Walker has known Mr. Jackson since he was a child and will testify in his defense.
Manipulation:
Racially Relevant Expert Witness Testimony = Present
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There is an increasing body of evidence that demonstrates the inherent unreliability of
eyewitness identification (e.g., Kassin, Ellsworth, & Smith, 1994; Malpass & Kravitz,
1987; Wells & Murray, 1984, etc.). Many factors have been shown to undermine an
eyewitness's ability to make an accurate identification after the commission of a crime.
One such factor that has consistently impaired the accuracy of identification is a crossracial identification (also referred to as the cross-race effect) (Malpass & Kravitz, 1987).
In this particular case, both of the eyewitnesses that identified Lamont Jackson as the
shooter, Wilma Thompson and Charles Anderson, are White, while the defendant, Mr.
Jackson, is African-American. According to the cross-race effect, the White
eyewitnesses in this case are significantly more likely to falsely identify an AfricanAmerican face than a White face. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that
individuals are much more likely to be able to accurately identify an own-race face
compared to an other-race face (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). In this case, the one
African-American eyewitness, Roberta Walker, insists that Mr. Jackson was not the third
accomplice. According to the cross-race effect, Ms. Walker's eyewitness account is
much more likely to be accurate, as it pertains to making a same-race identification, than
the cross-racial identifications made by the two White eyewitnesses.
The defense has called an expert witness to testify about cross-racial identification. The
following is a transcript of the expert witness's testimony.
Racially Relevant Expert Witness Testimony = Absent
There is an increasing body of evidence that demonstrates the inherent unreliability of
eyewitness identification (e.g., Kassin, Ellsworth, & Smith, 1994; Malpass & Kravitz,
1987; Wells & Murray, 1984, etc.). Many factors have been shown to undermine an
eyewitness's ability to make an accurate identification after the commission of a crime.
One such factor that has consistently impaired the accuracy of identification is a
phenomenon called weapon focus. Weapon focus refers to a witness's attention being
focused on a weapon, if present, during the commission of a crime. Therefore, the
witness gives less attention to other factors during a crime, such as the physical features
and clothing of the perpetrator. As a result, the witness's ability to accurately recall
details about the perpetrator and environment are reduced (Kramer, Buckhout, &
Eugenio, 1990; Loftus, Loftus, & Messo, 1987; Steblay, 1992). In this case, not only was
a weapon present, but also it was an imminent threat, as one of the witnesses was shot
twice. Therefore, one would expect that the witnesses' ability to accurately identify the
perpetrators would be reduced.
The defense has called an expert witness to testify on the phenomenon of weapon focus.
The following is a transcript of the expert witness's testimony.
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BriefCase Description: Black Defendant-White Expert

Prosecution's Case:
On August 5, 2000, at approximately 2:00 p.m. three men robbed Credit One, a credit and
lending institution in Indianapolis, Indiana. During the robbery, one of the creditor's
employees, Wilma Thompson, a 42-year-old Caucasian female, was shot in the chest and
head. Although she survived the attack, she lost her left eye and had to undergo
extensive rehabilitation to regain normal usage of her limbs and speaking ability. Ms.
Thompson's boss, Charles Anderson, a 59-year-old Caucasian male, was assaulted, and a
Credit One customer, Roberta Walker, a 63-year-old African-American female, was
robbed. A set of fingerprints was left at the scene, which belonged to a 25-year-old
African-American male named Eric Chapman. After Chapman's arrest, he revealed the
names of his two African-American male accomplices, 27-year-old James Smith and
Smith's cousin, whom he had only met a few months before the robbery, and knew him
only as "Lamont." However, he was able to provide police with an address where he
believed "Lamont" to live. Police were unable to locate "Lamont" at the provided
address; however, they arrested a 16-year-old African-American male named Lamont
Jackson, fitting a similar description, at a nearby address. The shooting victim, Ms.
Thompson, and her boss, Mr. Anderson, identified Mr. Jackson as the shooter during the
robbery. Furthermore, James Smith, one of the accomplices in the robbery, identified
Mr. Jackson as the shooter and agreed to testify against him.
Defense's Case:
Lamont Jackson maintains his innocence and insists that he was not involved in the
robbery. On August 5, 2000, from 1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m., several friends and relatives
corroborate his story that he was playing ball with them and will testify on his behalf.
Eric Chapman, the first accomplice arrested in connection with the crime who told police
that "Lamont" was the third accomplice, was adamant with the police that they arrested
the wrong guy when he saw 16-year-old Lamont Jackson. Furthermore, against the
advice of his attorney, Mr. Chapman will be testifying on behalf of Jackson's defense that
he was in no way involved with the robbery. James Smith, the second accomplice in the
robbery, who agreed to testify against Mr. Jackson, will be receiving a sentence reduction
in exchange for his testimony. Furthermore, Mr. Smith failed a polygraph test on
whether his version of the crime was true and continues to deny that he even has a cousin
named "Lamont." Roberta Walker, the customer in the bank at the time of the robbery,
was certain that Mr. Jackson was not the third accomplice in the bank robbery. Ms.
Walker has known Mr. Jackson since he was a child and will testify in his defense.
Manipulation:
Racially Relevant Expert Witness Testimony = Present
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There is an increasing body of evidence that demonstrates the inherent unreliability of
eyewitness identification (e.g., Kassin, Ellsworth, & Smith, 1994; Malpass & Kravitz,
1987; Wells & Murray, 1984, etc.). Many factors have been shown to undermine an
eyewitness's ability to make an accurate identification after the commission of a crime.
One such factor that has consistently impaired the accuracy of identification is a crossracial identification (also referred to as the cross-race effect) (Malpass & Kravitz, 1987).
In this particular case, both of the eyewitnesses that identified Lamont Jackson as the
shooter, Wilma Thompson and Charles Anderson, are White, while the defendant, Mr.
Jackson, is African-American. According to the cross-race effect, the White
eyewitnesses in this case are significantly more likely to falsely identify an AfricanAmerican face than a White face. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that
individuals are much more likely to be able to accurately identify an own-race face
compared to an other-race face (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). In this case, the one
African-American eyewitness, Roberta Walker, insists that Mr. Jackson was not the third
accomplice. According to the cross-race effect, Ms. Walker's eyewitness account is
much more likely to be accurate, as it pertains to making a same-race identification, than
the cross-racial identifications made by the two White eyewitnesses.
The defense has called an expert witness to testify about cross-racial identification. The
following is a transcript of the expert witness's testimony.
Racially Relevant Expert Witness Testimony = Absent
There is an increasing body of evidence that demonstrates the inherent unreliability of
eyewitness identification (e.g., Kassin, Ellsworth, & Smith, 1994; Malpass & Kravitz,
1987; Wells & Murray, 1984, etc.). Many factors have been shown to undermine an
eyewitness's ability to make an accurate identification after the commission of a crime.
One such factor that has consistently impaired the accuracy of identification is a
phenomenon called weapon focus. Weapon focus refers to a witness's attention being
focused on a weapon, if present, during the commission of a crime. Therefore, the
witness gives less attention to other factors during a crime, such as the physical features
and clothing of the perpetrator. As a result, the witness's ability to accurately recall
details about the perpetrator and environment are reduced (Kramer, Buckhout, &
Eugenio, 1990; Loftus, Loftus, & Messo, 1987; Steblay, 1992). In this case, not only was
a weapon present, but also it was an imminent threat, as one of the witnesses was shot
twice. Therefore, one would expect that the witnesses' ability to accurately identify the
perpetrators would be reduced.
The defense has called an expert witness to testify on the phenomenon of weapon focus.
The following is a transcript of the expert witness's testimony.
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Brief Case Description: White Defendant-Black Expert

Prosecution's Case:
On August 5, 2000, at approximately 2:00 p.m., three men robbed Credit One, a credit
and lending institution in Indianapolis, Indiana. During the robbery, one of the creditor's
employees, Wilma Thompson, a 42-year-old African-American female, was shot in the
chest and head. Although she survived the attack, she lost her left eye and had to
undergo extensive rehabilitation to regain normal usage of her limbs and speaking ability.
Ms. Thompson's boss, Charles Anderson, a 59-year-old African-American male, was
assaulted, and a Credit One customer, Roberta Walker, a 63-year-old Caucasian female,
was robbed. A set of fingerprints was left at the scene, which belonged to a 25-year-old
Caucasian male named Eric Chapman. After Chapman's arrest, he revealed the names of
his two Caucasian male accomplices, 27-year-old James Smith and Smith's cousin,
whom he had only met a few months before the robbery, and knew him only as "Lucas."
However, he was able to provide police with an address where he believed "Lucas" to
live. Police were unable to locate "Lucas" at the provided address; however, they
arrested a 16-year-old Caucasian male named Lucas McGregor, fitting a similar
description, at a nearby address. The shooting victim, Ms. Thompson, and her boss, Mr.
Anderson, identified Mr. McGregor as the shooter during the robbery. Furthermore,
James Smith, one of the accomplices in the robbery, identified Mr. McGregor as the
shooter and agreed to testify against him.
Defense's Case:
Lucas McGregor maintains his innocence and insists that he was not involved in the
robbery. On August 5, 2000, from 1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m., several friends and relatives
corroborate his story that he was playing ball with them and will testify on his behalf.
Eric Chapman, the first accomplice arrested in connection with the crime who told police
that "Lucas" was the third accomplice, was adamant with the police that they arrested the
wrong guy when he saw 16-year-old Lucas McGregor. Furthermore, against the advice
of his attorney, Mr. Chapman will be testifying on behalf of McGregor's defense that he
was in no way involved with the robbery. James Smith, the second accomplice in the
robbery, who agreed to testify against Mr. McGregor, will be receiving a sentence
reduction in exchange for his testimony. Furthermore, Mr. Smith failed a polygraph test
on whether his version of the crime was true and continues to deny that he even has a
cousin named "Lucas." Roberta Walker, the customer in the bank at the time of the
robbery, was certain that Mr. McGregor was not the third accomplice in the bank
robbery. Ms. Walker has known Mr. McGregor since he was a child and will testify in
his defense.
Manipulation:
Racially Relevant Expert Witness Testimony = Present
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There is an increasing body of evidence that demonstrates the inherent unreliability of
eyewitness identification (e.g., Kassin, Ellsworth, & Smith, 1994; Malpass & Kravitz,
1987; Wells & Murray, 1984, etc.). Many factors have been shown to undermine an
eyewitness's ability to make an accurate identification after the commission of a crime.
Once such factor that has consistently impaired the accuracy of identification is a crossracial identification (also referred to as the cross-race effect) (Malpass & Kravitz, 1987).
In this particular case, both of the eyewitnesses that identified Lucas McGregor as the
shooter, Wilma Thompson and Charles Anderson, are African-American, while the
defendant, Mr. McGregor, is Caucasian. According to the cross-race effect, the AfricanAmerican eyewitnesses in this case are more likely to falsely identify a Caucasian face
than an African-American face. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that
individuals are much more likely to be able to accurately identify an own-race face
compared to an other-race face (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). In this case, the one
Caucasian eyewitness, Roberta Walker, insists that Mr. McGregor was not the third
accomplice. According to the cross-race effect, Ms. Walker's eyewitness account is
much more likely to be accurate, as it pertains to making a same-race identification, than
the cross-racial identifications made by the two African-American eyewitnesses.
The defense has called an expert witness to testify about cross-racial identification. The
following is a transcript of the expert witness's testimony.
Racially Relevant Expert Witness Testimony = Absent
There is an increasing body of evidence that demonstrates the inherent unreliability of
eyewitness identification (e.g., Kassin, Ellsworth, & Smith, 1994; Malpass & Kravitz,
1987; Wells & Murray, 1984, etc.). Many factors have been shown to undermine an
eyewitness's ability to make an accurate identification after the commission of a crime.
Once such factor that has consistently impaired the accuracy of identification is a
phenomenon called weapon focus. Weapon focus refers to a witness's attention being
focused on a weapon, if present, during the commission of a crime. Therefore, the
witness gives less attention to other factors during a crime, such as the physical features
and clothing of the perpetrator. As a result, the witness's ability to accurately recall
details about the perpetrator and environment are reduced (Kramer, Buckhout, &
Eugenio, 1990; Loftus, Loftus, & Messo, 1987; Steblay, 1992). In this case, not only was
a weapon present, but also it was an imminent threat, as one of the witnesses was shot
twice. Therefore, one would expect that the witnesses' ability to accurately identify the
perpetrators would be reduced.
The defense has called an expert witness to testify on the phenomenon of weapon focus.
The following is a transcript of the expert witness's testimony.
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Brief Case Description: White Defendant-White Expert

Prosecution's Case:
On August 5, 2000, at approximately 2:00 p.m., three men robbed Credit One, a credit
and lending institution in Indianapolis, Indiana. During the robbery, one of the creditor's
employees, Wilma Thompson, a 42-year-old African-American female, was shot in the
chest and head. Although she survived the attack, she lost her left eye and had to
undergo extensive rehabilitation to regain normal usage of her limbs and speaking ability.
Ms. Thompson's boss, Charles Anderson, a 59-year-old African-American male, was
assaulted, and a Credit One customer, Roberta Walker, a 63-year-old Caucasian female,
was robbed. A set of fingerprints was left at the scene, which belonged to a 25-year-old
Caucasian male named Eric Chapman. After Chapman's arrest, he revealed the names of
his two Caucasian male accomplices, 27-year-old James Smith and Smith's cousin,
whom he had only met a few months before the robbery, and knew him only as "Lucas."
However, he was able to provide police with an address where he believed "Lucas" to
live. Police were unable to locate "Lucas" at the provided address; however, they
arrested a 16-year-old Caucasian male named Lucas McGregor, fitting a similar
description, at a nearby address. The shooting victim, Ms. Thompson, and her boss, Mr.
Anderson, identified Mr. McGregor as the shooter during the robbery. Furthermore,
James Smith, one of the accomplices in the robbery, identified Mr. McGregor as the
shooter and agreed to testify against him.
Defense's Case:
Lucas McGregor maintains his innocence and insists that he was not involved in the
robbery. On August 5, 2000, from 1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m., several friends and relatives
corroborate his story that he was playing ball with them and will testify on his behalf.
Eric Chapman, the first accomplice arrested in connection with the crime who told police
that "Lucas" was the third accomplice, was adamant with the police that they arrested the
wrong guy when he saw 16-year-old Lucas McGregor. Furthermore, against the advice
of his attorney, Mr. Chapman will be testifying on behalf of McGregor's defense that he
was in no way involved with the robbery. James Smith, the second accomplice in the
robbery, who agreed to testify against Mr. McGregor, will be receiving a sentence
reduction in exchange for his testimony. Furthermore, Mr. Smith failed a polygraph test
on whether his version of the crime was true and continues to deny that he even has a
cousin named "Lucas." Roberta Walker, the customer in the bank at the time of the
robbery, was certain that Mr. McGregor was not the third accomplice in the bank
robbery. Ms. Walker has known Mr. McGregor since he was a child and will testify in
his defense.
Manipulation:
Racially Relevant Expert Witness Testimony = Present
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There is an increasing body of evidence that demonstrates the inherent unreliability of
eyewitness identification (e.g., Kassin, Ellsworth, & Smith, 1994; Malpass & Kravitz,
1987; Wells & Murray, 1984, etc.). Many factors have been shown to undermine an
eyewitness's ability to make an accurate identification after the commission of a crime.
Once such factor that has consistently impaired the accuracy of identification is a crossracial identification (also referred to as the cross-race effect) (Malpass & Kravitz, 1987).
In this particular case, both of the eyewitnesses that identified Lucas McGregor as the
shooter, Wilma Thompson and Charles Anderson, are African-American, while the
defendant, Mr. McGregor, is Caucasian. According to the cross-race effect, the AfricanAmerican eyewitnesses in this case are more likely to falsely identify a Caucasian face
than an African-American face. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that
individuals are much more likely to be able to accurately identify an own-race face
compared to an other-race face (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). In this case, the one
Caucasian eyewitness, Roberta Walker, insists that Mr. McGregor was not the third
accomplice. According to the cross-race effect, Ms. Walker's eyewitness account is
much more likely to be accurate, as it pertains to making a same-race identification, than
the cross-racial identifications made by the two African-American eyewitnesses.
The defense has called an expert witness to testify about cross-racial identification. The
following is a transcript of the expert witness's testimony.
Racially Relevant Expert Witness Testimony = Absent
There is an increasing body of evidence that demonstrates the inherent unreliability of
eyewitness identification (e.g., Kassin, Ellsworth, & Smith, 1994; Malpass & Kravitz,
1987; Wells & Murray, 1984, etc.). Many factors have been shown to undermine an
eyewitness's ability to make an accurate identification after the commission of a crime.
Once such factor that has consistently impaired the accuracy of identification is a
phenomenon called weapon focus. Weapon focus refers to a witness's attention being
focused on a weapon, if present, during the commission of a crime. Therefore, the
witness gives less attention to other factors during a crime, such as the physical features
and clothing of the perpetrator. As a result, the witness's ability to accurately recall
details about the perpetrator and environment are reduced (Kramer, Buckhout, &
Eugenio, 1990; Loftus, Loftus, & Messo, 1987; Steblay, 1992). In this case, not only was
a weapon present, but also it was an imminent threat, as one of the witnesses was shot
twice. Therefore, one would expect that the witnesses' ability to accurately identify the
perpetrators would be reduced.
The defense has called an expert witness to testify on the phenomenon of weapon focus.
The following is a transcript of the expert witness's testimony.
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Description of Psychological Expert Witness: Black Expert

Dr. Tyrone Parker is a 40-year-old African-American male who was born in Chicago,
Illinois. He received his bachelor's degree in Psychology from Vanderbilt University in
1987 and went on to complete a Ph.D. in clinical psychology from the State University of
New York at Albany in 1993. Since that time Dr. Parker has worked primarily in private
practice; however, he has continued to conduct research and has published several
articles. In addition, he is currently an adjunct faculty member at Ball State University.
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Description of Psychological Expert Witness: White Expert
Dr. Thomas O'Neill is a 40-year-old Caucasian male who was born in Chicago, Illinois.
He received his bachelor's degree in Psychology from Vanderbilt University in 1987 and
went on to complete a Ph.D. in clinical psychology from the State University of New
York at Albany in 1993. Since that time Dr. O'Neill has worked primarily in private
practice; however, he has continued to conduct research and has published several
articles. In addition, he is currently an adjunct faculty member at Ball State University.
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Psychological Expert Witness Testimony Transcript: Black Defendant-Black ExpertNot Racially Relevant Testimony

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA,
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION CREDIT ONE,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: No. 12-3-456789-1

vs.
LAMONT JACKSON,
Defendant

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Before:HONORABLE JOHN M. POWERS
Date :
January 5, 2001
Place :
Courtroom Number 2, 2nd Floor
46 E. Ohio Street
Indianapolis, IN 46204

COUNSEL PRESENT:
Mark K. Dempsey
United States Attorney's Office
10 West Market Street, Suite 2000
Indianapolis, IN 46204-3048
For - Plaintiff
Robert B. Mitchell
Indiana Federal Community Defenders
111 Monument Circle
Indianapolis, IN 46204
For - Defendant
Betty Ann Smith
Official Court Reporter
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(Not Racially Relevant Testimony = Weapon Focus)
Tyrone Parker is a witness called by the defense counsel. He is first duly sworn and
testified as follows:
THE COURT: Could you spell that please?
PARKER: T-Y-R-O-N-E P-A-R-K-E-R
MITCHELL (Defense Attorney): What is your present occupation, Dr. Parker?
PARKER: I am a clinical psychologist in private practice.
MITCHELL: Where is your practice located?
PARKER: My office is at 5210 North Meridian Street here in Indianapolis.
MITCHELL: Thank you, Doctor. Could you describe for us your educational
background?
PARKER: Yes.. .well, I received my bachelor's degree from Vanderbilt University in
Psychology in 1987 and then I received my Ph.D. in clinical psychology from the State
University of New York at Albany in 1993.
MITCHELL: Could you briefly describe your training and curriculum for your Ph.D. in
clinical psychology?
PARKER: Uh...my graduate training consisted of course work, several practicum
rotations and research, which included participating on research teams as well as
conducting my own research for my dissertation.
MITCHELL: I'd like to go back for a minute, if I may, to understanding what your
coursework consisted of. Did you have any areas of specialization?
PARKER: Yes, actually. As clinical doctoral students we all took the same core group of
classes, such as assessment, research methods and clinical classes. However, I also had
some elective courses that allowed me to have a concentration in one area. I chose a
concentration in the area of cognition.
MITCHELL: So you focused on the area of thinking?
PARKER: Well, it certainly encompasses thinking (chuckle), but more specifically, I
examined memory, reasoning, perception and decision-making.
MITCHELL: Did you ever study anything related to eyewitness reliability?
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PARKER: Yes, actually, most of the literature on eyewitness reliability comes out of
cognitive psychology.
MITCHELL: What other training have you had regarding eyewitness identification?
PARKER: During my first two years in the doctoral program I participated on a research
team with a well-respected professor that was conducting the leading research in the area
of eyewitness identification at the time. I later went on to focus my doctoral dissertation
on several factors that affect eyewitness accuracy.
MITCHELL: Since finishing your Ph.D., have you done any other work related to
eyewitness reliability?
PARKER: Yes, I have continued to conduct research on the topic and have published
several peer-reviewed journal articles.
MITCHELL: What is the significance of the articles being peer-reviewed?
PARKER: This means that other researchers in the field review and critique the article
before it is published. These peer reviewers are examining the quality of scholarship,
relevance, appropriateness and so on.
MITCHELL: In other words, would it be fair to say that these peer reviewers make sure
the articles are up to snuff before publication?
PARKER: Yes.
MITCHELL: And is it fair to say that you have some special expertise and qualifications
in the area of eyewitness identification?
PARKER: Yes.
MITCHELL: Your Honor, I would like to have Dr. Parker recognized as an expert.
THE COURT: Let the record show that this witness has been qualified as an expert. You
may proceed, Mr. MITCHELL.
MITCHELL: Thank you, your Honor. Dr. Parker, how did you become involved with
this case?
PARKER: You contacted me, I believe on the referral of one of your colleagues from my
involvement in a previous case.
MITCHELL: Are you familiar with the facts of this particular case?
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DEMPSEY (Prosecutor): Ah.. .your Honor, I must object. The witness is not permitted
to comment on the particular circumstances of this case.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MITCHELL: I apologize, your Honor. Dr. Parker, what can you tell us about the
phenomenon of weapon focus?
PARKER: Weapon focus refers to a witness's visual attention being directed toward a
weapon, such as a gun or knife, while a crime is being committed. Since the weapon
draws the central focus, leaving less attention for other details in the environment, an
individual's ability to recall other details about the incident are reduced.
MITCHELL: When you say an individual's central attention is given to the weapon,
leaving less attention for other details in the environment, does that include details about
the perpetrator, such as facial features?
PARKER: Yes.
MITCHELL: Would it be fair to say that the presence of a weapon during the
commission of a crime can lead to reduced identification accuracy of the perpetrator?
Dempsey: Objection, your Honor. United States v. Frye established a standard in which
scientific testimony must be based on research findings that have gained general
acceptance in the field.
THE COURT: Dr. Parker is an expert witness who can testify.. .objection overruled. The
witness may answer.
PARKER: Yes.
MITCHELL: Thank you, your Honor. Dr. Parker is there any scientific research to
support the assertion that the presence of a weapon during a crime can lead to reduced
identification accuracy?
PARKER: Yes. In a meta-analytic review of studies MITCHELL: Ah.. .excuse me Dr. Parker, what exactly is a meta-analytic review?
PARKER: Oh, sorry, a meta-analytic review combines or synthesizes previous separate
but related studies, in this case studies related to weapon focus, by using various
statistical methods.
MITCHELL: Thank you. Please continue with your explanation, Mr. Parker.
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PARKER: Yes.. .so a meta-analytic review conducted by Nancy Mehrkens Steblay,
published in 1992, that examined 19 experimental tests on weapon focus found that both
lineup identification and participants' memory for characteristics of the perpetrator were
reduced in the presence of a weapon.
THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Dempsey, it sounds like there are research findings to support
this assertion. Your objection is overruled and Dr. Parker's last response will remain in
the record as professional opinion. You may continue Mr. MITCHELL.
MITCHELL: Mr. Parker, if an eyewitness is injured by the perpetrator's weapon.. .For
instance, if the perpetrator shoots an eyewitness, could that affect the eyewitness's ability
to identify the perpetrator?
PARKER: Possibly.. .yes. In 1990, Kramer, Buckhout and Eugenio examined the effects
of both arousal level and weapon visibility.
MITCHELL: Ah.. .Mr. Parker, could you define what you mean by "arousal level"?
PARKER: Certainly. I am simply referring to one's level of anxiety.
MITCHELL: Thank you, Mr. Parker. Please continue.
PARKER: As I was saying, these researchers found that the participants with the lowest
recall of the perpetrator's features were those with the highest levels of arousal in the
presence of a visible weapon. I suspect that arousal level of both the shooting victim and
anyone else not involved in the commission of the crime in close proximity would
experience a sharp increase in arousal, leading to reduced ability to accurately recall the
features of the perpetrator.
DEMPSEY: I'm sorry your Honor. I must object. Move to strike the witness's last
response on the basis that the witness is simply speculating here. The witness is unable
to offer any studies or research that would directly answer the question.
THE COURT: I have to agree with Mr. Dempsey here. Mr. Parker's opinion does not
seem to be based on any research that has examined the effect of an eyewitness being
shot on his or her recall ability. Your objection is sustained, Dr. Dempsey. Mr.
MITCHELL, you may continue.
MITCHELL: Thank you, your Honor. I have no further questions for the witness.
THE COURT: Do you have any questions for the witness Mr. Dempsey?
DEMPSEY: No, your Honor. I have no questions for the witness.
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THE COURT: Okay, then we will break for lunch. We'll reconvene for our afternoon
session at 1:30.
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Psychological Expert Witness Testimony Transcript: Black Defendant-Black ExpertRacially Relevant Testimony
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(Racially Relevant Testimony = Cross Racial Identification)
Tyrone Parker is a witness called by the defense counsel. He is first duly sworn and
testified as follows:
THE COURT: Could you spell that please?
PARKER: T-Y-R-O-N-E P-A-R-K-E-R
MITCHELL (Defense Attorney): What is your present occupation, Dr. Parker?
PARKER: I am a clinical psychologist in private practice.
MITCHELL: Where is your practice located?
PARKER: My office is at 5210 North Meridian Street here in Indianapolis.
MITCHELL: Thank you, Doctor. Could you describe for us your educational
background?
PARKER: Yes... well, I received my bachelor's degree from Vanderbilt University in
Psychology in 1987 and then I received my Ph.D. in clinical psychology from the State
University of New York at Albany in 1993.
MITCHELL: Could you briefly describe your training and curriculum for your Ph.D. in
clinical psychology?
PARKER: Uh.. .my graduate training consisted of coursework, several practicum
rotations and research, which included participating on research teams as well as
conducting my own research for my dissertation.
MITCHELL: I'd like to go back for a minute, if I may, to understanding what your
coursework consisted of. Did you have any areas of specialization?
PARKER: Yes, actually. As clinical doctoral students we all took the same core group of
classes, such as assessment, research methods and clinical classes. However, I also had
some elective courses that allowed me to have a concentration in one area. I chose a
concentration in the area of cognition.
MITCHELL: So you focused on the area of thinking?
PARKER: Well, it certainly encompasses thinking (chuckle), but more specifically, I
examined memory, reasoning, perception and decision-making.
MITCHELL: Did you ever study anything related to eyewitness reliability?
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PARKER: Yes, actually, most of the literature on eyewitness reliability comes out of
cognitive psychology.
MITCHELL: What other training have you had regarding eyewitness identification?
PARKER: During my first two years in the doctoral program I participated on a research
team with a well-respected professor that was conducting the leading research in the area
of eyewitness identification at the time. I later went on to focus my doctoral dissertation
on several factors that affect eyewitness accuracy.
MITCHELL: Since finishing your Ph.D., have you done any other work related to
eyewitness reliability?
PARKER: Yes, I have continued to conduct research on the topic and have published
several peer-reviewed journal articles.
MITCHELL: What is the significance of the articles being peer-reviewed?
PARKER: This means that other researchers in the field review and critique the article
before it is published. These peer reviewers are examining the quality of scholarship,
relevance, appropriateness and so on.
MITCHELL: In other words, would it be fair to say that these peer reviewers make sure
the articles are up to snuff before publication?
PARKER: Yes.
MITCHELL: And is it fair to say that you have some special expertise and qualifications
in the area of eyewitness identification?
PARKER: Yes.
MITCHELL: Your Honor, I would like to have Dr. Parker recognized as an expert.
THE COURT: Let the record show that this witness has been qualified as an expert. You
may proceed, Mr. MITCHELL.
MITCHELL: Thank you, your Honor. Dr. Parker, how did you become involved with
this case?
PARKER: You contacted me, I believe on the referral of one of your colleagues from my
involvement in a previous case.
MITCHELL: Are you familiar with the facts of this particular case?
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DEMPSEY (Prosecutor): Ah.. .your Honor, I must object. The witness is not permitted
to comment on the particular circumstances of this case.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MITCHELL: I apologize, your Honor. Dr. Parker, what is the cross-race effect?
PARKER: The cross-race effect, also sometimes referred to as "own race bias," refers to
the tendency of members of one race to see members of other races as being more similar
in appearance to each other than they actually are. Said another way, people tend to
remember own-race faces better than faces of other, less familiar races.
MITCHELL: Is this phenomenon unique to any particular race or is it pretty uniform
across races?
PARKER: The cross-race effect is not unique to any particular race; however, there is
variation between races. Whites have demonstrated a significantly larger cross-race
effect than African-Americans on certain measures, but not others. For instance, Whites
are more likely to incorrectly identify an unfamiliar other-race face as familiar.
However, on other measures, such as the likelihood that they would correctly recognize a
familiar face is roughly the same. There is an even larger difference in the cross-race
effect between Whites and other racial minorities. That is, Whites have a significantly
higher false alarm rate and fewer correct identifications than non-Black racial minorities.
MITCHELL: How do you explain this difference?
PARKER: This is not yet completely understood. Some researchers have suggested that
it may be related to an individual's level of interracial contact. Since being categorized
as a racial minority means that one's racial group is smaller in size than the racial
majority, racial minorities, on average, are more likely to have greater contact with
Whites than Whites are with racial minorities.
DEMPSEY: Objection, your Honor. Move to strike this witness's last response that is
based on speculation rather than on research. United States v. Frye established a standard
in which scientific testimony must be based on research findings that have gained general
acceptance in the field.
MITCHELL: Your honor, United States v. Frye also states that scientific testimony can
be based in theory.
THE COURT: Since the witness stated that an explanation is not clear or completely
understood within the scientific community, the objection is sustained. The Court will
strike the witness's last response from the record. You may continue Mr. MITCHELL.
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MITCHELL: Dr. Parker, are you saying that individuals of one race are more likely to
mistakenly identify individuals of another race than members of their own race?
PARKER: Yes.
MITCHELL: So, let's say, hypothetically, you have two witnesses identify one
individual. One is a different race than the individual and one is the same race as the
individual. Is the same race individual more likely to make an accurate identification
than the other-race individual?
DEMPSEY: Objection, your Honor. Mr. MITCHELL is asking the witness to speculate.
Move to strike the witness's last response.
THE COURT: Mr. MITCHELL?
MITCHELL: Your Honor, I am simply asking the witness to apply the research findings
to an example to illustrate for the jurors how they may be practically applied.
THE COURT: I will allow it this time, Mr. MITCHELL; however, you need to keep the
witness away from speculation. Mr. Dempsey, your objection is overruled and Dr.
Parker's last response will remain in the record as a professional opinion. You may
continue.
PARKER: Well, of course there is individual variation; but based purely on statistics,
yes, the same race individual is more likely to make an accurate identification.
MITCHELL: Thank you, your Honor. I have no further questions for the witness.
THE COURT: Do you have any questions for the witness Mr. Dempsey?
DEMPSEY: No, your Honor. I have no questions for the witness.
THE COURT: Okay, then we will break for lunch. We'll reconvene for our afternoon
session at 1:30.
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(Not Racially Relevant Testimony = Weapon Focus)
Thomas O'Neill is a witness called by the defense counsel. He is first duly sworn and
testified as follows:
THE COURT: Could you spell that please?
O'NEILL: T-H-O-M-A-S O-'-N-E-I-L-L
MITCHELL (Defense Attorney): What is your present occupation, Dr. O'Neill?
O'NEILL: I am a clinical psychologist in private practice.
MITCHELL: Where is your practice located?
O'NEILL: My office is at 5210 North Meridian Street here in Indianapolis.
MITCHELL: Thank you, Doctor. Could you describe for us your educational
background?
O'NEILL: Yes.. .well, I received my bachelor's degree from Vanderbilt University in
Psychology in 1987 and then I received my Ph.D. in clinical psychology from the State
University of New York at Albany in 1993.
MITCHELL: Could you briefly describe your training and curriculum for your Ph.D. in
clinical psychology?
O'NEILL: Uh...my graduate training consisted of course work, several practicum
rotations and research, which included participating on research teams as well as
conducting my own research for my dissertation.
MITCHELL: I'd like to go back for a minute, if I may, to understanding what your
coursework consisted of. Did you have any areas of specialization?
O'NEILL: Yes, actually. As clinical doctoral students we all took the same core group of
classes, such as assessment, research methods and clinical classes. However, I also had
some elective courses that allowed me to have a concentration in one area. I chose a
concentration in the area of cognition.
MITCHELL: So you focused on the area of thinking?
O'NEILL: Well, it certainly encompasses thinking (chuckle), but more specifically, I
examined memory, reasoning, perception and decision-making.
MITCHELL: Did you ever study anything related to eyewitness reliability?
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O'NEILL: Yes, actually, most of the literature on eyewitness reliability comes out of
cognitive psychology.
MITCHELL: What other training have you had regarding eyewitness identification?
O'NEILL: During my first two years in the doctoral program I participated on a research
team with a well-respected professor that was conducting the leading research in the area
of eyewitness identification at the time. I later went on to focus my doctoral dissertation
on several factors that affect eyewitness accuracy.
MITCHELL: Since finishing your Ph.D., have you done any other work related to
eyewitness reliability?
O'NEILL: Yes, I have continued to conduct research on the topic and have published
several peer-reviewed journal articles.
MITCHELL: What is the significance of the articles being peer-reviewed?
O'NEILL: This means that other researchers in the field review and critique the article
before it is published. These peer reviewers are examining the quality of scholarship,
relevance, appropriateness and so on.
MITCHELL: In other words, would it be fair to say that these peer reviewers make sure
the articles are up to snuff before publication?
O'NEILL: Yes.
MITCHELL: And is it fair to say that you have some special expertise and qualifications
in the area of eyewitness identification?
O'NEILL: Yes.
MITCHELL: Your Honor, I would like to have Dr. O'Neill recognized as an expert.
THE COURT: Let the record show that this witness has been qualified as an expert. You
may proceed, Mr. MITCHELL.
MITCHELL: Thank you, your Honor. Dr. O'Neill, how did you become involved with
this case?
O'NEILL: You contacted me, I believe on the referral of one of your colleagues from my
involvement in a previous case.
MITCHELL: Are you familiar with the facts of this particular case?
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DEMPSEY (Prosecutor): Ah.. .your Honor, I must object. The witness is not permitted
to comment on the particular circumstances of this case.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MITCHELL: I apologize, your Honor. Dr. O'Neill, what can you tell us about the
phenomenon of weapon focus?
O'NEILL: Weapon focus refers to a witness's visual attention being directed toward a
weapon, such as a gun or knife, while a crime is being committed. Since the weapon
draws the central focus, leaving less attention for other details in the environment, an
individual's ability to recall other details about the incident are reduced.
MITCHELL: When you say an individual's central attention is given to the weapon,
leaving less attention for other details in the environment, does that include details about
the perpetrator, such as facial features?
O'NEILL: Yes.
MITCHELL: Would it be fair to say that the presence of a weapon during the
commission of a crime can lead to reduced identification accuracy of the perpetrator?
Dempsey: Objection, your Honor. United States v. Frye established a standard in which
scientific testimony must be based on research findings that have gained general
acceptance in the field.
THE COURT: Dr. O'Neill is an expert witness who can testify.. .objection overruled.
The witness may answer.
O'NEILL: Yes.
MITCHELL: Thank you, your Honor. Dr. O'Neill is there any scientific research to
support the assertion that the presence of a weapon during a crime can lead to reduced
identification accuracy?
O'NEILL: Yes. In a meta-analytic review of studies MITCHELL: Ah.. .excuse me Dr. O'Neill, what exactly is a meta-analytic review?
O'NEILL: Oh, sorry, a meta-analytic review combines or synthesizes previous separate
but related studies, in this case studies related to weapon focus, by using various
statistical methods.
MITCHELL: Thank you. Please continue with your explanation, Mr. O'NEILL.
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O'NEILL: Yes.. .so a meta-analytic review conducted by Nancy Mehrkens Steblay,
published in 1992, that examined 19 experimental tests on weapon focus found that both
lineup identification and participants' memory for characteristics of the perpetrator were
reduced in the presence of a weapon.
THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Dempsey, it sounds like there are research findings to support
this assertion. Your objection is overruled and Dr. O'Neill's last response will remain in
the record as professional opinion. You may continue Mr. MITCHELL.
MITCHELL: Mr. O'Neill, if an eyewitness is injured by the perpetrator's weapon.. .For
instance, if the perpetrator shoots an eyewitness, could that affect the eyewitness's ability
to identify the perpetrator?
O'NEILL: Possibly...yes. In 1990, Kramer, Buckhout and Eugenio examined the effects
of both arousal level and weapon visibility.
MITCHELL: Ah.. .Mr. O'Neill, could you define what you mean by "arousal level"?
O'NEILL: Certainly. I am simply referring to one's level of anxiety.
MITCHELL: Thank you, Mr. O'Neill. Please continue.
O'NEILL: As I was saying, these researchers found that the participants with the lowest
recall of the perpetrator's features were those with the highest levels of arousal in the
presence of a visible weapon. I suspect that arousal level of both the shooting victim and
anyone else not involved in the commission of the crime in close proximity would
experience a sharp increase in arousal, leading to reduced ability to accurately recall the
features of the perpetrator.
DEMPSEY: I'm sorry your Honor. I must object. Move to strike the witness's last
response on the basis that the witness is simply speculating here. The witness is unable
to offer any studies or research that would directly answer the question.
THE COURT: I have to agree with Mr. Dempsey here. Mr. O'Neill's opinion does not
seem to be based on any research that has examined the effect of an eyewitness being
shot on his or her recall ability. Your objection is sustained, Dr. Dempsey. Mr.
MITCHELL, you may continue.
MITCHELL: Thank you, your Honor. I have no further questions for the witness.
THE COURT: Do you have any questions for the witness Mr. Dempsey?
DEMPSEY: No, your Honor. I have no questions for the witness.
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THE COURT: Okay, then we will break for lunch. We'll reconvene for our afternoon
session at 1:30.
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(Racially Relevant Testimony = Cross Racial Identification)
Thomas O'Neill is a witness called by the defense counsel. He is first duly sworn and
testified as follows:
THE COURT: Could you spell that please?
O'NEILL: T-H-O-M-A-S O-'-N-E-I-L-L
MITCHELL (Defense Attorney): What is your present occupation, Dr. O'Neill?
O'NEILL: I am a clinical psychologist in private practice.
MITCHELL: Where is your practice located?
O'NEILL: My office is at 5210 North Meridian Street here in Indianapolis.
MITCHELL: Thank you, Doctor. Could you describe for us your educational
background?
O'NEILL: Yes.. .well, I received my bachelor's degree from Vanderbilt University in
Psychology in 1987 and then I received my Ph.D. in clinical psychology from the State
University of New York at Albany in 1993.
MITCHELL: Could you briefly describe your training and curriculum for your Ph.D. in
clinical psychology?
O'NEILL: Uh...my graduate training consisted of coursework, several practicum
rotations and research, which included participating on research teams as well as
conducting my own research for my dissertation.
MITCHELL: I'd like to go back for a minute, if I may, to understanding what your
coursework consisted of. Did you have any areas of specialization?
O'NEILL: Yes, actually. As clinical doctoral students we all took the same core group of
classes, such as assessment, research methods and clinical classes. However, I also had
some elective courses that allowed me to have a concentration in one area. I chose a
concentration in the area of cognition.
MITCHELL: So you focused on the area of thinking?
O'NEILL: Well, it certainly encompasses thinking (chuckle), but more specifically, I
examined memory, reasoning, perception and decision-making.
MITCHELL: Did you ever study anything related to eyewitness reliability?
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O'NEILL: Yes, actually, most of the literature on eyewitness reliability comes out of
cognitive psychology.
MITCHELL: What other training have you had regarding eyewitness identification?
O'NEILL: During my first two years in the doctoral program I participated on a research
team with a well-respected professor that was conducting the leading research in the area
of eyewitness identification at the time. I later went on to focus my doctoral dissertation
on several factors that affect eyewitness accuracy.
MITCHELL: Since finishing your Ph.D., have you done any other work related to
eyewitness reliability?
O'NEILL: Yes, I have continued to conduct research on the topic and have published
several peer-reviewed journal articles.
MITCHELL: What is the significance of the articles being peer-reviewed?
O'NEILL: This means that other researchers in the field review and critique the article
before it is published. These peer reviewers are examining the quality of scholarship,
relevance, appropriateness and so on.
MITCHELL: In other words, would it be fair to say that these peer reviewers make sure
the articles are up to snuff before publication?
O'NEILL: Yes.
MITCHELL: And is it fair to say that you have some special expertise and qualifications
in the area of eyewitness identification?
O'NEILL: Yes.
MITCHELL: Your Honor, I would like to have Dr. O'Neill recognized as an expert.
THE COURT: Let the record show that this witness has been qualified as an expert. You
may proceed, Mr. MITCHELL.
MITCHELL: Thank you, your Honor. Dr. O'Neill, how did you become involved with
this case?
O'NEILL: You contacted me, I believe on the referral of one of your colleagues from my
involvement in a previous case.
MITCHELL: Are you familiar with the facts of this particular case?
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DEMPSEY (Prosecutor): Ah.. .your Honor, I must object. The witness is not permitted
to comment on the particular circumstances of this case.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MITCHELL: I apologize, your Honor. Dr. O'Neill, what is the cross-race effect?
O'NEILL: The cross-race effect, also sometimes referred to as "own race bias," refers to
the tendency of members of one race to see members of other races as being more similar
in appearance to each other than they actually are. Said another way, people tend to
remember own-race faces better than faces of other, less familiar races.
MITCHELL: Is this phenomenon unique to any particular race or is it pretty uniform
across races?
O'NEILL: The cross-race effect is not unique to any particular race; however, there is
variation between races. Whites have demonstrated a significantly larger cross-race
effect than African-Americans on certain measures, but not others. For instance, Whites
are more likely to incorrectly identify an unfamiliar other-race face as familiar.
However, on other measures, such as the likelihood that they would correctly recognize a
familiar face is roughly the same. There is an even larger difference in the cross-race
effect between Whites and other racial minorities. That is, Whites have a significantly
higher false alarm rate and fewer correct identifications than non-Black racial minorities.
MITCHELL: How do you explain this difference?
O'NEILL: This is not yet completely understood. Some researchers have suggested that
it may be related to an individual's level of interracial contact. Since being categorized
as a racial minority means that one's racial group is smaller in size than the racial
majority, racial minorities, on average, are more likely to have greater contact with
Whites than Whites are with racial minorities.
DEMPSEY: Objection, your Honor. Move to strike this witness's last response that is
based on speculation rather than on research. United States v. Frye established a standard
in which scientific testimony must be based on research findings that have gained general
acceptance in the field.
MITCHELL: Your honor, United States v. Frye also states that scientific testimony can
be based in theory.
THE COURT: Since the witness stated that an explanation is not clear or completely
understood within the scientific community, the objection is sustained. The Court will
strike the witness's last response from the record. You may continue Mr. MITCHELL.
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MITCHELL: Dr. O'Neill, are you saying that individuals of one race are more likely to
mistakenly identify individuals of another race than members of their own race?
O'NEILL: Yes.
MITCHELL: So, let's say, hypothetically, you have two witnesses identify one
individual. One is a different race than the individual and one is the same race as the
individual. Is the same race individual more likely to make an accurate identification
than the other-race individual?
DEMPSEY: Objection, your Honor. Mr. MITCHELL is asking the witness to speculate.
Move to strike the witness's last response.
THE COURT: Mr. MITCHELL?
MITCHELL: Your Honor, I am simply asking the witness to apply the research findings
to an example to illustrate for the jurors how they may be practically applied.
THE COURT: I will allow it this time, Mr. MITCHELL; however, you need to keep the
witness away from speculation. Mr. Dempsey, your objection is overruled and Dr.
O'Neill's last response will remain in the record as a professional opinion. You may
continue.
O'NEILL: Well, of course there is individual variation; but based purely on statistics,
yes, the same race individual is more likely to make an accurate identification.
MITCHELL: Thank you, your Honor. I have no further questions for the witness.
THE COURT: Do you have any questions for the witness Mr. Dempsey?
DEMPSEY: No, your Honor. I have no questions for the witness.
THE COURT: Okay, then we will break for lunch. We'll reconvene for our afternoon
session at 1:30.
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(Not Racially Relevant Testimony = Weapon Focus)
Tyrone Parker is a witness called by the defense counsel. He is first duly sworn and
testified as follows:
THE COURT: Could you spell that please?
PARKER: T-Y-R-O-N-E P-A-R-K-E-R
MITCHELL (Defense Attorney): What is your present occupation, Dr. Parker?
PARKER: I am a clinical psychologist in private practice.
MITCHELL: Where is your practice located?
PARKER: My office is at 5210 North Meridian Street here in Indianapolis.
MITCHELL: Thank you, Doctor. Could you describe for us your educational
background?
PARKER: Yes.. .well, I received my bachelor's degree from Vanderbilt University in
Psychology in 1987 and then I received my Ph.D. in clinical psychology from the State
University of New York at Albany in 1993.
MITCHELL: Could you briefly describe your training and curriculum for your Ph.D. in
clinical psychology?
PARKER: Uh.. .my graduate training consisted of coursework, several practicum
rotations and research, which included participating on research teams as well as
conducting my own research for my dissertation.
MITCHELL: I'd like to go back for a minute, if I may, to understanding what your
coursework consisted of. Did you have any areas of specialization?
PARKER: Yes, actually. As clinical doctoral students we all took the same core group of
classes, such as assessment, research methods and clinical classes. However, I also had
some elective courses that allowed me to have a concentration in one area. I chose a
concentration in the area of cognition.
MITCHELL: So you focused on the area of thinking?
PARKER: Well, it certainly encompasses thinking (chuckle), but more specifically, I
examined memory, reasoning, perception and decision-making.
MITCHELL: Did you ever study anything related to eyewitness reliability?
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PARKER: Yes, actually, most of the literature on eyewitness reliability comes out of
cognitive psychology.
MITCHELL: What other training have you had regarding eyewitness identification?
PARKER: During my first two years in the doctoral program I participated on a research
team with a well-respected professor that was conducting the leading research in the area
of eyewitness identification at the time. I later went on to focus my doctoral dissertation
on several factors that affect eyewitness accuracy.
MITCHELL: Since finishing your Ph.D., have you done any other work related to
eyewitness reliability?
PARKER: Yes, I have continued to conduct research on the topic and have published
several peer-reviewed journal articles.
MITCHELL: What is the significance of the articles being peer-reviewed?
PARKER: This means that other researchers in the field review and critique the article
before it is published. These peer reviewers are examining the quality of scholarship,
relevance, appropriateness and so on.
MITCHELL: In other words, would it be fair to say that these peer reviewers make sure
the articles are up to snuff before publication?
PARKER: Yes.
MITCHELL: And is it fair to say that you have some special expertise and qualifications
in the area of eyewitness identification?
PARKER: Yes.
MITCHELL: Your Honor, I would like to have Dr. Parker recognized as an expert.
THE COURT: Let the record show that this witness has been qualified as an expert. You
may proceed, Mr. MITCHELL.
MITCHELL: Thank you, your Honor. Dr. Parker, how did you become involved with
this case?
PARKER: You contacted me, I believe on the referral of one of your colleagues from my
involvement in a previous case.
MITCHELL: Are you familiar with the facts of this particular case?
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DEMPSEY (Prosecutor): Ah.. .your Honor, I must object. The witness is not permitted
to comment on the particular circumstances of this case.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MITCHELL: I apologize, your Honor. Dr. Parker, what can you tell us about the
phenomenon of weapon focus?
PARKER: Weapon focus refers to a witness's visual attention being directed toward a
weapon, such as a gun or knife, while a crime is being committed. Since the weapon
draws the central focus, leaving less attention for other details in the environment, an
individual's ability to recall other details about the incident are reduced.
MITCHELL: When you say an individual's central attention is given to the weapon,
leaving less attention for other details in the environment, does that include details about
the perpetrator, such as facial features?
PARKER: Yes.
MITCHELL: Would it be fair to say that the presence of a weapon during the
commission of a crime can lead to reduced identification accuracy of the perpetrator?
Dempsey: Objection, your Honor. United States v. Frye established a standard in which
scientific testimony must be based on research findings that have gained general
acceptance in the field.
THE COURT: Dr. Parker is an expert witness who can testify.. .objection overruled. The
witness may answer.
PARKER: Yes.
MITCHELL: Thank you, your Honor. Dr. Parker is there any scientific research to
support the assertion that the presence of a weapon during a crime can lead to reduced
identification accuracy?
PARKER: Yes. In a meta-analytic review of studies MITCHELL: Ah.. .excuse me Dr. Parker, what exactly is a meta-analytic review?
PARKER: Oh, sorry, a meta-analytic review combines or synthesizes previous separate
but related studies, in this case studies related to weapon focus, by using various
statistical methods.
MITCHELL: Thank you. Please continue with your explanation, Mr. Parker.
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PARKER: Yes.. .so a meta-analytic review conducted by Nancy Mehrkens Steblay,
published in 1992, that examined 19 experimental tests on weapon focus found that both
lineup identification and participants' memory for characteristics of the perpetrator were
reduced in the presence of a weapon.
THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Dempsey, it sounds like there are research findings to support
this assertion. Your objection is overruled and Dr. Parker's last response will remain in
the record as professional opinion. You may continue Mr. MITCHELL.
MITCHELL: Mr. Parker, if an eyewitness is injured by the perpetrator's weapon.. .For
instance, if the perpetrator shoots an eyewitness, could that affect the eyewitness's ability
to identify the perpetrator?
PARKER: Possibly.. .yes. In 1990, Kramer, Buckhout and Eugenio examined the effects
of both arousal level and weapon visibility.
MITCHELL: Ah.. .Mr. Parker, could you define what you mean by "arousal level"?
PARKER: Certainly. I am simply referring to one's level of anxiety.
MITCHELL: Thank you, Mr. Parker. Please continue.
PARKER: As I was saying, these researchers found that the participants with the lowest
recall of the perpetrator's features were those with the highest levels of arousal in the
presence of a visible weapon. I suspect that arousal level of both the shooting victim and
anyone else not involved in the commission of the crime in close proximity would
experience a sharp increase in arousal, leading to reduced ability to accurately recall the
features of the perpetrator.
DEMPSEY: I'm sorry your Honor. I must object. Move to strike the witness's last
response on the basis that the witness is simply speculating here. The witness is unable
to offer any studies or research that would directly answer the question.
THE COURT: I have to agree with Mr. Dempsey here. Mr. Parker's opinion does not
seem to be based on any research that has examined the effect of an eyewitness being
shot on his or her recall ability. Your objection is sustained, Dr. Dempsey. Mr.
MITCHELL, you may continue.
MITCHELL: Thank you, your Honor. I have no further questions for the witness.
THE COURT: Do you have any questions for the witness Mr. Dempsey?
DEMPSEY: No, your Honor. I have no questions for the witness.
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THE COURT: Okay, then we will break for lunch. We'll reconvene for our afternoon
session at 1:30.
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(Racially Relevant Testimony = Cross Racial Identification)
Tyrone Parker is a witness called by the defense counsel. He is first duly sworn and
testified as follows:
THE COURT: Could you spell that please?
PARKER: T-Y-R-O-N-E P-A-R-K-E-R
MITCHELL (Defense Attorney): What is your present occupation, Dr. Parker?
PARKER: I am a clinical psychologist in private practice.
MITCHELL: Where is your practice located?
PARKER: My office is at 5210 North Meridian Street here in Indianapolis.
MITCHELL: Thank you, Doctor. Could you describe for us your educational
background?
PARKER: Yes... well, I received my bachelor's degree from Vanderbilt University in
Psychology in 1987 and then I received my Ph.D. in clinical psychology from the State
University of New York at Albany in 1993.
MITCHELL: Could you briefly describe your training and curriculum for your Ph.D. in
clinical psychology?
PARKER: Uh.. .my graduate training consisted of coursework, several practicum
rotations and research, which included participating on research teams as well as
conducting my own research for my dissertation.
MITCHELL: I'd like to go back for a minute, if I may, to understanding what your
coursework consisted of. Did you have any areas of specialization?
PARKER: Yes, actually. As clinical doctoral students we all took the same core group
classes, such as assessment, research methods and clinical classes. However, I also had
some elective courses that allowed me to have a concentration in one area. I chose a
concentration in the area of cognition.
MITCHELL: So you focused on the area of thinking?
PARKER: Well, it certainly encompasses thinking (chuckle), but more specifically, I
examined memory, reasoning, perception and decision-making.
MITCHELL: Did you ever study anything related to eyewitness reliability?
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PARKER: Yes, actually, most of the literature on eyewitness reliability comes out of
cognitive psychology.
MITCHELL: What other training have you had regarding eyewitness identification?
PARKER: During my first two years in the doctoral program I participated on a research
team with a well-respected professor that was conducting the leading research in the area
of eyewitness identification at the time. I later went on to focus my doctoral dissertation
on several factors that affect eyewitness accuracy.
MITCHELL: Since finishing your Ph.D., have you done any other work related to
eyewitness reliability?
PARKER: Yes, I have continued to conduct research on the topic and have published
several peer-reviewed journal articles.
MITCHELL: What is the significance of the articles being peer-reviewed?
PARKER: This means that other researchers in the field review and critique the article
before it is published. These peer reviewers are examining the quality of scholarship,
relevance, appropriateness and so on.
MITCHELL: In other words, would it be fair to say that these peer reviewers make sure
the articles are up to snuff before publication?
PARKER: Yes.
MITCHELL: And is it fair to say that you have some special expertise and qualifications
in the area of eyewitness identification?
PARKER: Yes.
MITCHELL: Your Honor, I would like to have Dr. Parker recognized as an expert.
THE COURT: Let the record show that this witness has been qualified as an expert. You
may proceed, Mr. MITCHELL.
MITCHELL: Thank you, your Honor. Dr. Parker, how did you become involved with
this case?
PARKER: You contacted me, I believe on the referral of one of your colleagues from my
involvement in a previous case.
MITCHELL: Are you familiar with the facts of this particular case?
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DEMPSEY (Prosecutor): Ah.. .your Honor, I must object. The witness is not permitted
to comment on the particular circumstances of this case.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MITCHELL: I apologize, your Honor. Dr. Parker, what is the cross-race effect?
PARKER: The cross-race effect, also sometimes referred to as "own race bias," refers to
the tendency of members of one race to see members of other races as being more similar
in appearance to each other than they actually are. Said another way, people tend to
remember own-race faces better than faces of other, less familiar races.
MITCHELL: Is this phenomenon unique to any particular race or is it pretty uniform
across races?
PARKER: The cross-race effect is not unique to any particular race; however, there is
variation between races. Whites have demonstrated a significantly larger cross-race
effect than African-Americans on certain measures, but not others. For instance, Whites
are more likely to incorrectly identify an unfamiliar other-race face as familiar.
However, on other measures, such as the likelihood that they would correctly recognize a
familiar face is roughly the same. There is an even larger difference in the cross-race
effect between Whites and other racial minorities. That is, Whites have a significantly
higher false alarm rate and fewer correct identifications than non-Black racial minorities.
MITCHELL: How do you explain this difference?
PARKER: This is not yet completely understood. Some researchers have suggested that
it may be related to an individual's level of interracial contact. Since being categorized
as a racial minority means that one's racial group is smaller in size than the racial
majority, racial minorities, on average, are more likely to have greater contact with
Whites than Whites are with racial minorities.
DEMPSEY: Objection, your Honor. Move to strike this witness's last response that is
based on speculation rather than on research. United States v. Frye established a standard
in which scientific testimony must be based on research findings that have gained general
acceptance in the field.
MITCHELL: Your honor, United States v. Frye also states that scientific testimony can
be based in theory.
THE COURT: Since the witness stated that an explanation is not clear or completely
understood within the scientific community, the objection is sustained. The Court will
strike the witness's last response from the record. You may continue Mr. MITCHELL.
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MITCHELL: Dr. Parker, are you saying that individuals of one race are more likely to
mistakenly identify individuals of another race than members of their own race?
PARKER: Yes.
MITCHELL: So, let's say, hypothetically, you have two witnesses identify one
individual. One is a different race than the individual and one is the same race as the
individual. Is the same race individual more likely to make an accurate identification
than the other-race individual?
DEMPSEY: Objection, your Honor. Mr. MITCHELL is asking the witness to speculate.
Move to strike the witness's last response.
THE COURT: Mr. MITCHELL?
MITCHELL: Your Honor, I am simply asking the witness to apply the research findings
to an example to illustrate for the jurors how they may be practically applied.
THE COURT: I will allow it this time, Mr. MITCHELL; however, you need to keep the
witness away from speculation. Mr. Dempsey, your objection is overruled and Dr.
Parker's last response will remain in the record as a professional opinion. You may
continue.
PARKER: Well, of course there is individual variation; but based purely on statistics,
yes, the same race individual is more likely to make an accurate identification.
MITCHELL: Thank you, your Honor. I have no further questions for the witness.
THE COURT: Do you have any questions for the witness Mr. Dempsey?
DEMPSEY: No, your Honor. I have no questions for the witness.
THE COURT: Okay, then we will break for lunch. We'll reconvene for our afternoon
session at 1:30.
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(Not Racially Relevant Testimony = Weapon Focus)
Thomas O'Neill is a witness called by the defense counsel. He is first duly sworn and
testified as follows:
THE COURT: Could you spell that please?
O'NEILL: T-H-O-M-A-S O-'-N-E-I-L-L
MITCHELL (Defense Attorney): What is your present occupation, Dr. O'Neill?
O'NEILL: I am a clinical psychologist in private practice.
MITCHELL: Where is your practice located?
O'NEILL: My office is at 5210 North Meridian Street here in Indianapolis.
MITCHELL: Thank you, Doctor. Could you describe for us your educational
background?
O'NEILL: Yes.. .well, I received my bachelor's degree from Vanderbilt University in
Psychology in 1987 and then I received my Ph.D. in clinical psychology from the State
University of New York at Albany in 1993.
MITCHELL: Could you briefly describe your training and curriculum for your Ph.D. in
clinical psychology?
O'NEILL: Uh.. .my graduate training consisted of course work, several practicum
rotations and research, which included participating on research teams as well as
conducting my own research for my dissertation.
MITCHELL: I'd like to go back for a minute, if I may, to understanding what your
coursework consisted of. Did you have any areas of specialization?
O'NEILL: Yes, actually. As clinical doctoral students we all took the same core group of
classes, such as assessment, research methods and clinical classes. However, I also had
some elective courses that allowed me to have a concentration in one area. I chose a
concentration in the area of cognition.
MITCHELL: So you focused on the area of thinking?
O'NEILL: Well, it certainly encompasses thinking (chuckle), but more specifically, I
examined memory, reasoning, perception and decision-making.
MITCHELL: Did you ever study anything related to eyewitness reliability?
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O'NEILL: Yes, actually, most of the literature on eyewitness reliability comes out of
cognitive psychology.
MITCHELL: What other training have you had regarding eyewitness identification?
O'NEILL: During my first two years in the doctoral program I participated on a research
team with a well-respected professor that was conducting the leading research in the area
of eyewitness identification at the time. I later went on to focus my doctoral dissertation
on several factors that affect eyewitness accuracy.
MITCHELL: Since finishing your Ph.D., have you done any other work related to
eyewitness reliability?
O'NEILL: Yes, I have continued to conduct research on the topic and have published
several peer-reviewed journal articles.
MITCHELL: What is the significance of the articles being peer-reviewed?
O'NEILL: This means that other researchers in the field review and critique the article
before it is published. These peer reviewers are examining the quality of scholarship,
relevance, appropriateness and so on.
MITCHELL: In other words, would it be fair to say that these peer reviewers make sure
the articles are up to snuff before publication?
O'NEILL: Yes.
MITCHELL: And is it fair to say that you have some special expertise and qualifications
in the area of eyewitness identification?
O'NEILL: Yes.
MITCHELL: Your Honor, I would like to have Dr. O'Neill recognized as an expert.
THE COURT: Let the record show that this witness has been qualified as an expert. You
may proceed, Mr. MITCHELL.
MITCHELL: Thank you, your Honor. Dr. O'Neill, how did you become involved with
this case?
O'NEILL: You contacted me, I believe on the referral of one of your colleagues from my
involvement in a previous case.
MITCHELL: Are you familiar with the facts of this particular case?
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DEMPSEY (Prosecutor): Ah.. .your Honor, I must object. The witness is not permitted
to comment on the particular circumstances of this case.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MITCHELL: I apologize, your Honor. Dr. O'Neill, what can you tell us about the
phenomenon of weapon focus?
O'NEILL: Weapon focus refers to a witness's visual attention being directed toward a
weapon, such as a gun or knife, while a crime is being committed. Since the weapon
draws the central focus, leaving less attention for other details in the environment, an
individual's ability to recall other details about the incident are reduced.
MITCHELL: When you say an individual's central attention is given to the weapon,
leaving less attention for other details in the environment, does that include details about
the perpetrator, such as facial features?
O'NEILL: Yes.
MITCHELL: Would it be fair to say that the presence of a weapon during the
commission of a crime can lead to reduced identification accuracy of the perpetrator?
Dempsey: Objection, your Honor. United States v. Frye established a standard in which
scientific testimony must be based on research findings that have gained general
acceptance in the field.
THE COURT: Dr. O'Neill is an expert witness who can testify.. .objection overruled.
The witness may answer.
O'NEILL: Yes.
MITCHELL: Thank you, your Honor. Dr. O'Neill is there any scientific research to
support the assertion that the presence of a weapon during a crime can lead to reduced
identification accuracy?
O'NEILL: Yes. In a meta-analytic review of studies MITCHELL: Ah.. .excuse me Dr. O'Neill, what exactly is a meta-analytic review?
O'NEILL: Oh, sorry, a meta-analytic review combines or synthesizes previous separate
but related studies, in this case studies related to weapon focus, by using various
statistical methods.
MITCHELL: Thank you. Please continue with your explanation, Mr. O'Neill.
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O'NEILL: Yes.. .so a meta-analytic review conducted by Nancy Mehrkens Steblay,
published in 1992, that examined 19 experimental tests on weapon focus found that both
lineup identification and participants' memory for characteristics of the perpetrator were
reduced in the presence of a weapon.
THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Dempsey, it sounds like there are research findings to support
this assertion. Your objection is overruled and Dr. O'Neill's last response will remain in
the record as professional opinion. You may continue Mr. MITCHELL.
MITCHELL: Mr. O'Neill, if an eyewitness is injured by the perpetrator's weapon...For
instance, if the perpetrator shoots an eyewitness, could that affect the eyewitness's ability
to identify the perpetrator?
O'NEILL: Possibly.. .yes. In 1990, Kramer, Buckhout and Eugenio examined the effects
of both arousal level and weapon visibility.
MITCHELL: Ah.. .Mr. O'Neill, could you define what you mean by "arousal level"?
O'NEILL: Certainly. I am simply referring to one's level of anxiety.
MITCHELL: Thank you, Mr. O'Neill. Please continue.
O'NEILL: As I was saying, these researchers found that the participants with the lowest
recall of the perpetrator's features were those with the highest levels of arousal in the
presence of a visible weapon. I suspect that arousal level of both the shooting victim and
anyone else not involved in the commission of the crime in close proximity would
experience a sharp increase in arousal, leading to reduced ability to accurately recall the
features of the perpetrator.
DEMPSEY: I'm sorry your Honor. I must object. Move to strike the witness's last
response on the basis that the witness is simply speculating here. The witness is unable
to offer any studies or research that would directly answer the question.
THE COURT: I have to agree with Mr. Dempsey here. Mr. O'Neill's opinion does not
seem to be based on any research that has examined the effect of an eyewitness being
shot on his or her recall ability. Your objection is sustained, Dr. Dempsey. Mr.
MITCHELL, you may continue.
MITCHELL: Thank you, your Honor. I have no further questions for the witness.
THE COURT: Do you have any questions for the witness Mr. Dempsey?
DEMPSEY: No, your Honor. I have no questions for the witness.
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THE COURT: Okay, then we will break for lunch. We'll reconvene for our afternoon
session at 1:30.
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(Racially Relevant Testimony = Cross Racial Identification)
Thomas O'Neill is a witness called by the defense counsel. He is first duly sworn and
testified as follows:
THE COURT: Could you spell that please?
O'NEILL: T-H-O-M-A-S O-'-N-E-I-L-L
MITCHELL (Defense Attorney): What is your present occupation, Dr. O'Neill?
O'NEILL: I am a clinical psychologist in private practice.
MITCHELL: Where is your practice located?
O'NEILL: My office is at 5210 North Meridian Street here in Indianapolis.
MITCHELL: Thank you, Doctor. Could you describe for us your educational
background?
O'NEILL: Yes.. .well, I received my bachelor's degree from Vanderbilt University in
Psychology in 1987 and then I received my Ph.D. in clinical psychology from the State
University of New York at Albany in 1993.
MITCHELL: Could you briefly describe your training and curriculum for your Ph.D. in
clinical psychology?
O'NEILL: Uh...my graduate training consisted of coursework, several practicum
rotations and research, which included participating on research teams as well as
conducting my own research for my dissertation.
MITCHELL: I'd like to go back for a minute, if I may, to understanding what your
coursework consisted of. Did you have any areas of specialization?
O'NEILL: Yes, actually. As clinical doctoral students we all took the same core group
classes, such as assessment, research methods and clinical classes. However, I also had
some elective courses that allowed me to have a concentration in one area. I chose a
concentration in the area of cognition.
MITCHELL: So you focused on the area of thinking?
O'NEILL: Well, it certainly encompasses thinking (chuckle), but more specifically, I
examined memory, reasoning, perception and decision-making.
MITCHELL: Did you ever study anything related to eyewitness reliability?
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O'NEILL: Yes, actually, most of the literature on eyewitness reliability comes out of
cognitive psychology.
MITCHELL: What other training have you had regarding eyewitness identification?
O'NEILL: During my first two years in the doctoral program I participated on a research
team with a well-respected professor that was conducting the leading research in the area
of eyewitness identification at the time. I later went on to focus my doctoral dissertation
on several factors that affect eyewitness accuracy.
MITCHELL: Since finishing your Ph.D., have you done any other work related to
eyewitness reliability?
O'NEILL: Yes, I have continued to conduct research on the topic and have published
several peer-reviewed journal articles.
MITCHELL: What is the significance of the articles being peer-reviewed?
O'NEILL: This means that other researchers in the field review and critique the article
before it is published. These peer reviewers are examining the quality of scholarship,
relevance, appropriateness and so on.
MITCHELL: In other words, would it be fair to say that these peer reviewers make sure
the articles are up to snuff before publication?
O'NEILL: Yes.
MITCHELL: And is it fair to say that you have some special expertise and qualifications
in the area of eyewitness identification?
O'NEILL: Yes.
MITCHELL: Your Honor, I would like to have Dr. O'Neill recognized as an expert.
THE COURT: Let the record show that this witness has been qualified as an expert. You
may proceed, Mr. MITCHELL.
MITCHELL: Thank you, your Honor. Dr. O'Neill, how did you become involved with
this case?
O'NEILL: You contacted me, I believe on the referral of one of your colleagues from my
involvement in a previous case.
MITCHELL: Are you familiar with the facts of this particular case?
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DEMPSEY (Prosecutor): Ah.. .your Honor, I must object. The witness is not permitted
to comment on the particular circumstances of this case.
THE COURT: Sustained.
MITCHELL: I apologize, your Honor. Dr. O'Neill, what is the cross-race effect?
O'NEILL: The cross-race effect, also sometimes referred to as "own race bias," refers to
the tendency of members of one race to see members of other races as being more similar
in appearance to each other than they actually are. Said another way, people tend to
remember own-race faces better than faces of other, less familiar races.
MITCHELL: Is this phenomenon unique to any particular race or is it pretty uniform
across races?
O'NEILL: The cross-race effect is not unique to any particular race; however, there is
variation between races. Whites have demonstrated a significantly larger cross-race
effect than African-Americans on certain measures, but not others. For instance, Whites
are more likely to incorrectly identify an unfamiliar other-race face as familiar.
However, on other measures, such as the likelihood that they would correctly recognize a
familiar face is roughly the same. There is an even larger difference in the cross-race
effect between Whites and other racial minorities. That is, Whites have a significantly
higher false alarm rate and fewer correct identifications than non-Black racial minorities.
MITCHELL: How do you explain this difference?
O'NEILL: This is not yet completely understood. Some researchers have suggested that
it may be related to an individual's level of interracial contact. Since being categorized
as a racial minority means that one's racial group is smaller in size than the racial
majority, racial minorities, on average, are more likely to have greater contact with
Whites than Whites are with racial minorities.
DEMPSEY: Objection, your Honor. Move to strike this witness's last response that is
based on speculation rather than on research. United States v. Frye established a standard
in which scientific testimony must be based on research findings that have gained general
acceptance in the field.
MITCHELL: Your honor, United States v. Frye also states that scientific testimony can
be based in theory.
THE COURT: Since the witness stated that an explanation is not clear or completely
understood within the scientific community, the objection is sustained. The Court will
strike the witness's last response from the record. You may continue Mr. MITCHELL.
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MITCHELL: Dr. O'Neill, are you saying that individuals of one race are more likely to
mistakenly identify individuals of another race than members of their own race?
O'NEILL: Yes.
MITCHELL: So, let's say, hypothetically, you have two witnesses identify one
individual. One is a different race than the individual and one is the same race as the
individual. Is the same race individual more likely to make an accurate identification
than the other-race individual?
DEMPSEY: Objection, your Honor. Mr. MITCHELL is asking the witness to speculate.
Move to strike the witness's last response.
THE COURT: Mr. MITCHELL?
MITCHELL: Your Honor, I am simply asking the witness to apply the research findings
to an example to illustrate for the jurors how they may be practically applied.
THE COURT: I will allow it this time, Mr. MITCHELL; however, you need to keep the
witness away from speculation. Mr. Dempsey, your objection is overruled and Dr.
O'Neill's last response will remain in the record as a professional opinion. You may
continue.
O'NEILL: Well, of course there is individual variation; but based purely on statistics,
yes, the same race individual is more likely to make an accurate identification.
MITCHELL: Thank you, your Honor. I have no further questions for the witness.
THE COURT: Do you have any questions for the witness Mr. Dempsey?
DEMPSEY: No, your Honor. I have no questions for the witness.
THE COURT: Okay, then we will break for lunch. We'll reconvene for our afternoon
session at 1:30.
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Jury Instructions

Indiana Jury Instructions Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions for the Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit Judicial Council, on November 30,1998, approved these instructions
in principle and authorized their publication for use in the Seventh Circuit.
THE FUNCTIONS OF THE COURT AND THE JURY
Members of the jury, you have seen and heard all the evidence and the arguments of the
attorneys. Now I will instruct you on the law.
You have two duties as a jury. Your first duty is to decide the facts from the evidence in
the case. This is your job, and yours alone.
Your second duty is to apply the law that I give you to the facts. You must follow these
instructions, even if you disagree with them. Each of the instructions is important, and
you must follow all of them.
Perform these duties fairly and impartially. Do not allow sympathy, prejudice, fear, or
public opinion to influence you.
Nothing I say now, and nothing I said or did during the trial, is meant to indicate any
opinion on my part about what the facts are or about what your verdict should be.
THE CHARGE - THE INDICTMENT
The indictment in this case is the formal method of accusing the defendant of an offense
and placing the defendant on trial. It is not evidence against the defendant and does not
create any inference of guilt.
The defendant is charged with:
•

One count of Robbery (IC 35-42-5-1), Class A felony

The defendant has pleaded not guilty to the charge.
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE
If you find the defendant not guilty of the offense of robbery as charged in Count 1, then
you must go on to consider whether the government has proved the offense of:
•

One count of Battery (IC 3 5-42-2-1), Class C felony

The defendant has pleaded not guilty to the charge.
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Definition of Charges:
IC 35-42-5-1
Robbery
35-42-5-1 Sec. 1. A person who knowingly or intentionally takes property from
another person or from the presence of another person:
(1) by using or threatening the use of force on any person; or
(2) by putting any person in fear; commits robbery, a Class A felony if it results in
serious bodily injury to any person other than a defendant.
As added by Acts 1977, P.L.340, SEC.39. Amended by Acts 1982, P.L.204, SEC.34;
P.L. 186-1984, SEC. 1.
IC 35-42-2-1
Battery
35-42-2-1 Sec. 1. (a) A person who knowingly or intentionally touches another person
in a rude, insolent, or angry manner commits battery, a Class C felony if it results in
serious bodily injury to any other person or if it is committed by means of a deadly
weapon;
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Juror Post-Trial Questionnaire: Black Defendant-Black Expert

INSTRUCTIONS: Please read each question carefully, and circle the number that
corresponds to your answer. Take your time and consider each option before selecting
your response. Select only one response for each item.
1. Based upon the definition of Robbery and the jury instructions you have been
given, what is your verdict on one count of Robbery for Lamont Jackson?
1
2

=
=

Guilty
Not Guilty

2. Based upon the definition of Battery and the jury instructions you have been
given, what is your verdict on one count of Battery for Lamont Jackson?
1
2

=
=

Guilty
Not Guilty

3. Based upon the information you were given in the Brief Case Description and
expert witness testimony, how likely or unlikely is it that Lamont Jackson is
guilty?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

extremely unlikely
very unlikely
somewhat unlikely
guilt/innocence are equally likely
somewhat likely
very likely
extremely likely

4. How confident are you in your verdict on the charge of Robbery in this case?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

=
=
=
=
=
=

not at all confident
slightly confident
somewhat confident
moderately confident
fairly confident
highly confident
completely confident
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5. How confident are you in your verdict on the charge of Battery in this case?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

not at all confident
slightly confident
somewhat confident
moderately confident
fairly confident
highly confident
completely confident

ANSWER QUESTION #6 ONLY IF YOUR VERDICT IN QUESTION #1 WAS
"GUILTY." OTHERWISE, SKIP TO QUESTION #7.
6. What sentence do you believe Lamont Jackson should receive for his guilt on the
charge of Robbery in this case? (circle only one)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

no penalty
0 - 1 8 0 days
180 days - 1 year
1 - 3 years
3 - 8 years
8 - 2 0 years
2 0 - 5 0 years

ANSWER QUESTION #7 ONLY IF YOUR VERDICT IN QUESTION #2 WAS
"GUILTY." OTHERWISE, SKIP TO QUESTION #8.
7. What sentence do you believe Lamont Jackson should receive for his guilt on the
charge of Battery in this case? (circle only one)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

no penalty
0 - 1 8 0 days
180 days - 1 year
1 - 3 years
3 - 8 years
8 - 2 0 years
2 0 - 5 0 years

8. What most influenced your verdict?
1
2
3
4

=
=
=
=

The initial evidence presented by the prosecution
The initial evidence presented by the defense
The psychological expert testimony
Other, please explain:
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9. Was there any piece of evidence or testimony that you did not find believable?
1
2

=
=

No
Yes, please explain:

10. Do you think Lamont Jackson is or is not the type of person that engages in the
types of activities in which he stands accused?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

Lamont Jackson is definitely not the type
Lamont Jackson is probably not the type
Lamont Jackson is possibly not the type
Uncertain/Cannot Say
Lamont Jackson is possibly the type
Lamont Jackson is probably the type
Lamont Jackson is definitely the type

The following questions are about Lamont Jackson. Use the scale listed below each
question, and circle the number that best corresponds to your answer.
11. How much sympathy do you feel toward Lamont Jackson?
A great deal

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

no sympathy

7

no pity

of sympathy
12. How much pity do you feel for Lamont Jackson?
A great deal

1

2

3

4

5

6

of pity
13. How much anger do you feel toward Lamont Jackson?
A great deal 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
no anger
ofanger
14. In your opinion, how likely or unlikely is it that Lamont Jackson has engaged or
will engage in the behavior in which he stands accused?
Very likely
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
very unlikely
The following questions are about Wilma Thompson, the eyewitness who identified
Lamont Jackson in a lineup and was shot in the chest and head, Charles Anderson,
Ms. Thompson's boss, and Roberta Walker, also in the lending institution at the time
of the robbery. Use the scale listed below each question, and circle the number that
best corresponds to your answer.
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15. How much sympathy do you feel toward Wilma Thompson?
A great deal

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

no sympathy

of sympathy
16. How much pity do you feel for Wilma Thompson?
A great deal 1 2
3
4
5
6
7
of pity
17. How much sympathy do you feel toward Charles Anderson?
A great deal 1
3
of sympathy

no pity

no sympathy

18. How much pity do you feel for Charles Anderson?
A great deal

1

2

3

4

5

6

no pity

of pity
19. How much sympathy do you feel toward Roberta Walker?
A great deal

1

2

3

4

5

no sympathy

6

of sympathy
20. How much pity do you feel for Roberta Walker?

no pity

A great deal 1 2
3
4
5
6
of pity questions are about the expert psychological witness, Tyrone Parker.
The following
Please circle one of the numbers following each statement to indicate your level of
disagreement or agreement. This scale is as follows:
0
Disagree

1

6

7

8
Agree

In other words, if you DISAGREE with the statement, you would circle the "0." If you
AGREE with the statement, you would circle the "8." If you neither agree nor disagree,
you would circle the "4." The other numbers are to indicate varying degrees of opinion
in-between.
21. The witness is poorly qualified educationally.
0
Disagree

1

2

3

4

5
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6

7

8
Agree

22. The witness has a great deal of clinical experience.
0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

23. The witness has a poor professional reputation.
0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

24. The witness was comfortable on the witness stand.
0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

25. The witness had an awkward and unprofessional manner.
0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

26. The witness explained technical terms clearly.
0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

27. The witness inspired little confidence in his or her knowledge.
0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

28. The witness conducted a thoroughly professional evaluation of the defendant.
0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

29. The witness was quite unimpressive, as judged by the transcript.
0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

30. The witness was highly credible and trustworthy.
0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree
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31. The testimony was of little importance to the case.
0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

32. The testimony made sense, even to non-specialists or people outside the
profession.
0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

33. The testimony gave a negative impression of the witness's profession.
0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

34. The testimony showed that the witness had high professional and ethical
standards.
0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

35. The testimony was not very helpful to the jury in reaching a verdict.
0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

36. The testimony was very persuasive.
0
1
2
3
4
5
Disagree

6

7

8
Agree

37. Please add any comment you would like to make about the transcript you read.

38. According to the psychological expert testimony, what explanation was offered
on behalf of the defense?
1

=

2

=

3

=

The eyewitnesses may have made an incorrect identification due to
a phenomenon called weapon focus.
The eyewitnesses may have made an incorrect identification due to
a phenomenon referred to as the cross-race effect.
No explanation was offered by the expert testimony on behalf of
the defense.
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39. What racial group do you believe Lamont Jackson to be a member of?
1
2
3
4
5

=
=
=
=
=

Caucasian
Asian/Pacific Islander
African-American
Hispanic
Native American

40. What racial group do you believe the two witnesses who identified Lamont
Jackson as one of the perpetrators of the crime to be a member of?
1
2
3
4
5

=
=
=
=
=

Caucasian
Asian/Pacific Islander
African-American
Hispanic
Native American

41. What racial group do you believe the psychological expert witness, Tyrone
Parker, to be a member of?
1
2
3
4
5

=
=
=
=
=

Caucasian
Asian/Pacific Islander
African-American
Hispanic
Native American
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Juror Post-Trial Questionnaire: Black Defendant-White Expert

INSTRUCTIONS: Please read each question carefully, and circle the number that
corresponds to your answer. Take your time and consider each option before selecting
your response. Select only one response for each item.
42. Based upon the definition of Robbery and the jury instructions you have been
given, what is your verdict on one count of Robbery for Lamont Jackson?
1
2

=
=

Guilty
Not Guilty

43. Based upon the definition of Battery and the jury instructions you have been
given, what is your verdict on one count of Battery for Lamont Jackson?
1
2

=
=

Guilty
Not Guilty

44. Based upon the information you were given in the Brief Case Description and
expert witness testimony, how likely or unlikely is it that Lamont Jackson is
guilty?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

extremely unlikely
very unlikely
somewhat unlikely
guilt/innocence are equally likely
somewhat likely
very likely
extremely likely

45. How confident are you in your verdict on the charge of Robbery in this case?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

not at all confident
slightly confident
somewhat confident
moderately confident
fairly confident
highly confident
completely confident
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46. How confident are you in your verdict on the charge of Battery in this case?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

not at all confident
slightly confident
somewhat confident
moderately confident
fairly confident
highly confident
completely confident

ANSWER QUESTION #6 ONLY IF YOUR VERDICT IN QUESTION #1 WAS
"GUILTY." OTHERWISE, SKIP TO QUESTION #7.
47. What sentence do you believe Lamont Jackson should receive for his guilt on the
charge of Robbery in this case? (circle only one)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

no penalty
0 - 1 8 0 days
0 - 1 year
6 months - 3 years
2 - 8 years
6 - 2 0 years
2 0 - 5 0 years

ANSWER QUESTION #7 ONLY IF YOUR VERDICT IN QUESTION #2 WAS
"GUILTY." OTHERWISE, SKIP TO QUESTION #8.
48. What sentence do you believe Lamont Jackson should receive for his guilt on the
charge of Battery in this case? (circle only one)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

no penalty
0 - 1 8 0 days
0 - 1 year
6 months - 3 years
2 - 8 years
6 - 2 0 years
2 0 - 5 0 years

49. What most influenced your verdict?
1
2
3
4

=
=
=
=

The initial evidence presented by the prosecution
The initial evidence presented by the defense
The psychological expert testimony
Other, please explain:
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50. Was there any piece of evidence or testimony that you did not find believable?
1
2

=
=

No
Yes, please explain:

51. Do you think Lamont Jackson is or is not the type of person that engages in the
types of activities in which he stands accused?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

Lamont Jackson is definitely not the type
Lamont Jackson is probably not the type
Lamont Jackson is possibly not the type
Uncertain/Cannot Say
Lamont Jackson is possibly the type
Lamont Jackson is probably the type
Lamont Jackson is definitely the type

The following questions are about Lamont Jackson. Use the scale listed below each
question, and circle the number that best corresponds to your answer.
52. How much sympathy do you feel toward Lamont Jackson?
A great deal

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

no sympathy

7

no pity

of sympathy
53. How much pity do you feel for Lamont Jackson?
A great deal

1

2

3

4

5

6

of pity
54. How much anger do you feel toward Lamont Jackson?
A great deal 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
no anger
of anger
55. In your opinion, how likely or unlikely is it that Lamont Jackson has engaged or
will engage in the behavior in which he stands accused?
Very likely
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
very unlikely
The following questions are about Wilma Thompson, the eyewitness who identified
Lamont Jackson in a lineup and was shot in the chest and head, Charles Anderson,
Ms. Thompson's boss, and Roberta Walker, also in the lending institution at the time
of the robbery. Use the scale listed below each question, and circle the number that
best corresponds to your answer.
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56. How much sympathy do you feel toward Wilma Thompson?
A great deal

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

no sympathy

of sympathy
57. How much pity do you feel for Wilma Thompson?
A great deal 1 2
3
4
5
6
7
of pity
58. How much sympathy do you feel toward Charles Anderson?
A great deal 1 2
3
4
5
6
7

no pity

no sympathy

of sympathy
59. How much pity do you feel for Charles Anderson?
A great deal

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

no pity

of pity
60. A
How
much
do you feel toward Roberta Walker?
great
dealsympathy
1
of sympathy

2
3
4
5
61. How much pity do you feel for Roberta Walker?
A great deal
of pity

1

2

3

4

5

6

no sympathy
7

6

no pity

The following questions are about the expert psychological witness, Thomas O'Neill.
Please circle one of the numbers following each statement to indicate your level of
disagreement or agreement. This scale is as follows:
0
Disagree

1

7

8
Agree

In other words, if you DISAGREE with the statement, you would circle the "0." If you
AGREE with the statement, you would circle the "8." If you neither agree nor disagree,
you would circle the "4." The other numbers are to indicate varying degrees of opinion
in-between.
62. The witness is poorly qualified educationally.
0
Disagree

1

2

3

4

5
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6

7

8
Agree

63. The witness has a great deal of clinical experience.
0
Disagree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

64. The witness has a poor professional reputation.
0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

65. The witness was comfortable on the witness stand.
0
Disagree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

66. The witness had an awkward and unprofessional manner.
0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

67. The witness explained technical terms clearly.
0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

68. The witness inspired little confidence in his or her knowledge.
0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

69. The witness conducted a thoroughly professional evaluation of the defendant.
0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

70. The witness was quite unimpressive, as judged by the transcript.
0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

71. The witness was highly credible and trustworthy.
0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree
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72. The testimony was of little importance to the case.
0
Disagree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

73. The testimony made sense, even to non-specialists or people outside the
profession.
0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

74. The testimony gave a negative impression of the witness's profession.
0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

75. The testimony showed that the witness had high professional and ethical
standards.
0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

76. The testimony was not very helpful to the jury in reaching a verdict.
0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

77. The testimony was very persuasive.
0
1
2
3
4
5
Disagree

6

7

8
Agree

78. Please add any comment you would like to make about the transcript you read.

79. According to the psychological expert testimony, what explanation was offered
on behalf of the defense?
1

=

2

=

3

-

The eyewitnesses may have made an incorrect identification due to
a phenomenon called weapon focus.
The eyewitnesses may have made an incorrect identification due to
a phenomenon referred to as the cross-race effect.
No explanation was offered by the expert testimony on behalf of
the defense.
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80. What racial group do you believe Lamont Jackson to be a member of?
1
2
3
4
5

=
=
=
=
=

Caucasian
Asian/Pacific Islander
African-American
Hispanic
Native American

81. What racial group do you believe the two witnesses who identified Lamont
Jackson as one of the perpetrators of the crime to be a member of?
1
2
3
4
5

=
=
=
=
=

Caucasian
Asian/Pacific Islander
African-American
Hispanic
Native American

82. What racial group do you believe the psychological expert witness, Thomas
O'Neill, to be a member of?
1
2
3
4
5

=
=
=
=
=

Caucasian
Asian/Pacific Islander
African-American
Hispanic
Native American
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Juror Post-Trial Questionnaire: White Defendant-Black Expert

INSTRUCTIONS: Please read each question carefully, and circle the number that
corresponds to your answer. Take your time and consider each option before selecting
your response. Select only one response for each item.
83. Based upon the definition of Robbery and the jury instructions you have been
given, what is your verdict on one count of Robbery for Lucas McGregor?
1
2

=

Guilty
Not Guilty

84. Based upon the definition of Battery and the jury instructions you have been
given, what is your verdict on one count of Battery for Lucas McGregor?
1
2

=
=

Guilty
Not Guilty

85. Based upon the information you were given in the Brief Case Description and
expert witness testimony, how likely or unlikely is it that Lucas McGregor is
guilty?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

extremely unlikely
very unlikely
somewhat unlikely
guilt/innocence are equally likely
somewhat likely
very likely
extremely likely

86. How confident are you in your verdict on the charge of Robbery in this case?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

not at all confident
slightly confident
somewhat confident
moderately confident
fairly confident
highly confident
completely confident
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87. How confident are you in your verdict on the charge of Battery in this case?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

not at all confident
slightly confident
somewhat confident
moderately confident
fairly confident
highly confident
completely confident

ANSWER QUESTION #6 ONLY IF YOUR VERDICT IN QUESTION #1 WAS
"GUILTY." OTHERWISE, SKIP TO QUESTION #7.
88. What sentence do you believe Lucas McGregor should receive for his guilt on the
charge of Robbery in this case? (circle only one)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

no penalty
0 - 1 8 0 days
0 - 1 year
6 months - 3 years
2 - 8 years
6 - 2 0 years
2 0 - 5 0 years

ANSWER QUESTION #7 ONLY IF YOUR VERDICT IN QUESTION #2 WAS
"GUILTY." OTHERWISE, SKIP TO QUESTION #8.
89. What sentence do you believe Lucas McGregor should receive for his guilt on the
charge of Battery in this case? (circle only one)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

no penalty
0 - 1 8 0 days
0 - 1 year
6 months - 3 years
2 - 8 years
6 - 2 0 years
2 0 - 5 0 years

90. What most influenced your verdict?
1
2
3
4

=
=
=
=

The initial evidence presented by the prosecution
The initial evidence presented by the defense
The psychological expert testimony
Other, please explain:
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91. Was there any piece of evidence or testimony that you did not find believable?
1
2

=
=

No
Yes, please explain:

92. Do you think Lucas McGregor is or is not the type of person that engages in the
types of activities in which he stands accused?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

Lucas McGregor is definitely not the type
Lucas McGregor is probably not the type
Lucas McGregor is possibly not the type
Uncertain/Cannot Say
Lucas McGregor is possibly the type
Lucas McGregor is probably the type
Lucas McGregor is definitely the type

The following questions are about Lucas McGregor. Use the scale listed below each
question, and circle the number that best corresponds to your answer.
93. How much sympathy do you feel toward Lucas McGregor?
A great deal

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

no sympathy

of sympathy
94. How much pity do you feel for Lucas McGregor?
A great deal

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

no pity

of pity
95. How much anger do you feel toward Lucas McGregor?
A great deal 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
no anger
of anger
96. In your opinion, how likely or unlikely is it that Lucas McGregor has engaged or
will engage in the behavior in which he stands accused?
Very likely
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
very unlikely
The following questions are about Wilma Thompson, the eyewitness who identified
Lucas McGregor in a lineup and was shot in the chest and head, Charles Anderson,
Ms. Thompson's boss, and Roberta Walker, also in the lending institution at the time
of the robbery. Use the scale listed below each question, and circle the number that
best corresponds to your answer.
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97. How much sympathy do you feel toward Wilma Thompson?
A great deal

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

no sympathy

of sympathy
98. How much pity do you feel for Wilma Thompson?
no pity

A great deal 1 2
3
4
5
6
7
of pity
99. How much sympathy do you feel toward Charles Anderson?
A great deal 1
6
of sympathy
100.

no sympathy

How much pity do you feel for Charles Anderson?

A great deal
of pity

2

1

3

4

5

6

7

no pity

How much sympathy do you feel toward Roberta Walker?

101.

A great deal
of sympathy
102.

1

no sympathy

6

How much pity do you feel for Roberta Walker?

A great deal
of pity

1

2

3

4

5

6

no pity

The following questions are about the expert psychological witness, Tyrone Parker.
Please circle one of the numbers following each statement to indicate your level of
disagreement or agreement. This scale is as follows:
0
Disagree

1

8
Agree

6

In other words, if you DISAGREE with the statement, you would circle the "0." If you
AGREE with the statement, you would circle the "8." If you neither agree nor disagree,
you would circle the "4." The other numbers are to indicate varying degrees of opinion
in-between.
103.

The witness is poorly qualified educationally.

0
Disagree

1

2

3

4

5
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6

7

8
Agree

104.

The witness has a great deal of clinical experience.

0
1
Disagree
105.

6

7

8
Agree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

The witness explained technical terms clearly.

0
1
Disagree
109.

5

The witness had an awkward and unprofessional manner.

0
1
Disagree
108.

4

The witness was comfortable on the witness stand.

0
1
Disagree
107.

3

The witness has a poor professional reputation.

0
1
Disagree
106.

2

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

The witness inspired little confidence in his or her knowledge.

0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

110.
The witness conducted a thoroughly professional evaluation of the
defendant.
0
1
Disagree
111.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

The witness was quite unimpressive, as judged by the transcript.

0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree
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112.

The witness was highly credible and trustworthy.

0
1
Disagree
113.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

The testimony was of little importance to the case.

0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

114.
The testimony made sense, even to non-specialists or people outside the
profession.
0
1
Disagree
115.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

The testimony gave a negative impression of the witness's profession.

0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

116.
The testimony showed that the witness had high professional and ethical
standards.
0
1
Disagree
117.

2

3

4

5

6

8
Agree

The testimony was not very helpful to the jury in reaching a verdict.

0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

118.
The testimony was very persuasive.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Disagree
119.
read.

7

7

8
Agree

Please add any comment you would like to make about the transcript you
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120.
According to the psychological expert testimony, what explanation was
offered on behalf of the defense?
1

=

2

=

3

=

121.
1
2
3
4
5

The eyewitnesses may have made an incorrect identification due to
a phenomenon called weapon focus.
The eyewitnesses may have made an incorrect identification due to
a phenomenon referred to as the cross-race effect.
No explanation was offered by the expert testimony on behalf of
the defense.

What racial group do you believe Lucas McGregor to be a member of?
=
=
=
=
=

Caucasian
Asian/Pacific Islander
African-American
Hispanic
Native American

122.
What racial group do you believe the two witnesses who identified Lucas
McGregor as one of the perpetrators of the crime to be a member of?
1
2
3
4
5

=
=
=
=
=

Caucasian
Asian/Pacific Islander
African-American
Hispanic
Native American

123.
What racial group do you believe the psychological expert witness,
Tyrone Parker, to be a member of?
1
2
3
4
5

=
=
=
=
=

Caucasian
Asian/Pacific Islander
African-American
Hispanic
Native American
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Juror Post-Trial Questionnaire: White Defendant-White Expert

INSTRUCTIONS: Please read each question carefully, and circle the number that
corresponds to your answer. Take your time and consider each option before selecting
your response. Select only one response for each item.
124.
Based upon the definition of Robbery and the jury instructions you have
been given, what is your verdict on one count of Robbery for Lucas McGregor?
1
2

=
=

Guilty
Not Guilty

125.
Based upon the definition of Battery and the jury instructions you have
been given, what is your verdict on one count of Battery for Lucas McGregor?
1
2

=
=

Guilty
Not Guilty

126.
Based upon the information you were given in the Brief Case Description
and expert witness testimony, how likely or unlikely is it that Lucas McGregor is
guilty?
II

ii
II

II
II

it ii

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

extremely unlikely
very unlikely
somewhat unlikely
guilt/innocence are equally likely
somewhat likely
very likely
extremely likely

How confident are you in your verdict on
127.
case?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

=
=

=

not at all confident
slightly confident
somewhat confident
moderately confident
fairly confident
highly confident
completely confident
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128.
How confident are you in your verdict on the charge of Battery in this
case?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

not at all confident
slightly confident
somewhat confident
moderately confident
fairly confident
highly confident
completely confident

ANSWER QUESTION #6 ONLY IF YOUR VERDICT IN QUESTION #1 WAS
"GUILTY." OTHERWISE, SKIP TO QUESTION #7.
129.
What sentence do you believe Lucas McGregor should receive for his
guilt on the charge of Robbery in this case? (circle only one)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

no penalty
0 - 1 8 0 days
0 - 1 year
6 months - 3 years
2 - 8 years
6 - 2 0 years
2 0 - 5 0 years

ANSWER QUESTION #7 ONLY IF YOUR VERDICT IN QUESTION #2 WAS
"GUILTY." OTHERWISE, SKIP TO QUESTION #8.
130.
What sentence do you believe Lucas McGregor should receive for his
guilt on the charge of Battery in this case? (circle only one)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
131.
1
2
3
4

=
=
=
=
=
=

no penalty
0 - 1 8 0 days
0 - 1 year
6 months - 3 years
2 - 8 years
6 - 2 0 years
2 0 - 5 0 years

What most influenced your verdict?
=
=
=
=

The initial evidence presented by the prosecution
The initial evidence presented by the defense
The psychological expert testimony
Other, please explain:
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132.
Was there any piece of evidence or testimony that you did not find
believable?
1
2

=
=

No
Yes, please explain:

133.
Do you think Lucas McGregor is or is not the type of person that engages
in the types of activities in which he stands accused?
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

=
=
=
=
=
=
=

Lucas McGregor is definitely not the type
Lucas McGregor is probably not the type
Lucas McGregor is possibly not the type
Uncertain/Cannot Say
Lucas McGregor is possibly the type
Lucas McGregor is probably the type
Lucas McGregor is definitely the type

The following questions are about Lucas McGregor. Use the scale listed below each
question, and circle the number that best corresponds to your answer.
134.

How much sympathy do you feel toward Lucas McGregor?

A great deal

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

no sympathy

7

no pity

of sympathy
135.

How much pity do you feel for Lucas McGregor?

A great deal

1

2

3

4

5

6

of pity
136.

How much anger do you feel toward Lucas McGregor?

A great deal 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
no anger
ofanger
137.
In your opinion, how likely or unlikely is it that Lucas McGregor has
engaged or will engage in the behavior in which he stands accused?
Very likely
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
very unlikely
The following questions are about Wilma Thompson, the eyewitness who identified
Lucas McGregor in a lineup and was shot in the chest and head, Charles Anderson,
Ms. Thompson's boss, and Roberta Walker, also in the lending institution at the time
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of the robbery. Use the scale listed below each question, and circle the number that
best corresponds to your answer.
138.

How much sympathy do you feel toward Wilma Thompson?

A great deal

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

no sympathy

of sympathy
139.

How much pity do you feel for Wilma Thompson?

A great deal 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
no pity
of pity
140.
How much sympathy do you feel toward Charles Anderson?
A great deal 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
no sympathy
of sympathy
141.

How much pity do you feel for Charles Anderson?

A great deal

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

no pity

of pity
142.

How much sympathy do you feel toward Roberta Walker?

A great deal

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

no sympathy

of sympathy
143.

How much pity do you feel for Roberta Walker?

A great deal 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
no pity
of pity
The following questions are about the expert psychological witness, Thomas O'Neill.
Please circle one of the numbers following each statement to indicate your level of
disagreement or agreement. This scale is as follows:
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Disagree
Agree
In other words, if you DISAGREE with the statement, you would circle the "0." If you
AGREE with the statement, you would circle the "8." If you neither agree nor disagree,
you would circle the "4." The other numbers are to indicate varying degrees of opinion
in-between.
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144.

The witness is poorly qualified educationally.

0
1
Disagree
145.

Agree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

The witness conducted a thoroughly professional evaluation of the
defendant.

0
1
Disagree
152.

8

The witness inspired little confidence in his or her knowledge.

0
1
Disagree
151.

7

The witness explained technical terms clearly.

0
1
Disagree
150.

6

The witness had an awkward and unprofessional manner.

0
1
Disagree
149.

5

The witness was comfortable on the witness stand.

0
1
Disagree
148.

4

The witness has a poor professional reputation.

0
1
Disagree
147.

3

The witness has a great deal of clinical experience.

0
1
Disagree
146.

2

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

The witness was quite unimpressive, as judged by the transcript.

0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree
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153.

The witness was highly credible and trustworthy.

0
1
Disagree
154.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

The testimony was of little importance to the case.

0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

155.
The testimony made sense, even to non-specialists or people outside the
profession.
0
1
Disagree
156.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

The testimony gave a negative impression of the witness's profession.

0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

157.
The testimony showed that the witness had high professional and ethical
standards.
0
1
Disagree
158.

2

3

4

5

6

8
Agree

The testimony was not very helpful to the jury in reaching a verdict.

0
1
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Agree

159.
The testimony was very persuasive.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Disagree
160.
read.

7

7

8
Agree

Please add any comment you would like to make about the transcript you
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161.
According to the psychological expert testimony, what explanation was
offered on behalf of the defense?
1

=

2

=

3

=

162.
1
2
3
4
5

The eyewitnesses may have made an incorrect identification due to
a phenomenon called weapon focus.
The eyewitnesses may have made an incorrect identification due to
a phenomenon referred to as the cross-race effect.
No explanation was offered by the expert testimony on behalf of
the defense.

What racial group do you believe Lucas McGregor to be a member of?
=
=
=
=
=

Caucasian
Asian/Pacific Islander
African-American
Hispanic
Native American

163.
What racial group do you believe the two witnesses who identified Lucas
McGregor as one of the perpetrators of the crime to be a member of?
1
2
3
4
5

=
=
=
=
=

Caucasian
Asian/Pacific Islander
African-American
Hispanic
Native American

164.
What racial group do you believe the psychological expert witness,
Thomas O'Neill, to be a member of?
1
2
3
4
5

=
=
=
=
=

Caucasian
Asian/Pacific Islander
African-American
Hispanic
Native American
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Appendix X
Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986):
"Social Attitudes Survey"
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Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986):
"Social Attitudes Survey"

The following survey has a number of opinion statements about public issues, politics,
and your beliefs about the world, in general. Please circle one of the numbers following
each statement to indicate your level of disagreement or agreement. The scale is as
follows:
1
Disagree
Strongly

2
Disagree
Somewhat

3
Neither Agree
Nor Disagree
or
No Opinion

4
Agree
Somewhat

5
Agree
Strongly

Your responses will be completely confidential. The focus of this survey is on group
averages and percentages so do not put your name or any identifying information on this
form.
1.

Women should have to promise to obey their husbands when they get married.
1

2.

5

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in
government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our
society who are trying to create doubt in people's minds.
1

5.

4

It is important to protect the rights of radicals and deviants in all ways.
1

4.

3

Over the past few years, the government and news media have shown more
respect to Blacks than they deserve.
1

3.

2

2

3

4

5

It is easy to understand the anger of Black people in America.
1

2

3

Modern Racism Scale item

219

4

5

6.

Gays and Lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else.
1

7.

4

5

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

A "woman's place" should be wherever she wants to be. The days when
women are submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong
strictly in the past.
1

13.

3

Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children
should learn.
1

12.

2

Over the past few years, Black have gotten more economically than they
deserve.
1

11.

5

There is no "ONE right way" to live life; everybody has to create their own
way.
1

10.

4

It may be considered old fashioned by some, but having a normal, proper
appearance is still the mark of a gentleman, and especially, a lady.
1

9.

3

Discrimination against Blacks is no longer a problem in the United States.
1

8.

2

2

3

4

5

Blacks have more influence upon school desegregation plans (affirmative
action plans) than they ought to have.
1

2

3

* Modern Racism Scale item
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4

5

14.

The facts on crime, sexual immorality, and the recent public disorders all
show we have to crack down harder on deviant groups and troublemakers if
we are going to save our moral standards and preserve law and order.
1

15.

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the
authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the "rotten apples" who are ruining
everything.
1

19.

5

Blacks should not push themselves where they are not wanted.
1

18.

4

Our country needs free thinkers who will have the courage to defy traditional
ways, even if it upsets many people.
1

17.

3

Blacks are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights.
1

16.

2

2

3

4

5

A lot of rules regarding modesty and sexual behavior are just customs which
are not necessarily any better or holier than those which other people follow.
1

2

3

Modern Racism Scale item
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4

5

